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1
Shaping Administrative Practice: The
Institutional Habitus
For me that is ok. […] I mean, if someone uses a word like that who only
started [working here] three months ago, I might ask: ‘Hey, what does that
mean for you?’ But if [the decision] comes from someone whom I consider to
be a valuable, serious, good employee, then I’ll allow it, because I know, I can
imagine what it means for them.1
So said Nora. We were talking about words like “plausible”, “comprehensi-
ble”, “logical” and “realistic”. I had noticed that terms such as these occurred
repeatedly in asylum decisions so I questioned her about them. Nora, not her
real name but the name I have given her, is a state official working in the Swiss
State Secretariat for Migration (SEM). She is the head of an asylum unit and,
as such, one of her responsibilities is checking SEM decision-makers’ asylum
decisions before they are sent out to the applicants. In order for asylum
seekers to be legally recognised as refugees and be granted asylum, their
claims must be deemed (predominantly) credible by the decision-makers. It
was these practices of assessing asylum seekers’ credibility—or, more precisely,
that of their claims—that Nora and I were discussing. From my observation
of SEM asylum decision-makers at work as well as the analysis of case files,
I knew decision-makers often used terms such as “plausible”, “comprehen-
sible”, “logical” and “realistic” to substantiate their reasoning in credibility
assessments. I asked Nora about the different criteria and in her reply quoted
1Nora, head of asylum unit, headquarters, interview transcript, my own translation.
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above, she claims that she “knows” or can at least “imagine what it means”
for her experienced employees when they say that an asylum narrative is,
for example, “logical” or “realistic”. She thereby implies that she shares an
understanding of these concepts with her employees as well as an under-
standing of what credible narratives look or rather feel like. It is this kind
of shared implicit knowledge as well as shared understandings of what it
means to do one’s job well that are at the core of this book. To put it in
more general terms, I am interested in how state officials working in admin-
istrative organisations—hence, the people who “apply” state policies and laws
in their everyday work—come to think, feel, know and act in similar ways.
Studying what shapes and influences state officials’ everyday practices
is important, I argue, because it helps us understand the relatively stable
outcomes of administrative practice that can be observed from the outside.
Hence, this book is about the production of regularities in administrative
work. Starting from Max Weber’s ideal type of bureaucracy, the answer to the
question what generates regularities of administrative practice seems simple: it
is rule-bound conduct (see Weber 2013 [1978]: 220).2 However, as Weber’s
concept of the “ideal type” itself implies, in practice, administrative work
functions differently. Caseworkers do more than “merely” follow rules as has
been highlighted by much social science literature on administrative organ-
isations (see, for instance, Alpes and Spire 2014: 267; Calavita 2005; Eule
et al. 2019; Fuglerud 2004: 29; Heyman 1995, 2004, 2009; Liodden 2016:
68; Lipsky 2010; Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003). Building on this
broad body of literature, I argue that we must therefore also pay attention to
other factors—beyond written (legal) rules—that shape administrative case-
workers’ everyday practices. Such factors include organisational socialisation,
the ideological environments in which administrations and their officials
work, professional norms and values, embodied knowledge and routines as
well as decisional pragmatism (see also Alpes and Spire 2014; Dahlvik 2018;
Eckert 2020; Eule et al. 2019; Fassin and Kobelinsky 2012; Heyman 2004;
Johannesson 2017; Jubany 2017; Liodden 2016; Miaz 2017; Mountz 2010;
Poertner 2018; Probst 2012). However, at the same time, we should not
underestimate the role that rules play in guiding administrative work. Rules
are, as Hendrik Wagenaar writes, “simultaneously part of the problem as it
2The terms “bureaucracy” and “bureaucrats” carry negative connotations. They are often associated
with “red tape” and “officialism” and used as criticism (see Downs 1967: 1; Eckert 2020: 7; Poertner
2017: 12). In this book, I mostly use the terms “administration” and “office”. However, when referring
to literature which uses the terms “bureaucracy” and “bureaucrats”, I employ the same terminology.
For the people working in administrations, I use the terms “caseworkers”, “decision-makers” and
“officials” interchangeably.
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presents itself [to caseworkers], and part of the solution. […] [They] struc-
ture the situation […] [and] suggest what is possible and feasible” (2004:
650). Yet, as Wagenaar then goes on to claim, “for the rule to be able to act
as a rule it is important that [caseworkers] have a grasp of what the point
is of using that rule in a particular situation” (ibid.). Hence, without case-
workers’ understanding of and knowledge about these rules, they are socially
meaningless. It is only through officials’ mobilisation and interpretation of
rules when putting them to use that they “materialise in practice” (Eule et al.
2019: 90; see also Moore 1978; Sarat 2007). Without officials’ grasp of the
rules, the latter would therefore, in the words of Hendrik Wagenaar, merely
be a “dead letter” (2004: 650). This reflects the distinction made by socio-
legal scholars between “law in the books and law as practice” (Eule et al.
2019: 90). My main concern in this book is, therefore, how administrative
caseworkers come to understand, mobilise, interpret and thereby shape legal
rules in the course of their everyday work. I show how these practices of inter-
preting and “making” law are, on the one hand, shaped and structured by the
organisational environment the officials work in and are, on the other hand,
also constitutive of the latter.
Empirically, my analysis is based on a specific case study: asylum decision-
making in Switzerland. Thus, I study the everyday practices of decision-
makers working in the asylum divisions of the SEM, which is the state
administration in charge of taking first-instance asylum decisions in Switzer-
land. Caseworkers at the SEM decide whether asylum claims are credible or
not; whether asylum seekers are eligible for asylum or refugee status and—
in the case of negative asylum decisions—whether or not applicants should
be granted temporary protection. In my ethnography of everyday adminis-
trative practices in the SEM, I deal with the following questions: What are
dominant patterns of decision-making? How are these patterns generated?
How are they reproduced through everyday practice? And, most impor-
tantly, how do certain patterns of decision-making become the routine or
self-evident ones for decision-makers to follow? I am thereby particularly
interested in what Hendrik Wagenaar calls “the taken-for-granted routines:
the almost unthinking actions, tacit knowledge, fleeting interactions, practical
judgements, self-evident understanding and background knowledge, shared
meanings, and personal feelings that constitute the core of administrative
work” (Wagenaar 2004: 643).
Studying caseworkers’ grasp of legal rules—how they mobilise and inter-
pret them in their everyday work—is crucial because in much socio-legal
research as well as in so-called street-level bureaucracy studies, laws and poli-
cies are understood as something that must necessarily always be interpreted
when being fitted with specific situations or cases (Eule et al. 2019: 101;
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Hawkins 1992: 11; Heyman 2004: 493; Poertner 2018: 10–11; Wagenaar
2004: 651). Laws and policies are not simply “applied” or “implemented”
by the caseworkers, but rather become “shaped and mediated” (Wedel et al.
2005: 34) and are “(co-)produced” (Poertner 2018: 10) through officials’
everyday practices (see von Benda-Beckmann 1991; Brodkin 2011: 253–254;
Eckert, Behrens, and Dafinger 2012; Eule 2014; Shore and Wright 2011).
Hence, if we want to understand how asylum law and policy work, we must
study caseworkers’ everyday decision-making practices. Beyond this, studying
caseworkers’ everyday practices is also crucial for understanding the workings
of the state, since it allows us to analyse the “everyday production of state-
ness” (Eckert, Biner, Donahoe, and Strümpell 2012: 15, see also Beek 2016).
The state is thereby comprehended not as a monolithic entity, but rather as
something that is produced through the everyday practices of state officials
as well as through people’s imaginations of the state (Bierschenk and Olivier
de Sardan 2014; Eckert, Biner, Donahoe, and Strümpell 2012; Fassin 2015;
Gupta 1995; Mountz 2010; Sharma and Gupta 2006).
This idea that we must study “what lower-level officials do in the name of
the state” (Gupta 1995: 376) is at the core of numerous in-depth studies of
asylum and migration administrations and courts (see, for instance, Alpes
and Spire 2014; Calavita 1992; Dahlvik 2018; Eule 2014; Eule et al.
2019; Johannesson 2017; Jubany 2017; Kobelinsky 2015; Liodden 2016;
Miaz 2017; Mountz 2010; Poertner 2018; Probst 2012; Scheffer 2001;
Tomkinson 2018; see also the edited volumes by Gill and Good 2019 and
Lahusen and Schneider 2017). The authors all study asylum and migra-
tion case- and decision-making from a bottom-up perspective, describing
caseworkers’ everyday practices in great detail. Furthermore, several of them
share my interest in how everyday administrative practices become struc-
tured. They focus on different aspects shaping decision-makers’ everyday
practices, such as organisational socialisation (Dahlvik 2018; Heyman 2004;
Jubany 2017; Miaz 2017; Probst 2012), regulatory constraints (Dahlvik
2018; Miaz 2017), collective knowledge and embodied know-how (Dahlvik
2018; Jubany 2017; Liodden 2016; Poertner 2018), pragmatic considerations
(Eule et al. 2019; Poertner 2018), professional role perceptions (Johannesson
2017; Jubany 2017), accountability towards peers, authoritative bodies and
the general public (Heyman 2004; Johannesson 2017; Liodden 2016; Miaz
2017; Mountz 2010) as well as the broader political environment in which
the organisations are embedded (Alpes and Spire 2014; Dahlvik 2018; Fassin
and Kobelinsky 2012; Jubany 2017; Mountz 2010).
My book builds on these studies. I argue that it is important to not only
study what decision-makers do, but to also analyse what makes them do
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what they do, in order not to fall into the reductionist trap of bottom-up
approaches to the state that Didier Fassin cautions against. Fassin argues
that we should not treat practices of state-making as taking place in a
vacuum, since state “agents are confronted with explicit and implicit expecta-
tions formulated in discourses, laws and rules while keeping sizable space to
manoeuvre in the concrete management of situations and individuals” (2015:
4). If we want to understand how the state and policies work in practice, we
must, therefore, pay attention to the regulatory constraints and the ideolog-
ical environments under and in which these practices take place (ibid.: 6;
see also Eckert 2020). My study does this by developing the concept of the
institutional habitus, building on practice theory, and particularly the work
of Pierre Bourdieu. I understand the institutional habitus as the schemes of
thinking, acting, feeling and desiring that arise from caseworkers belonging
to and working in the SEM (see Bourdieu 1976; Terdiman 1987: 811).
However, before I describe my conceptualisation of the institutional
habitus in detail, I will outline two main discussions to which this book
makes a contribution through its focus on the shaping and structuring of
everyday practices. The first discussion is concerned with the role of so-
called discretionary practices in processes of bureaucratic decision-making.
The second relates to the widespread critique of credibility assessments in
asylum procedures as being “arbitrary” and based on “subjective beliefs”.
The Shaping of Discretion
Discretion is at the centre of much of the literature on street-level bureau-
cracies and I engage with these discussions for two main reasons. Firstly, I
challenge the binary distinction made both explicitly and implicitly in some
of the literature between “law”, on the one hand, and “discretion”, on the
other. This critique is, of course, not new (see, for instance, Eule et al. 2019:
86–89; Pratt 1999; Pratt and Sossin 2009). However, like Tobias Eule et al.,
when presenting my research to both academic and non-academic audiences,
I have “time and again encountered striking adherence to the idea of a regime
ruled by law” (2019: 83). People are often surprised and even outraged
by the fact that decision-makers interpret—rather than just “apply”—rules
when putting them to use in specific situations. Therefore, it seems crucial
to continue stressing the important role that discretionary practices play in
administrative decision-making. Discretion is what makes law work (see Eule
et al. 2019: 86, 105). It necessarily forms part of law in practice.
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Secondly, I argue against the individualist assumption about discretionary
freedom inherent in some of the street-level bureaucracy literature (see also
Eckert 2020). This critique, again, is not entirely new; several scholars
working on asylum and migration administrations have precisely pointed
to the importance of studying how discretionary practices are shaped (see
Brodkin 2012: 942; Dahlvik 2018; Hawkins 1992; Liodden 2016). Never-
theless, because much of the focus has been on the divergences of asylum
decision-making practices rather than on how regularities in administrative
practice are produced, I contend that the structuring of discretion has so far
received too little attention.
Since the 1960s, studies of administrations—mostly from the social
sciences—have stressed the importance of discretion for making law work
(see Eule et al. 2019: 86, 105; Pratt 1999; Pratt and Sossin 2009). Discretion
is seen as necessary for adapting the rules of law to individual cases (Pratt
and Sossin 2009: 303; see also Lipsky 2010; Maynard-Moody and Musheno
2003). By arguing that discretion is indispensable for making law work, these
scholars have, therefore, challenged the negative view on discretion held by
classical legal scholars such as Albert Dicey (1982 [1885]). According to
Anna Pratt and Lorne Sossin (2009), this “conventional view on discretion”
understood discretion as something negative; as something that needed to
be curbed as much as possible or even eliminated altogether, for instance
through establishing new legal rules or control mechanisms (see also Liodden
2016: 69). Furthermore, these “newer” approaches have also challenged the
quasi antagonistic relationship between law and discretion conveyed by the
“conventional view”, which held that “where the law ends, discretion begins”
(Pratt and Sossin 2009: 302).3 Yet, I argue that depending on how discretion
is conceptualised, some authors nevertheless continue to (implicitly) repro-
duce the binary between law and discretion. Hence, Tobias Eule, for example,
by drawing on Michael Lipsky, defines discretion as something which exists
in so-called “grey-zones”, zones in which decision-makers are “not bound by
a rule” (2014: 57; see also Lipsky 2010: 14–15). Thus, even if such practices
are seen to make law work, the binary distinction still prevails.
When we talk about “discretion” what do we mean? I can identify three
distinct meanings which are mainly ascribed to discretion in social science
literature. In the first, discretion seems to equate with room for manoeuvre.
It refers both to the leeway which street-level bureaucrats have in dealing with
3The latter understanding is nicely exemplified by Ronald Dworkin’s famous analogy of the doughnut.
“Discretion, like the hole in a doughnut”, Dworkin writes, “does not exist except as an area left open
by a surrounding belt of restriction” (1977: 31).
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cases, and to their obligation to make decisions. Thus, it is up to decision-
makers to decide which rules to “apply” in specific situations as well as when
to “apply” certain rules and when not to. This view is conveyed by Tobias
Eule et al. who write that
state officials always have room for manoeuvre and are thus confronted with
the obligation to take decisions – however different these might be. The
mobile police officer can decide whom to stop and search in the streets, which
workplace to control and whom to take in for interrogation. The frontline
caseworker can decide to detain or not to detain an individual lacking legal
residency […]. The asylum centre staff member or detention officer can decide
when and which disciplinary sanction to use against residents or detainees, and
when to overlook infractions to the house code. (2019: 82)
In a second use, discretionary practices are understood not only as
decision-makers’ actions of choosing between different legal rules and
deciding when (not) to “apply” them, but also as decision-makers’ actions of
interpreting legal rules when “applying” them to specific cases or situations
(see Eckert 2020: 15–16; Hawkins 1992: 11; Liodden 2016: 69). In a third
meaning, caseworkers’ actions of “establishing the ‘facts’ of […] [a] case” are
also referred to as discretionary practices (Liodden 2016: 68; see also Galligan
1990: 35; Hawkins 1992: 35).
These understandings differ from the term’s “formal” definition in Swiss
law. Thus, the Swiss Civil Code stipulates that “[w]here the law confers
discretion on the court or makes reference to an assessment of the circum-
stances or to good cause, the court must reach its decision in accordance
with the principles of justice and equity” (art. 4, Swiss Civil Code).4
Discretion (Ermessen) in Swiss jurisdiction is, therefore, understood as a
power given by written legislation and seen to exist only then. Contrarily,
in my understanding—which draws on the work of the above-mentioned
authors—discretion inevitably forms part of law and decision-making in legal
procedures, whether it is explicitly stated as such in the written legal text
or not (see also Heyman 2009: 367). Furthermore, I make use of the term
discretion regardless of whether decision-makers themselves feel that they
have discretion for taking decisions or not.
If we look finally at the etymology, as Tone Liodden shows, discre-
tion “stems from the Latin word ‘discretionem’ […] meaning ‘the power
4Similar definitions of discretion also exist in other civil law jurisdictions (see Eule 2014: 57; Eule
et al. 2019: 87; Liodden 2016: 68). In common law systems, discretion seems to be more self-
evidently accepted as playing a central part in decision-making.
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to make distinctions’” (2016: 75). This goes to the core of what admin-
istrative caseworkers do, for, as Don Handelman claims, “[t]here is no
bureaucracy without classification, without the invention of categories of
inclusion and exclusion” (1995: 280; see also Handelman 2004). This also
applies to the SEM where decision-makers’ work comes down to assigning
asylum claimants to one of four legal categories: refugee with asylum, refugee
with temporary admission, non-refugee with temporary admission (mostly
on the basis of so-called “humanitarian grounds”) and non-refugee without
temporary admission.
In contrast to the “conventional view on discretion”, the focus in contem-
porary social science literature is mainly on the discretionary practices
themselves rather than on “the restricting belt” governing them (see Liodden
2016: 69). Hence, as Anna Pratt and Lorne Sossin have noticed, social science
studies have mainly focused on the “‘extra-legal’ and ‘non-legal’ influences”
on decision-making (2009: 304). In connection to this, Julia Eckert notes
that some “ethnographic bottom-up perspectives on administration, policy
or the state suffer from a lack of attention to the impact of formal rules
and public ideologies – often due to the attempt to overcome reductionist
top-down analyses that do not attend to variation in bureaucratic practice”
(2020: 15–16, see also Fassin 2015: 5). This strong emphasis on variation
in bureaucratic practice is something that also applies to the literature on
asylum and migration administrations. Thus, much research is concerned
with divergences between different asylum or migration administrations,
different units within these administrations and, particularly, divergences
between individual decision-makers (see, for instance, Anker 1991; Eule
2014; Fassin and Kobelinsky 2012; Hamlin 2014; Johannesson 2017; Miaz
2017; Ramji-Nogales et al. 2009; Rehaag 2012; Spirig 2018).
My point is not to argue that such divergences do not exist. Research has
clearly shown that they do. Nevertheless, I argue that these divergences should
not be overestimated or, more particularly, that we should be careful not to
lose sight of the commonalities that exist. To give an example, some indi-
vidual asylum caseworkers might be more readily inclined to believe asylum
seekers’ stories than others, generating diverging outcomes. However, my
research has shown that even the decision-makers who are more inclined
to believe asylum seekers—the so-called “softies” in the SEM—still end up
rejecting the majority of asylum applications they deal with on the grounds of
non-credibility. Hence, I argue that it is these regularities that we should pay
attention to, inquiring into the different factors that generate such patterns.
Focusing on divergences brings the danger of (implicitly) assigning an
overly individualistic quality to discretionary practices. This also becomes
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apparent in the way the term discretion itself is sometimes conceptualised,
as shown in the following statement by Tony Evans who writes that “[a]s a
topic, discretion is concerned with the extent of freedom a worker can exer-
cise in a specific context and the factors that give rise to this freedom in
that context” (2010: 2). Similarly, Tobias Eule, referring to Norbert Cyrus
and Dita Vogel (2003) as well as Anna Triandafyllidou (2003), describes
discretionary practices as “‘deviant’ techniques of individual practice” (2014:
57). With this book, I attempt to overcome this “individualist bent” (Eckert
2020: 9–10). My approach—similar to that of Julia Dahlvik (2018) and
Tone Liodden (2016)—is, therefore, not only to study what caseworkers’
discretionary practices are—thus, how caseworkers deal with their room for
manoeuvre, interpret legal rules when “applying” them, assemble cases and
produce the necessary “facts” for taking decisions—but also to analyse ethno-
graphically the different factors that shape these discretionary practices. As
I will show in this book, the concept of the institutional habitus provides a
unique way of doing so by drawing attention to the unthinking, routine and
self-evident actions and judgements of decision-makers and how they come
to adopt such dispositions through institutional socialisation.
Assessing Credibility in Asylum Procedures:
A Subjective Matter?
In turning now to assessing credibility, we can see that an individualistic
quality is similarly ascribed to asylum decision-makers’ practices by many of
the critical studies on credibility determination in asylum procedures. Cred-
ibility determination plays a crucial role in asylum decision-making, since
credibility constitutes a major precondition for being recognised as a refugee
and receiving asylum. In Switzerland, the majority of asylum applicants are
rejected not because their claims do not fulfil refugee status requirements, but
rather because they are not perceived as being credible; a trend that has also
been observed in other countries, such as France (Fassin 2013: 47; Probst
2012), Germany (Probst 2012) and the UK (Kelly 2012: 759). Because
of the importance of credibility determination for asylum adjudication and
the widespread tendency to reject the majority of asylum applications on
the basis of non-credibility, credibility determination has attracted much
scholarly attention.5 Scholars engage critically with credibility assessment
5Audrey Macklin (1998), for instance, has dealt with credibility assessment (practices) in Canada,
Thomas Scheffer (2001, 2003) has done so in Germany, Nienke Doornbos (2005) and Thomas
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(practices), highlighting both the difficulty of taking decisions based on cred-
ibility, as well as the obstacles and injustices they generate for asylum seekers.
Much critique has thereby been directed at the so-called “subjectivity” and
“arbitrariness” of decision-makers’ credibility assessments as well as at a case-
worker’s so-called common sense, their understanding of what constitutes
normal or abnormal behaviour, and the role this has in credibility deter-
minations (see Einhorn 2009; Goodwin-Gill 1996; Kagan 2003; Macklin
1998; Ramji-Nogales et al. 2009; Thomas 2009).6 By doing so, the problem
of credibility assessment is often (implicitly) attributed to the individual
decision-makers and/or to “the law” for leaving a loophole for subjective
decision-making in the first place. This, I argue, leads to decision-makers’
practices being attributed an individualist quality, which is a view that I crit-
ically engage with in this book (see also Eckert 2020). Thus, Michael Kagan,
for instance, claims that “subjective assessments are highly personal to the
decision-maker, dependent on personal judgement, perceptions and disposi-
tions, and often lacking an articulated logic” (2003: 374). He criticises that
these assessments are, therefore, “very difficult to review and are likely to be
inconsistent from one decision-maker to another” (ibid.).
There appear to be two main reasons why much of the critique on cred-
ibility assessment practices in asylum procedures focuses on their so-called
“subjectivity” and “arbitrariness”. On the one hand, it has to do with the
outcome orientation of many of these critical studies. Hence, many of the
analyses are based on written asylum decisions, making it difficult to deduce
Spijkerboer (2000, 2005) in the Netherlands, Walter Kälin (1986), Olivia Le Fort (2013) as well
as Alain Maillard and Christophe Tafelmacher (1999) in Switzerland, Anthony Good (2009, 2011),
Jane Herlihy et al. (2010), Catriona Jarvis (2003), Olga Jubany (2011, 2017), Tobias Kelly (2011),
Isabella Mighetto (2016), James Sweeney (2007) and Robert Thomas (2009) in the UK and Deborah
Anker (1991), Bruce Einhorn (2009) and Michael Kagan (2003) in the USA. Furthermore, many
authors dealing with asylum decision-making in general and especially asylum interviews also broach
the subject of credibility (see, for instance, Blommaert 2001; Bohmer and Shuman 2008; Dahlvik
2018; Fresia et al. 2013; Poertner 2018; Probst 2012; Miaz 2017; Rousseau et al. 2002; Sbriccoli
and Jacoviello 2011; Schneider and Wottrich 2017), as do authors dealing with particular problems
applicants face when seeking asylum on the basis of sexual orientation (see, for instance, Jansen
and Spijkerboer 2011; Johnson 2011; Markard and Adamietz 2011; O’Leary 2008; Spijkerboer
2013). Finally, there have also been evaluative studies on credibility assessment, for instance, the
report “Breaking down the barriers” written by Heaven Crawley (1999) for the Immigration Law
Practitioners’ Association (ILPA), the UNHCR evaluation “Beyond Proof: Credibility Assessment in EU
Asylum Systems” (2013) and the joint report by Amnesty International and Still Human Still Here
“A question of credibility: Why so many initial asylum decisions are overturned on appeal in the UK ”
(2013).
6Other authors, however, take their analyses in different directions, focusing, for example, on
communication problems in asylum interviews and the obstacles asylum seekers face when trying
to successfully—meaning credibly—narrate their stories (see, for instance, Doornbos 2005; Good
2009, 2011; Kagan 2003; Kälin 1986) or on the particular standard of proof in asylum procedures
and the way uncertainty is turned into legal certainty through the procedure (see Kelly 2011; Scheffer
2001, 2003).
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how decision-makers reached their decisions, as from the “outside” the
outcomes of decision-making processes often seem very random and much
of what plays into decision-making is not actually reflected in the written
reasoning.7 On the other hand, the critique of the “subjectivity” and “arbi-
trariness” of asylum, and particularly credibility decisions, may also derive
from decision-makers’ emic views on their own work. Thus, in my research
I found that many decision-makers in the SEM themselves attach a “sub-
jective” quality to their credibility determinations. This is expressed in the
following statement made by a decision-maker whom I have called Denise8:
The word ‘credibility’ already indicates that it’s subjective. I have to believe
something. […] And precisely because it’s subjective it’s easier for me if I’ve
seen [the applicant] myself. That doesn’t necessary mean that the decision [I
take] is then the correct one, but it makes it easier for me, because then, in
addition, I have this personal impression.9
As Denise’s statement hints at, this view that credibility determinations are,
to some extent, always “subjective” is linked to the kind of knowledge that
guides and enables credibility assessments, an issue I deal with in detail in
Chapter 4. I was told by SEM decision-makers that their credibility assess-
ments often started from a “feeling” or “intuition”, a finding which is also
shared by many other scholars working on asylum decision-making (see,
for instance, Fassin and Kobelinsky 2012; Fassin 2013; Johannesson 2017;
Jubany 2011, 2017; Kelly 2012; Macklin 1998; Miaz 2017; Thomas 2009).
Such intuitive convictions are usually very difficult to articulate; decision-
makers—at least the experienced ones—mostly “just know” whether asylum
seekers’ statements are credible or not (see also Jubany 2017: 121, 183;
7There appear to be several reasons for this outcome orientation. First, access to asylum admin-
istrations in order to observe decision-makers’ everyday practices is often very difficult—or even
impossible—to achieve. Second, the outcome orientation of these critical studies seems to be linked
to the authors’ disciplinary backgrounds and their methodological approaches: many of the authors
are legal scholars whose discussions are generally based on analyses of written legal documents. Third,
many of the authors are mainly interested in what the outcomes of asylum decision-making mean for
asylum seekers and what consequences they have for them rather than how these particular outcomes
came into being.
8All the names I use in this book are pseudonyms. For reasons of anonymity I have randomly
assigned “identification features” such as place of work, educational background and gender to my
interaction partners as long as it did not lead to any distortions. Furthermore, as it is important
that officials (especially those in higher hierarchical positions) do not recognise their co-workers (or
employees), it was sometimes necessary for me to create more than one “fictional identity” out of one
interaction partner. I have anonymised all the references I make to asylum seekers and other actors
in this book (for instance when quoting field notes or documents from case files) in the same way.
My interactions with decision-makers were in Swiss German, German and French. The translations
of their statements in this book are mine.
9Denise, caseworker, headquarters, interview transcript, my own translation.
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Liodden 2016: 264–265). Hence, this is the “feeling” or intuitive knowl-
edge that they refer to as being “subjective”. My point is not to argue that an
asylum narrative, that to one decision-maker “feels” credible, might not “feel”
credible to someone else. Yet, an observation I made in the SEM was that the
“feelings” that decision-makers referred to as “subjective” often closely resem-
bled each other and were, at the same time, often quite different from mine,
the researcher from “outside”. This is also what Nora seems to be referring
to in her statement (quoted at the beginning of this introduction) that she
“knows” or can at least “imagine” what certain assessments mean for her expe-
rienced employees. Hence, I argue that it is crucial to study how such forms
of “tacit knowledge”, to use Michael Polanyi’s (1962 [1958], 1966) term,
or “practical knowledge” in the words of Andreas Reckwitz (2003), develop,
are acquired by decision-makers and are reaffirmed as well as transformed
through their everyday practices. In order to do so, I propose the concept of
the institutional habitus.
The Institutional Habitus: A Brief Conceptual
Introduction
According to Loïc J.D. Wacquant, the main question practice theory deals
with is: in the light of the regularities we observe in social life, what generates
these patterns “[i]f external structures do not mechanically constrain action”?
(1992: 18). It is precisely this question that interests me with regard to admin-
istrative work more generally, and asylum determination practices in the SEM
more specifically. The answer to this question, according to Pierre Bourdieu,
lies in the habitus. Bourdieu defines the habitus as a system of
durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to func-
tion as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize
practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes
without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the
operations necessary in order to attain them. (1990: 53)
He argues that the habitus
is what makes it possible to produce an infinite number of practices that are
relatively unpredictable […] but also limited in their diversity. In short, being
the product of a particular class of objective regularities, the habitus tends
to generate all the ‘reasonable’, ‘common sense’ behaviours (and only these)
which are possible within the limits of these regularities, and which are likely
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to be positively sanctioned because they are objectively adjusted to the logic
characteristic of a particular field. (ibid.: 55–56)
For Bourdieu, the dispositions which constitute a habitus are shared by
people belonging to the same social class or social collective. Thus, according
to him, people from the same social background, who share certain experi-
ences and histories, tend to have a similar habitus. This means that while
the habitus operates from within individuals, it is not strictly individual
(Wacquant 1992: 18). At the same time, the habitus does not work in a
deterministic way (Hitchings 2012: 62). It is creative and inventive and can
produce “an infinite number of practices” (Bourdieu 1990: 55). Yet, the prac-
tices a habitus generates will necessarily always fall within “the limits of its
structures” (Wacquant 1992: 19).
I find the concept of habitus useful for understanding practices of decision-
making in the SEM for three main reasons. First, because it allows us to
analyse the “shared subjectivity” I encountered during fieldwork. This fits
with what Bourdieu writes about the habitus when he states that “[t]o speak
of habitus is to assert that the individual, and even the personal, the subjec-
tive, is social, collective. Habitus is socialized subjectivity” (Bourdieu and
Wacquant 1992: 126). Second, the concept of habitus proves useful because
it allows us to comprehend patterns in decision-making which cannot be
explained with reference to explicit rules and informal norms. Thus, as Bour-
dieu writes, the practices the habitus generates are “[o]bjectively ‘regulated’
and ‘regular’ without being in any way the product of obedience to rules, they
can be collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organizing
action of a conductor” (1990: 53). One such pattern that I deal with in this
book is the tendency to reject the majority of asylum applications on the basis
of non-credibility; a pattern which has been referred to by many authors as
the “culture of disbelief” (Anderson et al. 2014; Jubany 2017; Marfleet 2006),
“suspicion” (Alpes and Spire 2014; Bohmer and Shuman 2008), “mistrust”
(Griffiths 2012; Probst 2012) or “denial” (Souter 2011). The concept of the
institutional habitus provides a way of understanding this pattern without
reducing it to being the “mere” outcome of political instrumentality (of anti-
immigration politics so to speak) or caseworkers’ emotional detachment. The
third reason for finding the concept of the institutional habitus useful for
understanding practices of asylum decision-making is the importance it gives
to the issue of belonging. Institutional belonging, both to the office as a whole
as well as to individual divisions of the SEM, on the one hand, shapes what
decision-makers come to perceive as their duties and what it means to profes-
sionally fulfil them, which, in turn, shapes their everyday practices (see also
Affolter et al. 2019). On the other hand, institutional belonging is important
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because the institution becomes a site where experiences come to be shared
and are collectively made.
In his work, Bourdieu mostly focuses on belonging in terms of people’s
social backgrounds and class. However, in “An Invitation to Reflexive Soci-
ology” he also refers to bureaucracies as an example of a social collective. He
claims that
social collectives such as bureaucracies have built-in propensities to perpetuate
their being, something akin to a memory or a loyalty that is nothing other than
the ‘sum’ of routines and conducts of agents who, relying on their know-how
(métier ), their habitus, engender […] lines of action adapted to the situation
such as their habitus inclines them to perceive it, thus tailor made (without
being designed as such) to reproduce the structure of which their habitus is
the product. (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 139–140)
My conceptualisation of the institutional habitus builds on this under-
standing of bureaucratic organisations as self-perpetuating social collectives. I
argue that, through belonging to and working in such organisations, case-
workers acquire specific dispositions which shape their everyday practices.
These dispositions, in turn, are again shaped and reaffirmed by decision-
makers’ everyday practices.
Instead of focusing on how SEM decision-makers’ social backgrounds
shape their dispositions to understand, judge and act, I mainly look at how
these practices are shaped by decision-makers’ belonging to the office and
their experiences on the job. This is not to say that caseworkers’ background
does not have an influence on their everyday practices. The argument I make
in this book is rather that their social backgrounds alone are not enough to
explain why they do what they do. For this, we must study the professional
values, pragmatic beliefs and (unthinking) routines that decision-makers
pick up and come to incorporate through their institutional socialisation.
Compared to Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, my derivation of the concept
is, therefore, less durable. I understand the institutional habitus as something
that is acquired on the job, and possibly shed after leaving the institution.
Similar concepts have also been used by Didier Fassin as well as Maybritt
Jill Alpes and Alexis Spire. The term Didier Fassin uses is that of the “profes-
sional habitus”. However, he refers only very briefly to it in the introduction
to “At the Heart of the State”, where he argues that officials’ “principles
of justice [and] or order” as well as “the values of the common good and
public service” are the products of officials’ professional habitus (2015: 6).
For Maybritt Jill Alpes and Alexis Spire, the “bureaucratic habitus” constitutes
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one of the principle concepts which they introduce in their article “Dealing
with Law in Migration Control ” (2014). Like me—and as Didier Fassin also
seems to imply—the authors argue that it is the habitus that “significantly
shapes […] [caseworkers’] interpretations of the legal frameworks” (2014:
263). However, there are two important differences between their usage of
the term bureaucratic habitus and my conceptualisation of the institutional
habitus. First, for Alpes and Spire, the bureaucratic habitus “encompasses a
set of norms shared by other agents involved in migration control” (ibid.).
Hence, they understand it as a set of norms that is shared by all agents
working in the field of migration control. In this regard, I conceptualise
the institutional habitus in a narrower sense, namely as the set of disposi-
tions shared within an organisation—or possibly even within different parts
of an organisation. However, this does not mean that I dismiss the impact of
the broader ideological environment(s) within which asylum decision-making
takes place, but rather that I am interested in how certain ideological values
become incorporated by caseworkers working inside these particular organi-
sations (see also Dahlvik 2018; Jubany 2017). Second, in my understanding,
the institutional habitus is mainly an analytical term that can be used to
describe the assemblage of dispositions which shape what caseworkers do,
think and feel. Alpes and Spire, in turn, refer to the bureaucratic habitus in
order to describe specific dispositions they encountered during their field-
work in French consulates, namely the “culture of suspicion” (ibid.: 269) as
well as—connected to this—caseworkers’ “concern to combat fraud and to
defend state interests” (ibid.: 267). This is very similar to what I encountered
in the SEM (see Chapter 6). However, in my understanding, the institutional
habitus is not limited to these dispositions, but also encompasses other—to
some extent even contradicting—dispositions. Furthermore, with this book I
aim to show that the “concern to combat fraud and to defend state interests”
(ibid.) does not only guide and shape caseworkers’ actions, but to also show
that the very idea that professionally carrying out one’s job means combat-
ting fraud and defending the state’s interests is continuously reaffirmed and
reproduced through everyday practice in these administrations.
Outline of the Book
Chapters 2 and 3 set the scene for the three main analytical chapters of
this book. Chapter 2 provides a methodological note on how I went about
studying everyday decision-making practices in the SEM. It discusses the
challenges I faced during my research and how I dealt with them, as well
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as the methodological limits of this study. Furthermore, I engage with what
it means methodologically, to study everyday practice(s) from a practice
theoretical perspective.
Following this, Chapter 3 offers a description of the Swiss asylum proce-
dure. It discusses the history of asylum politics, policies, law and the
first-instance asylum administration in Switzerland since the 1950s, and
contextualises the developments within broader trends in the Global North.
The chapter also introduces readers to the organisational structure of the
SEM as it existed until 2019, to how different tasks are organised within the
hierarchical organisation of the SEM, to the main elements of asylum law
that structure SEM officials’ decision-making practices and to the particular
standard of proof in refugee status determination.
The three main analytical chapters of this book deal with the “shared
practices” of decision-making. They shed light on what these practices are,
and describe the processes whereby these practices become shared. Although
each in a different way, the three main chapters are concerned with: how
decision-makers’ discretionary practices are shaped and structured; the role
the institutional habitus plays; what constitutes this institutional habitus; how
decision-makers develop such an institutional habitus on the job; and finally,
how the institutional habitus is reaffirmed through everyday practice.
Chapter 4 traces the processes of how asylum decisions are produced.
It analyses how asylum caseworkers attempt to overcome the uncertainties
inherent in refugee status—and particularly credibility—determination, and
the role different types of knowledge thereby play. Decision-making practice,
it argues, is fundamentally a “knowledge-based activity” (Dahlvik 2018: 57).
The chapter highlights the important role implicit practical knowledge—or
“gut feeling”—as well as the act of credibility determination itself play in
generating decisional certainty for categorising asylum seekers into one of
four legal categories: refugee with asylum, refugee with temporary admission,
non-refugee with temporary admission and non-refugee without temporary
admission.
The fifth chapter explores how asylum caseworkers are socialised on the
job and acquire an institutional habitus. It shows how decision-makers learn
what appropriate and inappropriate behaviours are and acquire the neces-
sary knowledge and skills for carrying out their job. I argue that caseworkers’
desire and need to fit into “the office” (or parts of it) and to be considered
good and professional decision-makers, as well as the pressure decision-
makers experience from their peers, superiors, but also from politics and
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the media all play an important role in shaping decision-makers’ everyday
practices.
In Chapter 6, I examine the norms and values which lie at the heart of
SEM officials’ day-to-day decision-making, showing what it means to be a
good and professional decision-maker in the SEM. The chapter brings to
light two substantial goals of the asylum administration: that of protecting
the abstract noble value of asylum and that of protecting “national interests”
through keeping numbers low: both of people applying for asylum and of
people being granted the right to reside in Switzerland. The chapter, thereby,
shows how the ethics and ethos of the office shape what decision-makers do
and how certain practices become normal and self-evident.
Finally, in the conclusion, I bring together the discussions of the different
chapters of this book to show how normative, structural and regulatory
constraints and the institutional habitus constitute each other; the latter
through the practices it generates. By doing so, I show how disbelief becomes
normalised in the office. I also discuss what lessons can be taken from the
case study of this book, towards a more general understanding of bureaucratic
administrations.
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2
Studying Everyday Practice(s) in the SEM
My interest in asylum decision-making and particularly in credibility deter-
mination began when, as a graduate student in social anthropology, I was an
intern in an NGO running a centre for asylum seekers. The centre provided
housing, financial support and social care. My job at the centre had no
direct involvement with asylum decision-making; nevertheless, the SEM’s
decisions about the individual asylum seekers were sent to our office. We, the
employees working at the centre, would then distribute the written notifica-
tions of decisions to the asylum seekers, and would often end up translating
decisions for them. When translating those letters, I was repeatedly unset-
tled by the reasons given for rejecting an asylum application—most of which
seemed to be based on the decision-maker finding the claim not credible. This
ignited my interest in studying SEM caseworkers’ decision-making practices.
I wanted to “find out” why so many negative decisions were based on non-
credibility and what criteria the decision-makers used to determine whether
asylum seekers’ claims were credible or not. I wanted to critically engage with
these practices.
As social scientists doing qualitative research, we (should) organise our
“research in such a way that […] [we] create the conditions for surprise”
(Wagenaar 2011: 243). Hendrik Wagenaar, therefore, argues that ethnog-
raphy or interpretive qualitative research should be thought of as more of “an
extended improvisation than [as] a well-thought-out-in-advance […] strat-
egy” (ibid.: 241). Hence, this is precisely how I went about doing fieldwork.
As I gained ever new insights into my research topic, new analytical questions
emerged and I began to re-think and question my original hypothesis—which
had been affirmed by the literature I initially engaged with—namely, that
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credibility assessments were arbitrary and based on highly subjective views.
Rather, what I came to deal with in this book is how administrative case-
workers come to think, feel, know and act in similar ways and how this
generates regularities in administrative practice.
My interest in this book lies with the practice of administrative work in a
practice theoretical sense. Following Andreas Reckwitz (2002), I understand
“practice” as an assemblage of different elements (see also Schatzki 2002: 71).
He writes: “A ‘practice’ (Praktik) is a routinized type of behaviour which
consists of several elements, interconnected to one other: forms of bodily
activities, forms of mental activities, ‘things’ and their use, a background
knowledge in the form of understanding, know-how, states of emotion and
motivational knowledge” (2002: 249). Bodily activities, according to Reck-
witz, include activities such as writing, reading and talking; the things that
decision-makers in the SEM do most (2003: 290). For researchers dealing
with administrative work, this means that we must pay attention to all these
different elements (or as many as possible) that constitute a practice: the
“taken-for-granted routines”; the implicit and explicit knowledge “brought to
bear on concrete situations”; officials’ interactions with each other and other
actors; the “informal banter and gossip with colleagues during coffee breaks”;
their emotional struggles, motivations, doubts and insecurities; as well as the
circulation of documents and ideas (Wagenaar 2004: 644). Hence, it means
paying attention to what decision-makers say they do in the fullest sense. We
must listen to what decision-makers think they should do, what they experi-
ence when they do it, and also look beyond what officials say, at what they
do or do not do.
This chapter outlines the methodological approach I developed to do this.
I describe how I struggled to—and eventually succeeded in—gaining research
access to the SEM and how I went about studying everyday practices in the
office. I thereby pay particular attention to the challenges I faced when doing
fieldwork, not only in terms of getting research access but also, and more
importantly, to the methodological challenges arising from a practice theo-
retical approach. I discuss the ways in which I dealt with and attempted to
overcome these challenges and the methodological limitations that remain.
Getting into the “Black Box”
Bureaucracies or administrations have frequently been characterised as secre-
tive, opaque entities (Hoag 2011: 82) or as “black boxes” (Eule 2014).
Furthermore, according to Weber, “administrative secrecy constitutes a key
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dimension of bureaucratic power” (2013 [1978]: 922). In many ways this
is what I encountered during fieldwork, as gaining access to the institution
proved challenging. However, once I was in, I experienced a lot of openness
and transparency towards me.
Gaining access to the field required stamina. In total, it took me one year
to get full research access, and one and a half years before I was able to prop-
erly start fieldwork. I first tried gaining access “the formal way” by applying
via a formal request to the head of the asylum directorate. However, after
months of waiting, my request was declined, the main reason for this being
that others had previously already done this kind of research.1 With persis-
tence and the help of my supervisor I finally managed to get permission to
observe an asylum interview and interview the official. However, after that I
was unsure how to continue with my research until, a couple of months later
at a national asylum conference, I met one of the officials who had rejected
my original research request. I approached him, presented myself to him and
asked him to help me “get in”, which he did. Thus, in the end it was through
him—and in this more informal way—that I eventually gained access to the
SEM. With his help and that of a colleague of his, I finally managed to draft
a new research proposal that was approved by the directorate and served as a
basis for the anonymisation contract I was asked to sign. The contract stipu-
lated that I was only allowed to take anonymised documents out of the office
with me, that all kinds of personal data I had would have to be destroyed
by a certain date, that I could only sit in on asylum interviews if the asylum
seeker gave consent and that I was only allowed to publish my doctoral thesis
after it had been checked by the SEM.
Once I had signed this contract and was “truly in”, I was surprised by the
openness and trust I experienced from officials in different hierarchical posi-
tions. I was, for instance, allowed to observe asylum interviews, read and copy
case files (as long as I anonymised them), and attend internal team meetings.
Once, after a day of analysing and copying random case files, I even appeared
to be the last one left in the building at 9 p.m. However, at the same time,
I am aware that certain information was deliberately not shared with me.
At times, caseworkers confided in me things they (thought they) were not
supposed to, but then asked me not to use this information; a request which
I, of course, honour.
1This is how I came to know Jonathan Miaz. Jonathan Miaz is a political scientist who also did
research on decision-making in the SEM. Later I met Ephraim Poertner, a human geographer working
on similar issues. Jonathan Miaz did fieldwork in the SEM between 2010 and 2012, Ephraim Poertner
was there between 2012 and 2014 and I eventually conducted my fieldwork between 2014 and 2015.
The three of us have since worked closely together on several occasions (see Affolter et al. 2019).
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Despite there being some aspects of decision-making that were not shared
with me, I believe the fact that officials were so open towards me is of impor-
tance and is something worth stressing. It shows that the officials—contrary
to a common assumption held by many critics of asylum decision-making—
feel that most aspects of their everyday work have no need to be hidden. The
assumption that caseworkers need to hide their everyday practices stems from
a particular view on administrations and on what research on administrations
is about. It is based on the premise that caseworkers do not do what they are
supposed to do and that research will uncover such “deviant’” behaviour; or
that bureaucracies and bureaucrats are “evil” and that they would not want
to have this “identity” uncovered. Neither of these views reflects my stance
on decision-makers in the SEM. Rather, I believe that what is important is
precisely that decision-makers are mostly confident that they are doing the
right thing. For them, their practices are normal and legitimate—they are
the self-evident thing to do. Therefore, they have nothing to hide. Taking
this seriously is important for understanding how the SEM, and bureaucratic
administrations in general, work.
That decision-makers were open towards me does not, however, mean that
they did not sometimes—especially at the beginning of my research—adopt a
defensive position in our conversations. In general, such a defensive position
is something SEM officials quite often adopt towards outsiders. As Tobias
Eule (2014: 104) has shown for German immigration offices, this defensive
position arises from the “constant criticism” officials are confronted with in
their work: criticism by politicians, political organisations and the media, for
example, of the office’s decision-making being either too harsh or too lenient
(see also Lentz 2014: 197). Thus, my empirical material must be read within
this context. My field encounters were influenced by this defensive position in
two main ways. First, most SEM officials with whom I interacted seemed to
categorise me accurately as a “leftist”. Therefore, especially at the beginning,
when my interaction partners and I were still in the process of establishing
mutual trust, it was mostly the “harsh part” of decision-making, their disbe-
lief of asylum stories and decisions to send people back home which they tried
to defend, because this was the part they assumed I would be the most critical
of. After a while, however, and this is the second way in which the defen-
sive stance of decision-makers influenced my field encounters, many officials
began to regard my work as not just a potential threat, but they began to see
it as an opportunity to convey a different image of the institution and of its
decision-making practices to the outside (see also Eule 2014: 107).
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“Getting In”… Literally
At the time of my research, asylum decisions were taken by officials working
in the five reception and processing centres (RPCs) mostly located close to
Switzerland’s “physical borders”, and in the eight different asylum units at the
headquarters in Bern. I eventually ended up doing research at the headquar-
ters—for the most part in two different units there—and in two of the RPCs.
This implied getting in and out of four different buildings in a literal sense,
which remained a challenging issue throughout the course of my fieldwork.
All four buildings were guarded by security officers based in a glass cubicle
adjacent to the first entrance door. Every time I wanted to enter, except for in
one of the asylum units where I was given a badge, it was obligatory to present
my identity card to the security guards, tell them what institution I was
from (the university of Bern) and with whom I was meeting that day. They
would then call the person to come and pick me up, because without them
the inner entrance door was unassailable. In both RPCs, I was usually left
standing in the entrance hall, which always seemed to be overcrowded. There
were asylum seekers asking guards for permission to leave, asylum seekers
coming back from outside and having to inform the guards of their return,
asylum seekers asking for appointments with decision-makers, new asylum
seekers arriving, having to register or being body searched, for example. It
was different at the headquarters. When I arrived I would always be asked to
take a seat in the waiting room to the right. I was never the sole occupant.
There would usually be social aid representatives and interpreters waiting to
be taken to their respective asylum interviews and occasionally there were
other “guests” like myself. While the interpreters often sat chatting together,
the social aid representatives, whose role it is to observe asylum interviews
from a “neutral perspective” and report on them to the Swiss Refugee Council
(see Chapter 3), were mostly preparing for upcoming interviews. This meant
they would be reading through the different documents from an applicant’s
case file, particularly the minutes from the first asylum interview, and taking
notes. Social aid representatives usually arrive well ahead of the scheduled
interview time because it is only upon registering with the security guards
that they receive the documents necessary for preparation.
From this waiting room, one could see over into the glass waiting room
on the other side of the guard’s cubicle, where asylum seekers waited for their
interviews. In this other waiting room there was a small playing area where
children—in the company of an adult—could play while they waited for their
parents to come back from their interviews. Outside the first entrance door
at the SEM headquarters there was a sign stating that all asylum seekers had
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to enter through a separate door on the left and register on the left side of
the security guard cubicle. Both on the left and on the right side there were
inner doors passing the guards’ cubicle that could only be opened with secu-
rity badges. On the first day of training for new SEM employees which I was
allowed to participate in, we were told that the purpose of having two sepa-
rate outer entrance doors and two inner doors was in case of “an applicant
becoming aggressive” the doors could be locked separately, thus, trapping
the person in between the left outer and inner door. For this reason, SEM
employees were advised to always use the doors on the right in order to not
get accidentally trapped between two locked doors with an applicant.2
From a methodological standpoint, not being able to enter the buildings
on my own had both advantages and disadvantages. While it sometimes made
me feel like a burden for the decision-makers—having to drag them out of
their offices to come and pick me up downstairs—and limited my ability
to move around freely between the different buildings, it also meant that
I always had to be in the company of someone, which for anthropological
research is, of course, very useful.
Doing Fieldwork
“You don’t do fieldwork, fieldwork does you”, Bob Simpson’s supervisor once
counselled him after he complained about being “manipulated by [a] prin-
cipal informant” (2006: 125). This nicely shows that we do not just choose
our interaction partners, sites and moments during fieldwork, but that they
also choose us (see Sökefeld 2006: 24). Martin Sökefeld, therefore, speaks of
fieldwork as a “social interaction”. He writes that, as ethnographers, we often
have to surrender control over the research situation to our interaction part-
ners and that only by ceding control to them can we sometimes gain access
to yet unknown spheres of social life (ibid.). I will now not only show how I
went about doing fieldwork, but also “how fieldwork did me”.
I conducted fieldwork in the SEM between 2014 and 2015 (with some
exploratory parts in 2013). Where I carried out my research was more or
less decided for me. The person who initially helped me gain research access
to the SEM—who was at the time in charge of the office’s quality manage-
ment—asked around amongst the heads of the different asylum units at the
headquarters and the RPCs who would be willing to have me. Four heads
agreed to this and I was put in contact with them to plan my individual
2Training instructor, A-modules, field notes, my own translation.
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field-stays. It was agreed that the individual stays would be relatively short
so as not to unduly burden the officials, who worked under a great deal of
time pressure. The units at the headquarters each allowed me to stay for two
consecutive weeks. I could only go to the two RPCs for one or two days at a
time, but they allowed me to do so on five different occasions. In addition to
this, I visited other divisions and asylum units of the SEM to sit in on asylum
interviews, carry out interviews with SEM officials, analyse case files and take
part in the three-week training course for new employees. Furthermore, I met
with caseworkers every so often for lunch or a drink outside work.
Following People Around
During my time in the different asylum units, I accompanied officials in
their daily work, observing what they were doing, asking them about what
they were doing, listening to their explanations and occasionally also actively
joining in their activities (see also McDonald 2005; Mugler 2019: 54; Müller
2017). I now describe the various aspects of the SEM officials’ job that I was
able to observe in more detail.
Asylum interviews constitute an important part of officials’ work. By
following caseworkers around, I was able to sit in on eighteen asylum inter-
views: six initial short asylum interviews and twelve longer second (or third)
interviews (see Chapter 3). Usually, a day or two before the interview, the
official in charge would give me the case file so that I could read it and
make copies of it before the interview. Often, we would then also discuss the
‘case’ together which could mean different things.3 Some decision-makers,
for instance, told me what decision they thought they would end up taking
before the interview, and why, while others explained to me how they had
prepared for the interview or planned to do so. In the case of “old stagers”,
this was often merely that they had looked through the case file, read through
the minutes of the first asylum interview and made a couple of notes.
However, some of them—as well as many of the newer employees—showed
me elaborate lists of questions they had prepared, and in some cases even
chronological diagrams they had made with all the information they already
had on a ‘case’. On four occasions, I was also able to sit down and prepare
the interviews together with the caseworker. Together we went through the
different documents in the case file, listing possible questions, which I was
also sometimes asked to contribute to, or at least to comment on.
3‘Cases’ is an emic term. Of course, what SEM decision-makers really deal with are not cases but
people whose lives are greatly affected by their practices and decisions.
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On the day of the interview itself, I would usually accompany the
decision-makers to pick up the asylum applicants, interpreters and social aid
representatives from their respective waiting rooms. Mostly we would then
all walk back to the caseworkers’ office in silence, but sometimes some of the
actors engaged in friendly conversation with one another. In the decision-
maker’s office, we would then all take our assigned places. I was always
assigned a place away from the square table around which the asylum seeker,
the SEM official, the interpreter and the social aid representative sat. Usually,
I was placed behind the minute-taker’s desk which allowed me to see onto the
computer screen and to observe what was written down during the interview.
During the actual interview my role was strictly limited to that of observer.
However, of course, this does not mean that my presence did not influence
the others. I sat there, listened, observed and took notes. I soon gave up trying
to write down everything that was said during the interviews because the
conversations were usually too fast for me to get everything down on paper
and because I always got a copy of the minutes at the end anyway. Instead,
I made notes of my other observations. These included things that were said
but not written down by the minute-taker—on their own account or because
they were instructed not to do so by the decision-makers—different actors’
demeanour, displayed emotions (as I interpreted them), the setting of the
room, material being used and passed around as well as my own impres-
sions and sentiments. I never said anything in these interview situations
except for the few times I was asked to present myself at the beginning of
the interview in order to ask for the applicant’s consent to my being there.
Normally, however, the decision-makers did this for me, either presenting
me as someone from the university who was there to observe them work or
as someone who was training for the job. In two of the initial short interviews
I sat in on, in which there are no minute-takers, as the minutes are written by
the caseworkers themselves, I was asked to write the minutes. The caseworker
carrying out the interview sat next to me, at times instructing me on what to
write.
During breaks in asylum interviews, I usually waited for the decision-
maker to come back from taking the other participants to their respective
waiting rooms and in the meantime chatted with the minute-takers who
often shared their views on the particular ‘case’ with me or on the decision-
maker carrying out the interview. When the caseworkers came back, I
normally asked them about their first impressions and how they planned on
proceeding.
Asylum interviews—especially those lasting a whole day—are exhausting,
even for me, as someone who did not have an active role. Therefore, the
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decision-makers and I rarely engaged in long conversations after the interview
had finished. Normally, the caseworkers printed out the minutes for me and
we would arrange to meet a day or two later to discuss the ‘case’. Sometimes,
by then the decision-makers had already started writing the decision and they
showed me the arguments they had developed so far. But mostly they just
told me what they thought their decision was going to be—and why they
were going to take that particular decision—as well as how they planned on
proceeding. I was also repeatedly asked to give them feedback on how they
had carried out their asylum interviews because the caseworkers thought I
might have some interesting insights from also having observed some of their
co-workers do interviews. Because most decisions had not been finalised by
the time I left the units, I was allowed to write down the number of the ‘cases’
and contact the secretaries of the different units on a regular basis to ask if
the decisions had been sent out, and then pick up copies of the final decisions
when they had been.4
It should be noted that the asylum interviews I attended during fieldwork
were not completely random. In the first instance, it depended on whether
the caseworkers would allow me to sit in (they did not allow me to in only
two cases). Furthermore, I was not permitted to attend any GespeVer (gender-
based persecution) interviews, which are mainly ‘cases’ in which the claimants
have experienced sexual violence or were persecuted on the grounds of their
sexual orientation. As a woman I would only have been permitted to attend
interviews with female applicants, and there were only a few during my stay.
Furthermore, the heads of the asylum units feared that my presence could
make the situation even more unbearable for the applicants—these interviews
tend to be particularly intimate—so I was excluded from them and I never
pushed to be allowed to sit in.
In addition to sitting in on asylum interviews, accompanying officials in
their daily work involved sitting in their offices and observing them carry
out different tasks: writing decisions; writing letters to applicants; reading
reports about different “countries of origin”; writing answers to interpellations
which had been passed down the institution’s hierarchy and had ended up
on their desks; dealing with family reunification requests as well as giving
advice to co-workers or asking for advice from them. In these situations, the
officials mostly treated me as a novice, explaining what they were doing step
by step. They also often printed out the documents they were working on
for me so that I could follow better. The same also happened on the days
in which I followed the heads of asylum units around. On those days, I was
4I was also able to trace decisions that were appealed at the Federal Administrative Court, where I
was given permission to study the case files under supervision and make notes of them.
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able to observe superiors assign new asylum ‘cases’ to their employees as well
as check the latter’s decisions before sending them out to asylum seekers.
Furthermore, many people kept stopping by or phoning the heads’ offices to
discuss various issues, which allowed me to observe interesting interactions.
Twice I was also able to sit in and observe so-called “consultation meetings”
between a superior and a caseworker in which they discussed specific ‘cases’
and how the caseworkers should proceed with them. Decision-makers can
ask for such meetings if they feel that they need help with a particular ‘case’.
Furthermore, one superior let me observe him prepare his staff appraisals and
to also sit in on one of the appraisal interviews. Lastly, two heads took me to
meetings with them: one to an internal meeting of the asylum unit he was in
charge of, and one to a division meeting attended by the heads of different
asylum units.
During my field-stays, I was usually assigned an office; a place where I
could write down my notes and anonymise all the documents I had received.
While I never spent much time in my office, having one nevertheless proved
helpful for fieldwork. Firstly, because in the SEM, hallways are busy places
and caseworkers tend to leave their office doors open. Thus, by just sitting
in “my office” I was able to overhear several interesting conversations: case-
workers telling their colleagues about an asylum interview they had just done
or were in the middle of doing, caseworkers asking their co-workers for help
with a decision or caseworkers jointly looking for arguments to prove the
non-credibility of a claim, for instance. The one time I shared an office with
three decision-makers, this coming and going was even more easily observ-
able. Furthermore, after a while, decision-makers would just come to my
office to talk to me and to tell me about ‘cases’ they were working on.
Finally, taking the morning coffee break together was common practice in
the asylum units. These breaks turned out to be particularly fruitful moments
of fieldwork. Sometimes, the conversations during breaks were completely
unrelated to work and so I learnt quite a bit about the decision-makers’
private lives. Often, however, they would discuss specific ‘cases’ or aspects
of their work—particularly if they were unhappy with them—allowing me
to learn a lot about the office.
Method Triangulation
In addition to following people around, observing them and talking to them
in and about their everyday work, I conducted interviews with twenty-seven
caseworkers from nine different asylum units. Thus, in addition to case-
workers from the units in which I did fieldwork, I also interviewed officials I
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met during the induction training; officials I was put in touch with by other
decision-makers; that I met by chance during one of my field-stays; or that I
already knew from before my research. I was able to interview two of the new
employees that I met on two occasions. The first, when they had only been
working at the SEM for a couple of weeks or months, and the second time
after they had been working there for a little over a year. I usually prepared
some questions before the interviews and developed preferences for a couple
of questions I found worked well in most situations. But, mostly, I proceeded
in a very open way in order to see what my interaction partners considered to
be important topics (see Wagenaar 2011: 253). I asked officials about obser-
vations I had made, asking for explanations and clarifications as well as their
reflections on them. Without much probing from my side, decision-makers
often started telling me specific “stories” or describing particular ‘cases’ which
then repeatedly led them to search for and show me the specific case file, if
it was still in their possession. Such narratives, according to Steven Maynard-
Moody and Michael Musheno, are very useful for gaining an understanding
of the “normative reasoning and context” that shape administrative work.
Thus, they write that
[w]hen examining moral responsibility, especially when it is deeply embedded
in the normative structures of institutions and policy regimes, we cannot expect
people, whether frontline staff or upper-level managers, to articulate their
actual decision norms. Narratives, on the other hand, provide rich evidence
of the normative reasoning and context that shape judgements and actions.
Through narratives, storytellers reveal more than they consciously know. (2012:
21)
My interviews, which I recorded either in writing or via audio and later
transcribed, include “stories”, biographical accounts, normative reflections
and abstract descriptions of everyday practice. I often, rather subconsciously
at the time, pushed for detailed descriptions of officials’ work, asking over
and over again why and how they did certain things, which frequently led
decision-makers to tell me that there were certain aspects of their work that
simply could not be explained: these were things they just did or knew,
without being able to put them into words. In hindsight, these questions
have proven helpful for discerning decision-makers’ implicit knowledge—the
things they just know and do without being able to discursively explain why
and how—and the taken-for-granted, self-evident aspects of their everyday
work.
Another important method I made use of was document analysis. As
mentioned above, in my interactions with SEM officials, I was often given
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copies of the documents they were working on or working with, such as
training materials, so-called country of origin reports, internal guidelines on
how to deal with applications by people from specific countries, news reports
or drafts of asylum decisions, for example. Furthermore, I was able to photo-
copy and analyse the content of seventy-two case files. Thirteen of these files
came from ‘cases’ I had come into contact with during my fieldwork and in
which I had sat in on the corresponding asylum interviews. The remaining
fifty-nine case files were from when I was granted access to nearly all the
files of ‘cases’ that had been decided upon by decision-makers from all of
the SEM’s asylum units on two randomly set dates. Hence, in many of these
‘cases’ I do not know the decision-makers personally, nor was I present when
these ‘cases’ were dealt with in practice. Nevertheless, they allowed me to get
a good overview of the different types of asylum decisions that are made, the
different kind of enquiries undertaken by the decision-makers (see Chapter 3)
and the different kinds of documents that exist in the SEM.
This “method triangulation” (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007: 184) was
crucial for my research for two connected reasons. First, because the data
generated through these different methods shed light on decision-making
practices from different angles, allowing me to, for example, analytically
approach both discursive and non-discursive aspects of everyday practice in
the SEM (see also Dahlvik 2018: 19). Second, the different insights I gained
from each of these methodological approaches provided me with new ideas,
for instance, on what issues to inquire into, what moments to pay special
attention to during my observations, what documents to look for, or what
questions to ask my interaction partners. In this regard, I gained particu-
larly fruitful insights during the three weeks I was able to participate in the
induction training for new SEM employees (see Chapter 5).
The Researcher as a Learner
When “studying an unfamiliar setting” we are, at least at the beginning,
always novices (Hammersely and Atkinson 2007: 80). However, as Martyn
Hammersley and Paul Atkinson argue, there is an essential difference between
what they call “lay novices” and ethnographers, in that “the latter attempts
to maintain a self-conscious awareness of what is learned, how it has been
learned, and the social transactions that inform the production of such
knowledge” (2007: 80). This is precisely what I attempted to do while
participating in the trainings for new asylum decision-makers in the SEM.
Being a learner or a novice is, of course, a role we as ethnographers
occupy beyond such specific learning situations. In general, it is a helpful
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role because we often want the people we are working with to teach us about
their “everyday worlds” (see Le Compte et al. 1999: 21–22). However, at
the same time, it is also important to maintain a balance between ignorance
and expertise (see also Hammersley and Atkinson 1995: 103). This appears
to be particularly important when studying organisations and “professional
worlds” where, as Johanna Mugler argues, researchers must “acquire a consid-
erable amount of expert knowledge” in order “to be taken seriously” by the
people we are working with (2019: 65). The training sessions in the SEM
constituted an important setting for me in order to acquire this necessary
expertise. But they were also unique learning situations in other ways.
What made the training sessions special and, to some extent, also quite
challenging was that I was not the only learner there. Except for the trainers,
everybody else present was also learning. With regard to my relationship with
the other participants this meant that I could not really “be taught” by them,
which seemed to make it more difficult to establish a rapport with them.
In comparison with the rest of my field-stays, I experienced less openness
towards me and less interest in my research endeavours. Some even seemed a
bit suspicious of me, but most of them were simply very busy learning new
tasks, getting to know their co-workers, and growing used to their new daily
routines. The best moments for engaging in conversation with the trainees
were, therefore, when we had to work together in groups and try to apply the
aspect of law we had just learnt about to specific ‘cases’. In those moments I
“truly” became a participant like the others and often refrained from taking
field notes.
It was also in these moments that I gained the most valuable insights
into decision-makers’ learning processes: into what they found easy, diffi-
cult, surprising or disturbing, for example; into the knowledge and experience
they brought with them to the job; into how the different training mate-
rials were used and referred to during “practical exercises”; into the questions
the trainees posed to their trainers; and the aspects of the job—or rather of
the practical exercises we did—that they seemed to struggle with most. But
not only was I able to observe how others were learning, I also tried to self-
reflexively take notes of my own experiences during the training sessions. The
following entry from my fieldwork diary illustrates this:
I feel just like yesterday. I’m shocked by what these exercises trigger in me.
It’s really exiting to finally be able to apply the law and to see in each ‘case’
whether I managed to get it ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. The more complex a ‘case’, the
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more interesting it becomes. Looking around me, I don’t think I’m the only
one that feels that way.5
It was, amongst other things, observations like these that got me interested
in how certain practices become “normalised” for decision-makers, helping
me shape my analytical research questions. Furthermore, the training mate-
rials I received and the notes I took during those three weeks helped me a
great deal to get an idea of the regulatory constraints and conditions of asylum
decision-making, the different steps of the formal proceedings as well as of the
documents and artefacts available for and used in decision-making. They also
allowed me to better understand what it was that people were doing during
my subsequent field-stays, and to be able to ask more specific questions.
My Interaction Partners in the SEM
Fitting with practice theory, the personalities of the officials I interacted with
do not figure prominently in my work. I marginally deal with their educa-
tional backgrounds and their motivations for doing the job in Chapter 5.
But other than that, for my analysis with its focus on situated practice and
on institutional socialisation and learning processes, what is mainly relevant
is decision-makers’ “position” within the organisation and their professional
experience. What was important for my research was, therefore, to include
both experienced caseworkers and those who were still quite new to the job,
as well as people holding different hierarchical positions, in my sample of
interaction partners in the SEM. In the end, nine of my thirty-one interac-
tion partners were “old stagers”, meaning that they had worked at the SEM
for fifteen years or more. Seventeen of my interaction partners had only been
working at the SEM for three years or less at the time I met them. These
seventeen all considered themselves to be “quite new to the job” and still had
temporary working contracts. In contrast, only five of my interaction part-
ners had been working at the SEM between four and fourteen years and, with
the exception of one, all held higher hierarchical positions. This fits with the
assessment of several of my interaction partners (all of them “new” employees)
that after roughly five years on the job, it was either time to leave, or to move
up the hierarchy. In addition to these four officials, three of the “old stagers”
I interacted with also held higher hierarchical positions.
As can be seen, the percentage of “new” employees with fixed-term
contracts in my sample was quite high, for which there seem to be several
5Field notes, my own translation.
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reasons. Firstly, it has to do with the fact that in general, at the time of
my fieldwork, there were many “new” caseworkers in the SEM. The SEM’s
asylum directorate had significantly grown in the years previous to my field-
work and many new decision-makers had been employed in an attempt to
reduce the number of pending cases (see Chapter 3). Secondly, it was often
easier for me to approach and establish rapport with new employees. On the
one hand, this was related to new employees mostly being the same age as me
and having a similar educational background (see Chapter 5). On the other
hand, they tended to be more physically present in the office. They normally
came to the coffee breaks in the morning (whereas quite a few “old stagers”
did not) and spent the working days in their offices (whereas quite a few “old”
employees were allowed to sometimes work from home or had special tasks
which at times took them away from the office). Thirdly, in many asylum
units where I did my fieldwork, the superiors decided with whom I would
be spending time. I do not know if the superiors always approached specific
employees or just asked around who would be willing to “have me”. However,
I think there are again two probable reasons why I was more often sent to new
employees than to their experienced co-workers. On the one hand, I know
that two of the “old stagers” that had been approached by the superiors told
them that they did not want me to accompany them in their work. Of course,
it is also possible that some of the new employees refused my company, and
that I am simply not aware of this. Nevertheless, based on my observations,
I assume that for new employees it was more important to get the approval
of their superiors (who had agreed to receive me and now needed a place
for me to be every day) and, therefore, did not want to deny their superiors’
request. This might also relate to the fact that new employees hold fixed-
term contracts and, thus, getting into (or remaining in) their superiors’ good
books is crucial for them. On the other hand, it could also be that the supe-
riors directly approached more new employees who, not having been on the
job very long, were often less behind with their work than their “older”, more
experienced colleagues who had accumulated much bigger workloads. Thus,
they had more time for me.
Thinking Through and with Practice Theory:
Methodological Limits and Challenges
In this final part of the chapter, I address the methodological challenges and
limits of grasping everyday practices through ethnography. As stated above, I
find a practice theoretical understanding of practice useful because, as Russel
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Hitchings writes “[t]his area of scholarship has had some of the most to say
about the relatively habitual ways in which we all pass through much of
our lives” (2012: 61). I argue that this also applies to many of the things
administrative caseworkers do. It should be noted here that it was through
my “data”, through the observations I made in the SEM, that I arrived at
practice theory—which seemed the most useful for analysing my empirical
material—and not the other way around. I therefore “use” theory in the way
proposed by Hendrik Wagenaar who, drawing on Barney Glaser and Anselm
Strauss (1967) writes that “[t]heory is not a final statement about some social
phenomena or activity but a ‘strategy for handling data’ […]: provisional,
open-ended, but always restrained by what the world tells us” (Wagenaar
2011: 260).
Following Andreas Reckwitz’s suggestion, decision-makers’ “bodily activ-
ities”, such as writing, reading and talking to each other, their implicit
practical knowledge and everyday routines, are at the centre of my analysis.
Furthermore, I am interested in how decision-makers’ “professional subjec-
tivities” are shaped by their surroundings: the regulatory constraints posed by
the organisation, the type of bureaucratic decision-making work they do as
well as the laws and policies they must “apply” within the ideological envi-
ronments they work. I inquire into how decision-makers come to think, act
and know things in similar ways, but also how they develop similar under-
standings of what is moral, ethical and desirable. For this purpose, I draw
on Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of the habitus, as outlined in the introduc-
tion (see Bourdieu 1976). Similar to Bourdieu, Andreas Reckwitz argues that
the “conventionalized ‘mental’ activities of understanding, knowing how and
desiring are necessary elements and qualities of a practice in which the single
individual participates, not of the individual” (2002: 250). Thus, individ-
uals—in my case SEM officials—become “carriers” of certain practices (ibid.).
However, this does not mean that the (institutional) habitus works in a deter-
ministic way or that, as Russel Hitchings claims, “individuals always bow
automatically to the dictates of the practice” (2012: 62). Practice also allows
for and requires improvisation (see Bourdieu 1990; Shove and Pantzar 2007).
Not everything we do is verbalisable. Rather, some things we do, like
cooking or skiing for example, are partially non-linguistic (see Bloch 1991:
189; Martens 2012). This has led some authors to argue that “talk” is not
enough to understand practices and that we need to also make use of other
qualitative (or even quantitative) methods to be able to more fully compre-
hend practices (see Browne 2016; Halkier and Jensen 2011; Martens 2012).
I agree with these authors that not everything can be expressed through “talk”
and that—depending on the research questions we pose (see Shove 2017)—
method triangulation may indeed make sense to approach practices from
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different angles. Nevertheless, following Russel Hitchings (2012), I argue that
we also should not underestimate the things that can be verbalised and what
we can learn from talking to our interaction partners. As human beings, we
are able to reflect on the things we do and to some extent also the things that
make us do what we do. We are often even used to doing so. Talking to people
during fieldwork, also but not exclusively through doing interviews with
them, can, therefore, be useful for learning about such reflections. Further-
more, in retrospective, our interaction partners are usually also capable of
telling us about how certain things went, what they did and how they felt in
those moments. And conversations can also tell us a lot about norms, rules
and principles (see Browne 2016) which, as I will show in this book, are
crucial for understanding asylum decision-making.
SEM officials reflect a lot upon the work they do. They have their own
theories about what they do, why they do it and what a critical analysis of
their work should be about. I learnt a great deal from those theories. Never-
theless, I believe that as anthropologists it is equally important to maintain
a critical distance from these theories and interpretations and to not just
unquestioningly make them our own. On the contrary, it might sometimes
be more fruitful for us as researchers to look at those aspects of what we are
studying that our interaction partners have no theories about; the things that
are just normal and self-evident to them. However, when doing fieldwork, we
also become inured to such normalities. Consequently, Cris Shore and Susan
Wright claim that it is important to “maintain sufficient critical distance to be
able to keep asking fundamental questions about how [our interaction part-
ners] conceptualise their worlds and what this means for theoretical debates”
(2011: 15). In my case, doing fieldwork so “close to home” helped maintain
this critical distance because I never completely left my academic surround-
ings and also during fieldwork, I kept discussing my findings with colleagues.
Furthermore, the collaborative work I did with Jonathan Miaz and Ephraim
Poertner, the other two researchers working on decision-making in the SEM,
also proved to be useful in this regard in that it helped me uncover some of
my “blind spots”. At the same time, I am sure that other blind spots remain.
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This chapter sets the scene for the three main analytical chapters of this book
by providing a brief outline of how the Swiss asylum procedure works. It
introduces readers to the main elements of (Swiss) asylum law that structure
SEM officials’ decision-making practices and the organisation they work in.
Thereby, the chapter, on the one hand, aims to bring out the particularities
of the Swiss case. On the other hand, it highlights the many similarities that
exist between asylum determination proceedings in Switzerland and those in
other countries of the Global North, particularly in Western Europe. Given
these similarities, I argue that while empirically, my research focuses on first-
instance asylum decision-making in Switzerland, my analysis, nevertheless,
provides insights beyond this specific case study, allowing us to gain a better
understanding of asylum decision-making processes more generally.
There are five parts to this chapter. The first part discusses the main
developments in Swiss asylum politics since the 1950s and contextualises
them within broader global trends. One such trend and, at the same time,
consequence of the changing politics, are the numerous adaptations made to
asylum law and, connected to this, the proliferation of decision-making cate-
gories, which I discuss separately in the second part of this chapter. The third
part shows how in the light of global trends in asylum politics, and parallel
to the many changes made to Swiss asylum law, a growing—and increas-
ingly specialised—asylum administration emerged: the SEM we know today.
What this administration does and how it is organised—or, rather, how it was
organised at the time of my fieldwork between 2014 and 2015—is the topic
of the fourth part of this chapter. Finally, in the fifth and last part, I discuss
© The Author(s) 2021




the legal categorisations decision-making in the SEM ultimately comes down
to and outline the relevant articles from Swiss asylum law which constitute
the basis for these categorisations.
Asylum Politics in Switzerland and Beyond
Despite its title, giving a full overview of asylum politics in Switzerland (or
globally) is not the aim of this section. That would go beyond the scope of
this chapter. What I aim to do instead is to situate developments in asylum
politics and decision-making practices in Switzerland since the 1950s within
broader trends described in the Global North.
According to Ephraim Poertner,
two contrasting regimes for the government of refugees exist today: collective
protection regimes for people who escape wars and persecution across national
borders and are commonly hosted in camps in neighbouring countries – these
are typical for the global South; and individual protection regimes concerned
with people seeking admission common in wealthy states of the global North.
(2018: 5; see also Fassin and Kobelinsky 2012: 448)
I find this distinction useful for two reasons, first, because it reminds us
of an important fact, namely that the vast majority of people seek protec-
tion in countries of the Global South. Comparatively very few people apply
for asylum in Switzerland or Europe in general. Second, different terminolo-
gies are used for the people seeking protection in these regimes. As Poertner,
building on Didier Fassin (2016a: 66–67), argues, in collective protection
regimes “people are collectively regarded as ‘refugees’ because they fled their
countries of origin or residence” (Poertner 2018: 5). In contrast, in individual
protection regimes, people are considered as “individual ‘asylum seekers’
whose ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ has to be examined in a laborious
administrative procedure before they may become ‘refugees’ legally” (ibid.;
see also Jubany 2017: 45). Hence, the terms “refugees” and “asylum seekers”
carry different, specific political meanings (see also Zetter 2007: 180). Rather
than merely reflecting a difference in status, the two terms represent “a funda-
mental difference of recognition”, as Fassin argues (2016b). Because the focus
of this book is on decision-makers’ perspectives, I employ the emic terminolo-
gies decision-makers themselves use to refer to the people they are dealing
with. Thus, I use the terms “asylum seekers”, “applicants” and “claimants”,
also because they fittingly describe people’s positions in the legal proceedings
at work in countries of the Global North. However, I do not wish to imply
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that I do not consider these people to be refugees in the broader sense of the
term described above. To the contrary, they are all people who have fled their
country of origin or of residence and are in need of protection.
As is common in the Global North, the Swiss asylum system is based on
the administrative assessment of individual asylum claims. Figure 3.1, which
I have taken from Ephraim Poertner’s thesis “Re-cording Lives: Governing
Asylum in Switzerland and the Need to Resolve” (2018), illustrates the number
of such individual asylum applications filed in Switzerland each year between
1968 and 2017.
We can see that in the 1980s and 1990s, there was an increase of people
seeking asylum in Switzerland. Simultaneously, as the red line indicates, there
is a sharp decline in the number of people receiving asylum. Before the
1980s—or, more specifically, between the 1950s and 1980s—asylum was
generally granted. This was mostly related to the fact that people applying
for asylum had fled communist states (see D’Amato 2008: 178; Däpp 1984;
Efionayi-Mäder 2003: 3–4; Haug 1984; Parini and Gianni 2005: 196–201;
Piguet 2006: 87–95, 2009: 70–77). Furthermore, in addition to Switzerland’s
anti-communist stance in the Cold War period; the booming economy at the
time (and consequently Switzerland’s need for extra labour power) was also
a decisive factor for this “welcome reception”. Moreover, according to Heinz
Däpp, there was also a strong desire at that time, for Switzerland to compen-
sate for its restrictive refugee policy during the Second World War (1984:
212). This so-called “open arms policy” (Piguet 2006: 91) towards people
fleeing communist countries continued throughout the 1980s. However,
Fig. 3.1 Number of asylum applications and recognition rates between 1968 and
2017 (Source Poertner 2018: 5)
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while this was happening, Swiss asylum policies were becoming more restric-
tive towards other refugees. This meant that, in 1973, following Pinochet’s
coup d’état, when the UNHCR urged countries to receive Chilean refugees,
Switzerland reneged on its “open arms policy”, because these were now the
“wrong” refugees: these were leftists and communists (Meiner 2007: 119; see
also D’Amato 2008: 178; Piguet 2009: 77). In the end, the Swiss govern-
ment, after much pressure from leftist organisations and churches, granted
protection to 255 Chilean refugees. Yet, this was a first step towards a more
restrictive asylum and refugee policy which has continued ever since. In their
analyses of asylum politics in Switzerland, Heinz Däpp (1984), Werner Haug
(1984) and Etienne Piguet (2006) identify two main reasons for asylum poli-
cies becoming stricter at that time. Firstly, the refugees that started to arrive
in the 1980s, no longer neatly fitted into the East/West divide. Secondly,
the economic crisis following the 1973 oil crises led to increased unemploy-
ment and a ban on labour immigration which restricted possibilities (other
than asylum) for gaining residency in Switzerland. In addition, in his detailed
analysis, Jonathan Miaz (2017: 79–83) shows how the discourse on Über-
fremdung (foreign domination or infiltration) became increasingly dominant
in Swiss politics in the 1970s and eventually merged with the discourse on
asylum.
Very similar developments to those of Switzerland are also described for
France by Didier Fassin (2016b) and Carolina Kobelinsky (2015), and for
the UK and Europe in general by Olga Jubany (2017: 44–46). These authors
describe an increase in the number of people applying for asylum in the 1980s
with a simultaneous sharp decline in the recognition rate. In order to explain
these changes, they identify the same reasons described above in the case
of Switzerland: less need for labour power following the economic crisis in
the 1970s and refugees no longer fitting clearly into the East/West divide.
In their work, Didier Fassin and Carolina Kobelinsky thereby challenge the
common interpretation that the rise of asylum applications following the
closure of borders for immigration in the mid-1970s is a sign of “immigrants
attempt[ing] to pass themselves off as refugees” (Fassin and Kobelinsky 2012:
449). Rather, Carolina Kobelinsky argues (in the context of France), that this
interpretation
ignores two important explanatory factors: the lifting of temporal and spatial
restrictions of the Geneva Convention, and the fact that until the formal inter-
ruption of labour immigration in 1974 it was easier to obtain a work permit
than refugee status. As a result, many potential applicants for refugee status
under the Convention did not claim for asylum, as they already had legal
residence in France. (2015: 72; see also Fassin and Kobelinsky 2012: 449)
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Given that the historical accounts on asylum politics in Switzerland
discussed above also describe a strong need for labour power in the 1950s and
1960s, as well as the introduction of an immigration labour ban following the
economic crisis in the 1970s, it seems plausible that Kobelinsky’s argument
also applies to the Swiss context, at least to some extent. Switzerland rati-
fied the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (often referred to
as the Geneva Convention) in 1955 and later also the 1967 Protocol which
removed the temporal and geographical restrictions of the original Conven-
tion by extending the definition of refugeehood to encompass people fleeing
from outside Europe and also due to events taking place after 1951.
Today, in the Global North, the “fight against abuse”, as it is often referred
to, is high on the political agenda, accompanied by a widespread discourse
on so-called “false” or “bogus refugees” (see Däpp 1984: 216–219; Fassin
2007; Zimmermann 2011). Asylum seekers and migrants in general are
often portrayed as a “problem” in today’s political discourse and media.
They are seen as a “threat” to states’ economy, culture and identity (see
Dahlvik 2018: 9; Gill and Good 2019: 5–6; Miaz 2017: 11–12). Further-
more, they are increasingly depicted as a “threat” to the safety of countries
and their citizens, which serves to justify heightened securitisation measures
such as the externalisation of border controls and the restriction of access to
refugee determination procedures (see Boswell 2007: 589; Dahlvik 2018: 9;
Huysmans 2000; Jubany 2017; Miaz 2017: 13–14; Stünzi 2010). Asylum
determination procedures in the Global North today are, therefore, struc-
tured around a “politics of deterrence” (Poertner 2017; see also Hamlin 2014;
Poertner 2018: 282–287), with no country wanting to be more generous in
granting asylum and subsidiary protection than others in order not to create
a so-called “pull-effect” (see Fuglerud 2004: 33; Jubany 2017: 62; Liodden
2016: 219; Miaz 2017: 15, 343; Poertner 2017: 17, 283). Indeed, in the
initial training sessions for new SEM decision-makers in which I took part,
on the very first day, those present were told by a trainer: “You are going to
hear this often from now on: We are always afraid of the ‘pull-effect’”.1
In Switzerland, this politics of deterrence is linked to the discourse on
Überfremdung (foreign domination or infiltration), which as Jonathan Miaz’s
careful analysis of asylum politics in Switzerland shows, has a long tradition
in Swiss German-speaking right-wing politics. For example, the Nationale
Aktion gegen die Überfremdung von Volk und Nation (the national action
against foreign infiltration of the nation and homeland) was founded in
Switzerland in 1961. The party subsequently launched several initiatives
1Training instructor, A-modules, field notes, my own translation.
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against Überfremdung , aimed at laying down fixed quotas for the percentage
of foreigners in Switzerland. In the 1950s and 1960s, this discourse of Über-
fremdung was mainly aimed at so-called “guest workers” from Italy and Spain,
who were perceived as a threat to national identity. In contrast, asylum seekers
were, at that time, perceived as victims. However, in the 1970s and 1980s
different right-wing parties started transferring the discourse of Überfrem-
dung onto the issue of asylum, increasingly portraying asylum seekers as a
threat for Switzerland (Miaz 2017: 79–83). While the discourse of Überfrem-
dung itself has not really transferred out of right-wing politics, the “fight
against abuse”, which is very much linked to this discourse, has since then
been adopted and put on the political agenda by several “mainstream” polit-
ical parties too (ibid.: 87–90). It has been the drive behind, and a legitimation
for, many of the changes made to Swiss asylum law over the past forty years.
Changing Law and the Proliferation of Legal
Categories
Since its introduction in 1981, the Swiss Asylum Act has been adapted more
times than any other Swiss law ever has in such a short time period (Mail-
lard and Tafelmacher 1999: 103; Piguet 2009: 84).2 Such frequent legislative
changes to asylum and migration law are not specific to Switzerland and have
been described for other European countries too (see Boswell 2003; Eule
2014: 43; Eule et al. 2019: 41–42). What is, however, specific about the
Swiss case is that several of the changes to Swiss asylum law were made as
the result of political referenda (see Miaz 2017: 16). In addition to the “fight
against abuse” and the idea of deterrence, Jonathan Miaz identifies the will
to accelerate asylum procedures as a further leitmotiv behind the many adap-
tations of the Swiss Asylum Act (2017: 2). To go into all these changes in
detail would go beyond the scope of this chapter, but a detailed analysis can
be found in Miaz’s doctoral thesis “Politique d’asile et sophistication du droit ”
(2017). In short, the general tendencies of these changes include the intro-
duction of new reasons for rejecting asylum claims, the introduction of new
evidentiary requirements as well as restrictions to the possibilities of claiming
asylum in the first place and the creation of particular obstacles for appealing
asylum decisions (Miaz 2017: 2). The following table shows some of these
changes which best illustrate these major trends (Fig. 3.2).
2Substantial changes were made to the Asylum Act in 1983, 1984, 1986, 1990, 1992, 1994/1995,
1996, 1998, 1999, 2003, 2005/2006, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2015 and 2016 (see Miaz 2017: 95–96;
Piguet 2006: 106; Schweizerische Flüchtlingshilfe SFH 2009: 31–38).
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1984 - The asylum procedure is shortened.
- In so-called “evidently unfounded cases” the procedure can be shortened by 
not conducting a second longer interview. 
- It is no longer possible to appeal asylum decisions at the Federal Tribunal. 
1986 - Rejected asylum seekers can be detained up to 30 days pending deportation. 
- The cantons are allowed to issue a three-month working ban for asylum 
seekers. 
1990 - Applications by people from so-called “safe countries” now lead to a 
“dismissal without entering into the substance of the case” (DAWES-decision.) 
- The Asylum Appeals Commission (Asylrekurskommission), an independent 
appeal board (which later becomes the Federal Administrative Court) is created. 
- The cantons are allowed to stretch the working ban for asylum seekers to six 
months. 
1999 - If applicants do not hand in any identity papers (or render credible why they 
cannot), this leads to a DAWES-decision (see above).
2006 - If applicants do not hand in any identity papers within the first 48 hours of 
applying for asylum (or render credible why they cannot), this leads to a 
DAWES-decision.
- The deadline for appealing DAWES-decisions is lowered from 30 to five 
days.
- All rejected asylum seekers are no longer entitled to social welfare. They now 
only receive emergency aid according to article 12 of the Federal Constitution 
of the Swiss Confederation, which states that “Persons in need and unable to 
provide for themselves have the right to assistance and care, and to the financial 
means required for a decent standard of living”.
2008 - The Schengen Agreement and Dublin Regulation comes into effect.
2012 - People who “have refused to perform military service or have deserted” and 
claim for asylum on these grounds are excluded from refugee status as well as 
people “who claim grounds based on their conduct following their departure 
that are neither an expression nor a continuation of a conviction already held in 
their native country or country of origin” (Art. 3, paragraphs 3 and 4, AsylA).
Fig. 3.2 Changes to asylum legislation between 1984 and 2012 (Source My own
summary). The information I use here comes from Miaz (2017: 92–97) and from
the SRF News website (https://www.srf.ch/news/schweiz/abstimmungen/abstimmung-
vom-9-6-2013/asylgesetz/chronologie-asylrecht-sukzessive-verschaerft, last accessed
29.01.2020). The dates I refer to in the table are from when the decision to make
the changes was taken (mostly by parliament or by political referendum). However,
some of those changes only came into effect a year or more later
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A consequence of the changes made to asylum law has been the prolif-
eration of legal categories or labels of protection, a trend which has been
described for the Global North in general (see Poertner 2018: 5; Zetter 2007).
The graph below, which was created by Jonathan Miaz, nicely illustrates this
for Switzerland.
The dark blue bars indicate the percentage of asylum claims being granted,
while the orange bars show the proportion of rejected asylum claims. The red
and green bars—the latter are only barely visible—show the percentage of
so-called DAWES decisions. DAWES stands for “dismissal without entering
into the substance of the case”. The red bars are DAWES decisions without
temporary admission, the nearly invisible green bars are DAWES decisions
with temporary admission. Rejected asylum claims with temporary admis-
sion are marked in light blue. The yellow bars show the percentage of Dublin
decisions. While before 1986 there were only two possible outcomes of
decision-making: people were either granted asylum or their claims were
rejected, we can since then observe a multiplication of legal categories. In
1986, the legal status of temporary admission was created. This came at a
time of rising numbers of rejected asylum seekers who could nevertheless not
be deported either under international law or for humanitarian and technical
reasons (Sille 2016: 22–24). The emergence of this category fits with what
Didier Fassin has called the “humanitarianization of asylum”, a kind of “sub-
stitution of a right to asylum by an obligation in terms of charity” (2005: 387;
see also Fassin 2012). In one of the training courses for new decision-makers
that I attended, this understanding was taught to the novices in very explicit
terms: “Temporary protection is not a right, but a service [Dienstleistung ] we
provide”, the instructor announced.3 Today in countries of the Global North,
such forms of subsidiary protection are granted more frequently than asylum.
In the Swiss case, subsidiary protection is further divided into subcategories,
as I will discuss later on in this chapter. Figure 3.3 shows the emergence of
DAWES decisions in 1990, when this category was newly introduced. We
can see how in 1999, when the lack of identity papers was added as a reason
for rejecting asylum claims without going into the substance of the case,
the number of DAWES decisions significantly increased. After most reasons
for taking such decisions were abolished in 2014, in turn, there is a sharp
decline. In 2009, we can see the new category of “Dublin decisions” emerging
after the Schengen Agreement and Dublin regulation came into effect in
Switzerland in December 2008. This agreement, amongst other things, “reg-
ulates which member state is responsible for processing an application for
3Training instructor, A-modules, field notes, my own translation.
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Fig. 3.3 The proliferation of legal categories and first instance asylum decisions
between 1968 and 2015 (Source Miaz 2017: 168)
asylum”: normally the first country in the so-called “Schengen/Dublin” area
an applicant enters, or is registered by.4
This proliferation of legal categories, together with the increased
complexity in asylum law and the growing numbers of asylum applications
(especially in the early and late 1990s due to the wars in the Balkan region),
has led to the emergence of an increasingly specialised office called the SEM,
as I will go on to discuss.
The SEM: A Specialised Asylum Administration
Emerges
You know, thirty years ago this office was a mere section of the Federal Office
of Police, the fedpol, just a section. And then when I started [working here]
it was the Office of the Delegate for Refugees (Amt des Delegierten für das
Flüchtlingswesen). That was more like a task force. The idea was to deal with
4https://www.refugeecouncil.ch/asylum-law/legal-basis/schengendublin-and-switzerland.html, last
accessed 03.02.2020, see also: https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/en/home/asyl/dublin.html, last accessed
03.02.2020.
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the asylum business and to just get it over and done with. And then […] later
it was merged with the Federal Office for Foreigners and became the Federal
Office of Migration and now we’re a State Secretariat. Do you see? In thirty
years we have gone from being a single section to being a State Secretariat.
That explains a lot of things.5
In this quote, SEM caseworker Peter accurately summarises the develop-
ment of the office in charge of dealing with asylum applications since 1981.
He shows how since 1981 the office has gone from being a small section
within the Federal Office of Police (fedpol) to a State Secretariat, making
its director one of the six State Secretaries in Switzerland. The first office in
charge of taking asylum decisions was set up in 1981 when the first Swiss
Asylum Act came into effect. At that time, the office was a mere section
within the Federal Office of Police (fedpol). Being part of the fedpol, the
office formed part of the Federal Department of Justice and Police (FDJP), as
the SEM still does today. The FDJP is one of seven government departments
in Switzerland, each of which is led by one of the seven Federal Councillors
which constitute the country’s executive. In 1985, the Federal Councillor
then in charge of the FDJP founded a new office, the Office of the Dele-
gate for Refugees, with the clear aim of dealing with “the refugee problem”
(Kopp 1987). The idea was that this office would exist for a maximum of
ten years and that by then “the problem” would be “solved” (Miaz 2017: 98).
Apart from taking asylum decisions, it was the office’s duty to coordinate
the work of the federal government with the cantons and different NGOs
working with refugees. It was also in charge of cooperating with international
actors and preparing the Swiss state for possible future “problems” (Kopp
1987). By 1990, it was clear that a more long-term “solution” was needed
and the Federal Office for Refugees was set up. While the Federal Office for
Refugees still formed part of the FDJP, it was no longer a part of the fedpol
itself. Fifteen years later, in 2005, the then responsible Federal Councillor, in
an attempt to substantially reduce administrative costs, merged the Federal
Office for Refugees with the Federal Office of Immigration, Integration and
Emigration, which together became the Federal Office of Migration. With
this merger, the Councillor’s main aim was to steer Switzerland’s migration
politics in a more “holistic and consequent” way.6 As can be seen in a media
communiqué presented by the FDJP at the time, the merger was meant to
solve the “problems that exist nowadays in the ‘fields of asylum and foreigners’
5Peter, caseworker, headquarters, interview transcript, my own translation.
6https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/de/home/aktuell/news/2004/ref_2004-06-07.html, last accessed
30.01.2020.
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(Asyl - und Ausländerbereich) […] in a more effective and economic way”.7
Furthermore, the communiqué states that the aim of the consolidation of
the two offices was to be better able to “combat abuse”, which clearly reflects
the global trends described above. The merger exemplifies how asylum has
increasingly become a “vector of immigration”, as Carolina Kobelinsky has
argued (2015: 87). Finally, on 1st January 2015, in the midst of my fieldwork,
the Federal Office of Migration became a State Secretariat in order to “take
account of the growing importance of the SEM’s work and its expanding
range of tasks”.8 A further reason for this “upgrading” was to strengthen the
office director’s position in international negotiations and place him on the
same level as the representatives from other countries so he would better be
able to represent Switzerland’s interests.9 Before the Federal Office of Migra-
tion (FOM) became the State Secretariat for Migration in 2015, there were
only four State Secretaries: one responsible for foreign affairs, one for interna-
tional finance issues, one for economy and one for education and research.10
It seems noteworthy that this change came at a time when Switzerland began
negotiating the issue of free movement of people (Personenfreizügigkeit ) with
the EU following the acceptance of the referendum “against mass immi-
gration” (Masseneinwanderungsinitiative ) by a majority of the electorate in
2014.
The institutional changes I have described so far are those which led to
name changes of the first-instance asylum administration in Switzerland. In
addition, there have also been several other structural reforms. For instance,
in September 2013, all the asylum units at the SEM headquarters in Bern
were newly put together. While before, decision-makers had worked in so-
called regional teams, meaning that each unit specialised in dealing with
applications from asylum seekers from specific regions, from September 2013
onwards all of the newly constituted teams were requested to deal with ‘cases’
from everywhere. When I started doing fieldwork in the SEM in early 2014,
some of the teams had because of that only quite recently started working
together. A rather substantial restructuration, furthermore, occurred in March
7https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/de/home/aktuell/news/2004/ref_2004-06-07.html, last accessed
30.01.2020.
8https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/en/home/ueberuns/sem.html, last accessed 30.01.2020.
9https://www.ejpd.admin.ch/ejpd/de/home/aktuell/news/2014/2014-09-191.html, last accessed
31.01.2020.
10In 2018, the Directorate for European Affairs was created and its director became the sixth State
Secretary.
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2019, thus well after I had completed my fieldwork.11 While this last reform
has led to significant changes in the administration’s organisational structure
and some procedural aspects have slightly changed, the core of SEM decision-
makers’ work has not: decision-makers still conduct asylum interviews and
assess asylum seekers’ eligibility to refugee status as well as their credibility,
which is what this book is mainly about. The procedural and structural organ-
isations I describe in this book reflect matters as they stood at the time of my
research in 2014 and 2015. However, before turning to these descriptions, I
would like to briefly highlight some of the major changes introduced by the
2019 reform.
The main aim of the 2019 reform was to accelerate the procedure for
which three principal reasons were given: first, to get rejected asylum seekers
to leave the country as fast as possible; second, to ensure that asylum seekers
do not have to wait for years to receive their decision so that they can be more
quickly “integrated into society”12; and third, to cut government costs.13
Today, the new accelerated procedure lasts for a maximum of 140 days,
with sixty to seventy per cent of all asylum applications being dealt with
in this way. The remaining thirty to forty per cent of all asylum applica-
tions—namely, those deemed more complicated and needing more time to
be examined—are assigned to the extended procedure which works more
or less the same way as the “regular” procedure did at the time of my
research. The accelerated procedures take place in so-called “federal centres”
(Bundeszentren) located in six different regions in Switzerland. Apart from
accommodating the asylum seekers, these centres also house SEM decision-
makers and legal advisors. Asylum seekers have access to free legal advisors
who accompany the former throughout the whole procedure. Before the
2019 reform, it was uncommon for asylum seekers to have legal represen-
tation during the first-instance proceedings with legal advice services being
provided by different NGOs mainly at the appeal level. However, there used
to be so-called “social aid representatives” (Hilfswerksvertretungen) present
during the asylum interviews in the old procedures. These social aid represen-
tatives—whose function I will describe in more detail below—have now been
replaced by the new “in-house” legal advisors. Moreover, another substantial
11This last reform was set in motion after it had been “accepted by two-thirds of [the] voters in a
nationwide ballot in 2016” (https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/explainer-_how-well-does-the-new-swiss-asy
lum-system-work--/45360318, last accessed 31.01.2020).
12https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/explainer-_how-well-does-the-new-swiss-asylum-system-work--/453
60318, last accessed 31.01.2020.
13See: https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/explainer-_how-well-does-the-new-swiss-asylum-system-work--/
45360318, last accessed 31.01.2020 and https://sem.media-flow.ch/asylverfahren-de#12, last accessed
31.01.2020.
3 Asylum Decision-Making in Switzerland 59
change induced by the reform has been to drastically cut the deadline for
appealing first-instance asylum decisions to the Federal Administrative Court:
from thirty days down to seven days for those asylum seekers going through
the accelerated procedure. For those assigned to the extended procedure, the
deadline remains at thirty days.14
In the remaining parts of this book, I will not deal with this accelerated
procedure but rather look at the “regular” procedure as it existed until early
2019. Most steps of the decision-making procedure and the legal require-
ments for receiving asylum have remained the same. What I describe in this
book is, therefore, still relevant for understanding asylum decision-making
in Switzerland today. Furthermore, the Swiss asylum decision-making proce-
dure shares many characteristics with other initial asylum decision-making
proceedings in the Global North: the proceedings are inquisitorial in design,
credibility determination plays a crucial role and is based on a special standard
of proof, and the legal refugee definition is based on the one from the 1951
Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol (see Johannesson 2017: 13; Poertner
2018: 6). Hence, my analysis also contributes to understanding processes and
practices of asylum decision-making more generally.
The Decision-Making Procedure
The SEM is, according to its website, “responsible for all matters covered by
legislation on foreign nationals and asylum seekers in Switzerland”.15 The
organisation defines its main tasks as follows:
The SEM determines under what circumstances a person may enter Switzer-
land to live and work. It also decides who is granted protection from
persecution. In collaboration with the cantons, the SEM organises the accom-
modation of asylum seekers and the return of people who do not need
protection to their country of origin. It also co-ordinates the integration of
foreign nationals into Switzerland, is responsible for naturalising foreigners
and works actively at an international level to control migration movements.16
In “Economy and Society”, Max Weber identifies both the “clearly defined
hierarchy of offices” and the clear division of competences and tasks as typical
14See: https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/explainer-_how-well-does-the-new-swiss-asylum-system-work--/
45360318, last accessed 31.01.2020 and https://sem.media-flow.ch/asylverfahren-de#12, last accessed
31.01.2020, https://www.fluechtlingshilfe.ch/asylgesetzrevision.html, last accessed 31.01.2020.
15https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/en/home/ueberuns/sem/aufgaben.html, last accessed 02.02.2020.
16https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/en/home/ueberuns/sem.html, last accessed 02.02.2020.
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characteristics of bureaucracy (Weber 2013 [1978]: 220). Both these features
are characteristic of the SEM.
This book considers the work which is done within one of the SEM’s four
directorates: the asylum directorate. More specifically, I did all my fieldwork
in three of this directorate’s divisions: “Asylum I”, “Asylum II” and “RPC”.
“RPC” stands for reception and processing centres, whose function I will
describe in detail below. The directorate “Asylum” is the biggest directorate
in the SEM and the three divisions I studied were, at the time of my research,
those with the most staff. This was clearly evident when I attended a “wel-
come day” for new SEM employees in early 2014. There were twenty-five
new employees present that day of whom twenty were destined for the asylum
directorate while the other five were headed to the other three directorates.
The asylum directorate is responsible for first-instance asylum proceed-
ings in Switzerland. It is charged with examining all asylum applications
and reaching first-instance decisions. At the second instance, these deci-
sions can then be appealed at the Federal Administrative Court. The Federal
Administrative Court is the first, and simultaneously the last, appeal board
in Switzerland. Negative judgements by the court cannot be appealed on a
national level any further. Thereafter, the only remaining possibility is to file
an appeal against Switzerland at the European Court of Human Rights.17 The
SEM’s asylum directorate’s duties are, to a great extent, limited to the asylum
decision-making proceedings. Consequently, the provision of accommoda-
tion for asylum seekers and providing social welfare, for example, are duties
which are carried out by other actors. Organisations (both profit and non-
profit) are commissioned by the SEM to provide these “services” in the RPCs
(or today in the Bundeszentren) or they are commissioned by the cantons
once asylum seekers have been assigned to them. The cantons are also respon-
sible for executing removal orders—or, to put it more bluntly, for detaining
and deporting rejected asylum seekers—and for many questions concerning
asylum seekers’ stay (such as their right to employment).
At the time of my research, the majority of asylum applications were filed
at the RPCs. Even if the RPCs have now been replaced by the Bundeszentren
and do not exist as such anymore, I will proceed to describe the proceed-
ings in the RPCs in the present tense for better readability. In RPCs, asylum
seekers’ personal data is recorded, their photos and fingerprints are taken,
and a medical examination is carried out by security, medical or otherwise
17In some cases, asylum seekers can make use of what are called “extraordinary legal remedies”
(ausserordentliche Rechtsmittel ): a request for a revision of the judgement by the Federal Administrative
Court or for a “reconsideration” (Wiedererwägung ) of the claim by the SEM on the basis of article
66 of the Federal Act on Administration Procedure (APA).
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specialised staff. Their fingerprints are then checked against the EuroDac
(European Dactyloscopy) database in order to see whether the applicant has
been registered in any of the other signatory states of the Schengen Agree-
ment. On the basis of this, a case file is opened up, which is randomly
assigned to a decision-maker at the RPC. Days, or sometimes weeks later, this
decision-maker summons the asylum seeker to the first (short) asylum inter-
view: the Befragung zur Person (the interview about the applicant’s identity).
Other than the decision-maker and the asylum seeker, only an interpreter
may be present during these interviews. Thus, the decision-makers themselves
write the minutes of the interview. In these first interviews, the asylum seekers
are questioned about their personal data (e.g. family ties, education, place
of residence, etc.) as well as their reasons for applying for asylum and their
travel routes. Often in these interviews, decision-makers probe with a detailed
“country test” to try and ascertain whether the asylum seekers “really” are
from where they claim. This is because, after the first interview, the decision-
maker has to assign the ‘case’ to one of three identity categories: A, B or C.
Category A indicates that there is “valid” (rechtsgenüglich) proof of identity.
Category B concedes that, although there is no valid proof of identity, the
caseworkers have no serious doubts about the applicant’s country of origin.
Category C, on the other hand, indicates that caseworkers suspect the appli-
cants’ declared “country of origin” to be untrue because they question the
authenticity of identity documents and/or find that the asylum seekers have
“insufficient knowledge” about their “country of origin” or that there are “lin-
guistic indicators” that the asylum seekers might be from somewhere else
other than what they have said. My analysis of random case files suggests
that the majority of case files are assigned to category B, or at least that was
true at the time of my fieldwork. The classification of ‘cases’ into the category
C usually leads to a so-called LINGUA report being requested before the
case file is passed on to a decision-maker for taking further procedural steps.
LINGUA reports are done by so-called external experts, which are contacted
by the LINGUA unit of the SEM, “a specialised unit for analysis of origin”.
The unit’s—or rather its experts’—task is to
carry out analyses of origin for people seeking asylum and for other foreigners.
[…] It is the aim of the analysis of origin to determine the country and/or
region or, at least, the milieu, which have had the biggest influence on the
subject in his/her process of socialization. It is for this purpose that the subject’s
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speech as well as his/her cultural knowledge of the region concerned are
examined.18
In addition to assigning ‘cases’ to the three identity categories, after the
first interview, decision-makers also have to indicate if (they think) the ‘case’
they are dealing with falls within the Schengen/Dublin regulation or is a so-
called GespeVer (gender-based persecution) ‘case’. All forms of violence, harm
and discrimination experienced by the applicants on the basis of their gender
identity and sexual orientation are considered gender-based persecution by
the SEM.19 According to Article 6 of the Asylverordnung 1 über Verfahrens-
fragen (“Regulation 1 on Asylum”), in the case of gender-based persecution,
the asylum interview must be conducted by a decision-maker of the same
gender as the applicant and only in the presence of people (the social aid
representative, interpreter and minute-taker) of the same gender (see Art. 6,
AsylV1).
All these assessments—what identity category a ‘case’ is assigned to and
whether it is a GespeVer or Dublin ‘case’ or not—impact upon where the
case file is next sent and how it is dealt with further. This first “triage”, as
it is called, falls within the jurisdiction of the heads of the different units
at the RPCs. They decide whether the file is sent to the headquarters, stays
at the RPC or goes to the Dublin unit. Exactly which ‘cases’ are kept at
the RPCs and which are sent to the headquarters remained a slight puzzle
to me throughout my fieldwork. Mostly, this was because my interaction
partners—including the heads—were often confused themselves about the
current practice, which they told me kept changing. The heads at the RPCs
triage the files according to a list which states for each “country of origin”
whether the case file has to be sent to the headquarters or not. On the lists,
the countries are classified into different “priority categories”. When I first
started doing research in the SEM, there were three such “priority cate-
gories”.20 “Priority 1” were countries, to which applicants could (‘easily’) be
deported back. In turn, countries were classified as “priority 2” if deportations
were possible but complicated and costly (aufwändig ). “Priority 3” countries
were those to which deportations were not possible, and only so-called
“voluntary returns” (see Loher 2020) could be affected. Decision-makers at
the reception centres mostly dealt with “priority 1 cases”, while the ‘cases’
18https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/en/home/publiservice/service/sprachanalysen/lingua.html, last
accessed 02.02.2020.
19See SEM manual “Asyl und Rückkehr ”, article D2, https://www.sem.admin.ch/dam/data/sem/asyl/
verfahren/hb/d/hb-d2-d.pdf, last accessed 02.02.2020.
20See also Ephraim Poertner (2018: 172–173, 283–284) for a discussion of the priority categories in
the SEM.
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assigned to the other two categories were sent to the headquarters. Later on
during my research the situation changed, with the three “priority categories”
being reduced to two categories. “Prio 1 cases” then became those ‘cases’
that would most likely be decided negatively (e.g. claims by applicants from
countries with very low recognition rates, claims by applicants coming from
so-called “safe countries” or through a “Dublin country”, claims by applicants
who have committed a crime, etc.), while all others became “second priority
cases”. With “prio 1 cases”, the decision-makers were requested to work
according to the principle “last in, first out”. With second priority ‘cases’,
in turn, the guiding principle was “first in, first out”. Ephraim Poertner has
argued that these principles function as measures of deterrence. Thus, “for the
first group of claimants, deterrence is considered to work best with a prompt
negative decision and a threat of expulsion […]. And for the second group
of claimants, who are likely to receive protection, deterrence works through
the suspension of benefits until asylum is finally granted” (2017: 19).
During my research, it seemed that many of the “prio 1 cases” remained
at the RPCs to be dealt with while a large proportion of the other priority
categories were sent to the headquarters. However, as officials, both at the
headquarters and at the RPCs, told me repeatedly, this division was not
as strict as it had formerly been, leading to “everyone doing everything”.
Nevertheless, my impression was that ‘cases’ submitted by applicants from
countries where fewer asylum seekers come from were often sent to the head-
quarters as well as ‘cases’ which were deemed to be “very complex” and
“time-consuming”.
Once the files are assigned to a specific section, either at the headquarters
or the RPCs, it is up to the head of this section to allocate the ‘cases’ to
one of their employees or to send them to the archives for a while. Some
cases, instead of going directly to a decision-maker, are first given to a
so-called “pooly”. The name “pooly” derives from the fact that these people
belong to a pool of interviewers who only conduct asylum interviews but
do not take any decisions. “Poolies” do not belong to the SEM’s regular
staff, but are rather paid by the hour to conduct asylum interviews. Like
decision-makers, “poolies” carry out the second longer asylum interviews—
which may take place weeks, months or, in some cases, even years after the
first short interview. In these interviews, the decision-makers or “poolies”
interrogate the asylum seekers in detail about their reasons for fleeing and
for applying for asylum in Switzerland. In rare cases, a third supplementary
interview is carried out. A minute-taker and a social aid representative join
the decision-maker (or “pooly”), the asylum seeker and the interpreter in
the longer second and third interviews. As the job title indicates, social aid
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representatives work for different NGOs active in the field of asylum. Their
job is to “observe the procedure from a neutral perspective”. Furthermore,
they can “have the SEM [officials] ask the asylum seekers about certain issues
or pose the questions themselves, express objections and urge additional
clarifications”.21 At the end of the interview, they fill in a form, which
is stapled to the minutes of the interview and goes in the case file. On
the forms they can note any particular observations they made during the
interview, suggest further investigations (e.g. a medical examination), and
state any objections they might have to the minutes. Finally, they write a
report for the organisation they work for and for the Swiss Refugee Council
(Schweizerische Flüchtlingshilfe ) which is the umbrella organisation of all
refugee organisations in Switzerland, coordinating social aid representatives’
work in the asylum procedures. On these forms, the social aid representatives
must, amongst other things, assess the ‘case’ (and indicate if they think it
was credible or not and predict whether it will probably lead to asylum or
not). These forms are sometimes used by lawyers and legal advisors when
filing an appeal against a negative decision with the Federal Administrative
Court. At the end of the second and sometimes third asylum interviews, the
minutes are read back to the asylum seeker by the interpreter. The asylum
seeker has to sign every page in order to prove the veracity of the recorded
statements. The signed minutes, together with the report form from the
social aid representative and any material evidence the applicant might have
handed in, are then included in the case file, which normally remains with
the same caseworker or, in the case of a “pooly-interview”, is passed on to the
official responsible for taking the decision. During the process of taking the
written decision, caseworkers might undertake further investigations with the
Swiss embassies in the applicants’ countries of origin, have documents tested
for their authenticity, order a LINGUA report or a wrist bone analysis (the
latter is done in order to find out whether the applicant is “really” a minor)22
or consult a “country analyst”, for instance.23 Once the caseworker has made
the decision, it must be checked and double-signed by the head of the section
or their proxy before it is sent by post to the asylum seeker or their legal
representative. The SEM official’s involvement is then usually over except in
case of an appeal. In case of an appeal, the FAC invites the SEM (through the
official in charge of the ‘case’) to hand in an official statement concerning the
21https://www.refugeecouncil.ch/asylum-law/asylum-procedure-until-march-2019/social-aid-represent
ation.html, last accessed 02.02.2020.
22For a description of this method, see Andreas Schmeling et al. (2003: 164).
23These kinds of investigations are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
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SEM’s stance on the applicant’s reasons for appeal. If the SEM’s original deci-
sion is upheld by the court or if the decision is not appealed against in the first
place (e.g. because it is a positive decision, the deadline for appeal is too short
or the applicants do not find a legal advisor willing to help and/or represent
them), the decision obtains legal force (Rechtskraft ). If asylum or temporary
protection is granted, the responsibility is primarily passed on to the cantons.
In case of a negative decision without temporary protection, the directorate
of “International Cooperation” (a different directorate of the SEM) becomes
responsible for organising the “return” of the rejected applicants and the
cantons become responsible for organising the deportations.
From the above description, we can see that asylum determination in the
SEM fits an inquisitorial style of decision-making, one of two main types of
decision-making which Mirjan Damaška distinguishes, the other one being
adversarial decision-making (1986: 3). Rebecca Hamlin contrasts the two
styles as follows:
The adversarial style takes the shape of a triad: two disputants arguing their
respective cases before a passive judge, who must resolve the dispute by
deciding which case is more persuasive […] Unlike this courtroom-like setting,
inquisitorial hearings are designed to be nonadversarial and nonlegalistic,
taking the form of a dyad between the person whose fate is to be decided and
the person deciding it. The inquisitorial decision maker engages in a conversa-
tion with the parties, and the facts must be discovered through a collaborative
process of research and questioning. (2014: 18)
The inquisitorial style appears to be common for the initial stages in most
asylum determination procedures in the Global North (see Hamlin 2014;
Johannesson 2017: 13). Second-instance proceedings, in turn, tend to be
more adversarial. In Switzerland, on appeal level, the appellant and the SEM
both submit their opinions or “versions of the story” (Hamlin 2014: 18)
in writing to the Federal Administrative Court, with the whole proceedings
from then on taking place via written documents and briefs. While in theory
the judges at the Federal Administrative Court would have the possibility
to conduct court hearings, in practice this is not done. Instead, the judges
sometimes send out written questionnaires to the appellants, but, mostly,
their work consists of analysing the documents handed in at appeal level as
well as those from the first-instance proceedings, including the minutes from
the asylum interviews. Furthermore, they sometimes also request information
or ask for assessments from the in-house “country analysts”. Hence, in this
regard, their role to some extent also remains inquisitorial.
66 L. Affolter
Robert Kagan suggests an additional way of distinguishing between
different models of decision-making, namely according to how “formal” or
“informal” they are and whether they are organised in a more “hierarchical
and centralised” or “fragmented and participatory” way, the latter referring to
“multiple disputing parties” participating in the proceedings (Hamlin 2014:
19; see Kagan 2001: 9–10). By “informal” he means that decision-making is
mainly “based on discretion and case-by-case considerations” while “formal”
decision-making is “based on legal rules and precedents” (Hamlin 2014:
19; see Kagan 2001: 9–10). Apart from being clearly inquisitorial, I would
argue that asylum decision-making in the SEM tends more towards being
“formal” as well as “hierarchical and centralised”, which Robert Kagan
refers to as “bureaucratic legalism” (2001: 10). Rules, institutional guide-
lines—or “secondary application norms”, as Jonathan Miaz calls them (2017:
291–297)—as well as precedents set by the Federal Administrative Court
significantly guide SEM decision-makers’ everyday practices. However, at the
same time, decision-making in the SEM is also to some extent what Kagan
calls “informal”: officials deal with asylum applications on a case-by-case
basis, actively investigating the ‘cases’ they are dealing with, selecting which
rules to apply in particular situations and interpreting those rules in the
course of their application. With its centralised organisation that is then
segmented into “decentralised branch-offices” (Schneider 2019: 288) and
rather clear-cut institutional hierarchies, the SEM, furthermore, seems to
closely resemble first-instance asylum organisations in other Western Euro-
pean civil law countries, such as the Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl
in Austria (see Dahlvik 2018), the Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge
in Germany (see Probst 2012; Schneider 2019) or the Office Français de
Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides in France (Probst 2012).
The Swiss Asylum Act
Decision-making in the SEM ultimately comes down to assigning asylum
claimants to one of four legal categories, each of which is attached to a set
of rights and obligations. As Fig. 3.4 shows, these categories are: refugee
with asylum, refugee with temporary admission, non-refugee with tempo-
rary admission (mostly on the basis of so-called “humanitarian grounds”) and
non-refugee without temporary admission.
In order to assign asylum seekers to one of the four categories a sequence of
yes or no questions must be answered by the decision-makers. The two main
eligibility questions decision-makers deal with are: Are applicants eligible to
3 Asylum Decision-Making in Switzerland 67
Fig. 3.4 Flowchart of asylum decision-making based on the Swiss Asylum Act (Source
Own diagram). This diagram is my synthesis of flowcharts I received in three separate
training modules that I attended in the SEM
asylum and, if not, are they eligible to temporary protection? Both these eligi-
bilities are enshrined in the Swiss Asylum Act (AsylA). In order to receive
asylum, asylum seekers must be recognised as refugees. Drawing on the 1951
Refugee Convention, refugees in the Swiss Asylum Act are defined as “per-
sons who in their native country or in their country of last residence are
subject to serious disadvantages or have a well-founded fear of being exposed
to such disadvantages for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of
a particular social group or due to their political opinions” (Art. 3, paragraph
1, AsylA). Article 3 AsylA, furthermore, elaborates on what is included in
“serious disadvantages”: namely “a threat to life, physical integrity or freedom
as well as measures that exert intolerable psychological pressure” (Art. 3, para-
graph 2, AsylA). In addition, it notes that “[m]otives for seeking asylum
specific to women must be taken into account” (ibid.). In 2012, following
a public referendum, the refugee category was made more restrictive by
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excluding certain groups of people from it. For this purpose, two new para-
graphs were added to Article 3 of the Asylum Act. Paragraph 3 now states that
“[p]ersons who are subject to serious disadvantages or have a well-founded
fear of being exposed to such disadvantages because they have refused to
perform military service or have deserted are not refugees” (Art. 3, paragraph
3, AsylA). And paragraph 4 lays down that “[p]ersons who claim grounds
based on their conduct following their departure that are neither an expres-
sion nor a continuation of a conviction already held in their native country or
country of origin are not refugees” (Art. 3, paragraph 4, AsylA). These restric-
tions mainly came about as a reaction to applications from Eritreans seeking
protection after having deserted from the military and, thus, having fled from
probable life-long service, and as a reaction to people claiming asylum on the
basis of persecution due to their conversion to Christianity, for example.
In Fig. 3.4, we can see that in some cases, while people are recognised
as refugees, they are, nevertheless, excluded from asylum. This is, on the one
hand, done on the basis of Article 1F of the 1951 Refugee Convention which
states that
The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to […] person[s] with
respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that: (a) [they have]
committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as
defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect
of such crimes; (b) [they have] committed a serious non-political crime outside
the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee; (c)
[they have] been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of
the United Nations. (Article 1F, 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees)
On the other hand, the Swiss Asylum Act itself sets out reasons for
excluding refugees from asylum. Thus, Article 53 determines that “[r]efugees
shall not be granted asylum if: a. they are unworthy of it due to serious
misconduct; b. they have violated or endangered Switzerland’s internal or
external security” (Art. 53, AsylA) and Article 54 states that “[r]efugees shall
not be granted asylum if they became refugees in accordance with Article
3 only by leaving their native country or country of origin or due to their
conduct after their departure” (Art. 54, AsylA).
A major precondition for being recognised as a refugee and receiving
asylum is that applicants “prove or at least credibly demonstrate their refugee
status” (Art. 7, paragraph 1, AsylA). Article 7 stipulates that one’s “[r]efugee
status is credibly demonstrated if the authority regards it as proven on the
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balance of probabilities [and that] [c]ases are not credible in particular if
they are unfounded in essential points or are inherently contradictory, do
not correspond to the facts or are substantially based on forged or falsified
evidence” (Art. 7, paragraphs 2 and 3, AsylA). “On the balance of prob-
abilities” seems to be a comparatively high standard of proof in asylum
proceedings compared to that of other countries and the standard set by
international law which ‘merely’ demands “a reasonable degree of likelihood”
(see Good 2015; Kelly 2012; Sweeney 2009). Commonly, “on the balance
of probabilities” is the standard of proof in civil law proceedings, and not
in asylum procedures (see Kelly 2012: 764). Whether this is a translation
problem – since English is not an official language of the Swiss Confedera-
tion – or whether the standard of proof is, at least in formal terms, indeed
higher in Switzerland than in other countries is not possible for me to deter-
mine with certainty, but may be an important issue to be addressed by legal
scholarship. In any case, being credible is “different both from ‘being proven’
and from ‘being true’” (Sweeney 2009: 711). Claimants’ eligibility to refugee
status does not have to be “proven beyond reasonable doubt” and is not
“immediately susceptible to positivistic proof” (Kelly 2012: 759, 264; see
also Kelly 2011: 194). Hence, material evidence and witnesses that corrob-
orate the ill treatment of asylum seekers are not a necessary requirement for
being granted asylum (see Good 2011: 94).24
If asylum seekers are regarded as not being eligible to asylum, for instance
because the claims are deemed non-credible, the caseworkers must decide
whether the applicant should receive temporary admission on the basis of
Article 83 of the Federal Act on Foreign Nationals (FNA). Temporary admis-
sion is granted to applicants “[i]f the enforcement of removal is not permitted
[under international law],25 not reasonable [for humanitarian reasons]26 or
not possible [for ‘technical’ reasons]”27 (Art. 83, paragraph 1, FNA). If any
of these questions are answered with yes, the applicant is granted subsidiary
protection. If the answer to all these questions is no, applicants receive a letter
24See also Anthony Good (2003: 4), Walter Kälin (1990: 299), Cécile Rousseau et al. (2002: 44) as
well as the SEM “Asylum and Return Compendium”: https://www.sem.admin.ch/dam/data/sem/asyl/
verfahren/hb/b/hb-b3-d.pdf, last accessed 10.02.2020.
25“Enforcement is not permitted if Switzerland’s obligations under international law prevent the
foreign national from making an onward journey to their native country, to their country of origin
or to a third country” (Art. 83, paragraph 3, FNA). The relevant international treaties this refers to
are the European Convention on Human Rights, the United Nations Conventions relating to the
Status of Refugees and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.
26“Enforcement may be unreasonable for foreign nationals if they are specifically endangered by
situations such as war, civil war, general violence and medical emergency in their native country or
country of origin” (Art. 83, paragraph 4, FNA).
27“Enforcement is not possible if the foreign national is unable to travel or be brought either to their
native country or to their country of origin or a third country” (Art. 82, paragraph 2, FNA).
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informing them that they must leave Switzerland within a certain amount of
time. With such “removal orders”, the responsibility for the ‘case’ is passed on
to another directorate of the SEM, that of “International Cooperation”, and
to the cantonal authorities who must decide whether to detain or to deport
the people whose asylum applications have been rejected, and hence organise
these actions. Thus, this no longer falls within the responsibility of asylum
decision-makers.
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4
Knowledge as Practice: Producing Decisional
Certainty
Over lunch Julie tells me that she still really struggles with assessing the credi-
bility of asylum claims. She has only started working in the SEM a couple of
weeks ago and so far, finds credibility determination the most difficult part of
her job. “I keep having doubts”, she tells me. She knows that stories ‘only’ have
to be “predominantly credible” to fulfil the requirements, but she finds this
incredibly difficult to assess. She explains that, at the moment, she is luckily
only dealing with asylum applications by Eritreans and they “anyway always
receive temporary admission [on humanitarian grounds] or temporary admis-
sion as refugees. So, either way they are in safety”. But in other cases assessing
credibility “must be so much more difficult”, she fears.1
Julie’s statements are characteristic for what new decision-makers expe-
rience on the job. Many told me that they found reaching final decisions
very difficult, especially regarding the assessment of asylum seeker’s cred-
ibility—or, more precisely, the credibility of asylum seekers’ statements.2
Julie’s statement hints at one important reason for this: Asylum caseworkers’
decisions have very serious consequences for asylum seekers’ lives. In case
of a “wrong decision”, asylum seekers may experience further traumatisa-
tion, be imprisoned, tortured or even killed, a fact that decision-makers are
well aware of. This creates a high emotional burden for decision-makers,
1Julie, caseworker, headquarters, field notes, my own translation.
2In German, a distinction is made between “glaubwürdig ” and “glaubhaft ” which in English both
translate as “credible”. “Glaubwürdig ” refers to the credibility of a person whereas “glaubaft ” relates to
the credibility of statements. In the Swiss asylum procedure, the focus is explicitly on “Glaubhaftigkeit ”
and not on “Glaubwürdigkeit ”. However, in practice these evaluations intersect and the words were
often interchangeably used in the office.
© The Author(s) 2021




making it important for them to reach as much certainty as possible that—
to the best of their knowledge—they are taking “the right decision” (see
Liodden 2016: 235, 277; Sweeney 2007: 31). This emotional burden is
not something that goes away, however, as I will show in this and the
following chapter, credibility assessment is something that becomes easier
over time, with decision-makers gaining experience and professional-practical
knowledge.
That Julie finds credibility assessment so difficult, moreover, has to do with
the “fundamental unknowability” (Poertner 2018: 218) inherent in asylum
decision-making or what Tobias Kelly (2012) calls “known unknowns”. The
term stands for the things decision-makers are aware of that they can never
truly know but which, nevertheless, play a crucial role in decision-making.
In asylum decision-making, I identify four such major “known unknowns”.
In order to be recognised as refugees, applicants must have been persecuted
(or—in the words of Article 3 AsylA—have been subject to serious disadvan-
tages) in the past or have a “well-found fear” of being persecuted in the future.
The first “known unknown” therein is that decision-makers can never know
for sure what will happen to an applicant in the future, of which they are
well aware. Assessing the probability of future persecution and, connected
to this, the well-founded-ness of fear of future persecution is, therefore,
highly challenging for decision-makers. A second “known unknown” is that
decision-makers realise they cannot know for sure what “really happened”
to the applicant in the past (see Poertner 2018: 218). The fact that they do
not and cannot know this is mostly put down to the particular standard of
proof in asylum procedures (see Chapter 3). Since credibility assessments are
mainly done on the basis of applicants’ statements, decision-makers know
that there is always the possibility that applicants could lie—this is some-
thing they themselves would probably do, I was often told (see also Kelly
2012). The third “known unknown” is that decision-makers are conscious
that they can never—and are also not required to—know for sure whether
what the asylum seekers are telling them is “the truth” or not. According
to Article 7 of the Asylum Act, the veracity of a story must “just” be prob-
able, that is what credibility means. Many decision-makers told me that, in
theory, this meant that a claim must be regarded as 51 per cent probable
in order to be deemed credible, which again leaves a lot of room for uncer-
tainty. The fourth “known unknown” in this is that decision-makers are aware
of the fact that one can never really know what it means for something to
be 51 per cent probable because it is not something that can be measured
in numerical terms. Nevertheless, despite these uncertainties, as is character-
istic of legal categorisations, asylum decision-makers must in the end reach
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clear-cut either/or decisions: asylum applicants must either be recognised as
refugees and be granted asylum or not, or they must be granted subsidiary
protection or not. Hence, as Tobias Kelly claims, a “forced migrant” cannot
be “half a refugee” just like a “convict is not a little bit guilty [and] a couple is
not partially divorced” (2015: 188). This is illustrated by the statement made
by Alexandra when describing her task as a decision-maker to me. Alexandra
is a decision-maker close to retirement, who has been working at the SEM
for most of her adult life.
Decision-making, well, that’s our trade, […] that’s our main business […]. This
might be a bad comparison, but it’s a bit like Caesar in the arena going like
this [thumbs up] or like that [thumbs down]. We either say yes or no. There
is a little bit of grey area in-between, but in the end we say yes or no, that’s
the decision.3
What I am mainly concerned with in this chapter is how SEM officials like
Alexandra attempt to overcome the uncertainties described above in order to
reach such clear-cut either/or decisions. Thus, rather than dwelling on what
these uncertainties are and how they are experienced by the decision-makers,
in this chapter I focus on the techniques they devise to overcome these uncer-
tainties and to manage their doubts (see Kelly 2012: 765–766; 2015: 188).
By doing so, I follow Tobias Kelly who argues that
[t]he sense of known unknowns and, more importantly, the techniques we
devise to try to overcome such ignorance, whilst also being aware of the limits
of our knowledge, are central to the ways in which we try to make important
decisions. […] The key point […] is not that things are uncertain. Rather,
it is that we need to grasp the conditions under which attempts are made to
overcome these uncertainties in the full knowledge of their existence. (2012:
765–766)
That decision-making is about reducing uncertainties and doubt is not
specific to asylum administrations, but appears to be characteristic of bureau-
cratic decision-making in general (see Lahusen and Schneider 2017: 12;
Liodden 2016: 274; Lipsky 2010: xiii). It is also typical that doubt and
uncertainties can never be fully eradicated (see Downs 1967: 3). However,
for caseworkers to be able to feel sufficiently confident about their deci-
sions, doubt must be reduced as much as possible. In the SEM, as my
analysis in this chapter shows, different factors contribute to this. These
3Alexandra, caseworker, reception and processing centre, interview transcript, my own translation.
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include: practice doctrine, “country knowledge”, the production of “on-file
facts”—mostly through the questioning techniques in asylum interviews but
sometimes also in form of so-called “expert reports”—and, very importantly,
decision-makers’ professional-practical knowledge.
This chapter contributes to the overall argument of the book in a threefold
way. First, by shedding light on how uncertainties, ambiguities and doubt
are reduced in and through the decision-making processes while never being
fully eradicated, I contribute to gaining a better understanding not only
of how asylum administrations work but also of bureaucracies in general.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that while not being unique to asylum
decision-making, the “psychological weight” of taking asylum decisions in
the light of their potential consequences for asylum seekers’ lives appears
to be particularly elevated in asylum administrations (Rousseau et al. 2002:
44). Furthermore, the specific “known unknowns” arising from the standard
of proof in asylum determination constitute another particularity of asylum
administrations. Second, this chapter brings out the ways in which structural
constraints posed by the law itself—or, more precisely, arising from the clear-
cut form necessarily required of legal categorizations—as well as regulatory
frameworks in the form of practice doctrine, shape what decision-makers
do. Third, as Julia Dahlvik argues, from a praxeological perspective “every
practice is first and foremost a knowledge-based activity” (2018: 57). This
means that if we want to understand what administrative caseworkers do,
we need to pay attention to the knowledge that constitutes their practices.
Much of this knowledge is implicit, embodied and non-verbalisable. As I
show in this chapter, this kind of non-verbalisable, implicit knowledge—
which, building on Andreas Reckwitz’s (2003: 289–294) definition, I call
professional-practical knowledge—plays a crucial role in credibility deter-
mination by guiding decision-makers’ practices, but also by providing them
with the necessary conviction or “sense of security” that they are taking “the
right” decision (see also Dahlvik 2018: 57–62). In other words, it shapes what
decision-makers do. Drawing on Julia Dahlvik (2018: 58), I argue that this
kind of knowledge, on the one hand, shapes the meanings ascribed to certain
objects, persons and situations. On the other hand, it provides decision-
makers with a sense of what the procedural steps are and of “how a chain
of action is competently produced” (ibid.). Finally, it gives decision-makers
an understanding of what they want; of what seems appropriate and desirable
(ibid.). As such, it becomes clear that professional-practical knowledge—and,
more generally, knowledge decision-makers have acquired through experi-
ence—constitutes part of caseworkers’ institutional habitus, their schemes
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of thinking, acting, feeling and desiring that arise from belonging to and
working in the SEM.
This chapter mainly focuses on the first above-mentioned aspects of knowl-
edge: how it shapes the meanings ascribed to certain objects, persons and
situations. The other two aspects are addressed in Chapters 5 and 6. I start
this chapter by introducing a case example to provide an image of what
dealing with uncertainties may look like in practice. Following this, the
chapter sets out the different means and moments through which uncertainty
is turned into decisional certainty, allowing decision-makers to take clear-cut
either/or decisions, and the role different types of knowledge play.
Ben’s Case
Ben is a decision-maker in his early thirties, who had been working in the
SEM for a couple of months at the time I first met him. It was by chance that
I sat in on his interview one morning. Originally, it was planned that I would
spend the day with one of Ben’s more experienced co-workers. However, this
decision-maker suddenly decided he did not want me attending his asylum
interview after all so the head of the asylum unit took me to Ben’s office.4
At this point, Ben is just about to start an asylum interview so he hurriedly
briefs me on the ‘case’. He tells me that the applicant is a young man from
Afghanistan, who claims to have been persecuted due to his former occupa-
tion as a bodyguard for an official of the Afghan authorities. He explains that
he has already interviewed the same applicant once before, but, because he
still does not know how to decide on the case, he has decided to conduct a
supplementary interview. The difficulty, he says, lies in the credibility assess-
ment. He explains that while the applicant has told his asylum story in a
very detailed manner, there are also serious contradictions in his story. That
is why, he says, he just does not know whether to believe the applicant or
not. Ben hopes that after the second interview he will finally be able to reach
a decision. I ask him how he has prepared for the interview and he tells
me that, as usual, he has prepared questions he wants to ask the applicant
and that he also wants to confront the applicant with some of the contra-
dictions in the story to see if they can be resolved. Also, because Ben is not
very familiar with ‘cases’ from Afghanistan yet, he has read the Asyl - und
Wegweisungspraxis (APPA) for Afghanistan. APPAs are institutional guidelines
4I do not know why the caseworker did not want me there; he did not tell me himself but informed
his boss before I arrived at the office in the morning. This is a good example of how “fieldwork does
you” which I described in Chapter 2 (see Simpson 2006: 125).
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on how to decide asylum cases from specific countries or regions and with
specific flight motives. Furthermore, they provide internal “country of origin
information”. Studying the APPA, he explains, is important in order for him
to have something to compare the applicant’s statements to. He adds that if
one already knows the country well, it is not necessary to read and prepare
an interview as much as he has in this case. He explains that “knowing the
country” is important, because it helps to assess whether what the applicant
is saying could be true or not.
Then, Ben gets a phone call from a security guard at the main building,
informing him that the applicant, the interpreter and the social aid represen-
tative have all arrived. Together we go to collect them, while the minute-taker
stays behind in Ben’s office. When we return to Ben’s office everyone takes
their assigned seats around a square table on which there are glasses of water
and a box of tissues. The interview starts as usual. Ben introduces all the
people present and asks the applicant whether he knows what his rights and
duties are. The applicant—through the interpreter—confirms that he does.
Then, Ben asks the applicant about his family and his education. Next, he
questions the applicant thoroughly about his activities as a bodyguard and
then requests that the applicant tell him about the different threats he expe-
rienced in a chronological order. In his account the claimant says that he and
his family had received several death threats from the Taliban; that once he
was beaten up by a group of four men who he identified as being Taliban;
and that once he was abducted for three days by his persecutors but was
released after his father paid a significant amount of ransom money. Ben then
continues to ask specific follow-up questions on the different threats. At the
end, as is common practice in the SEM, he confronts the applicant with the
contradictions he has “found” in the applicant’s narrative.
After the interview, and also during breaks, I ask Ben what he thinks about
the ‘case’ and what decision he is going to take. Ben tells me that he still finds
it a very difficult ‘case’ and that he is pretty sure not everything the asylum
seeker has told him is true, especially not the part about being abducted.
Noticing from my puzzled look that the reasons for this are not as clear to
me as they are for him, he goes on to explain: “He got really worked up
there, emotionally, that just did not seem very authentic”. However, Ben tells
me that he does believe the applicant was a bodyguard and that he might
really have been threatened a couple of times. And since the requirements for
Afghanistan are “quite low”, as he puts it (which is something he considers
to be “not so fair”), believing the applicant when he says that he used to be a
bodyguard for a government official would probably be enough to give him
asylum. Ben also points out that, as a consequence, there is no need for him
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to “find out the truth about everything”. But, because he still feels unsure
about this ‘case’, and says that the second interview has produced even more
contradictions in the asylum narrative, he decides to weigh all the credible
elements against the non-credible ones. He also thinks that he will probably
take another look at the APPA before making the decision.
Unfortunately, by the time Ben writes his decision, I have already left his
unit. However, I return a couple of months later for the final decision. Ben
has, indeed, taken the decision to grant asylum. On the internal request form
for positive decisions—forms which must be counter-signed by a superior
but never leave the institution to prevent applicants learning from them how
to present a successful claim—Ben has, as requested, identified a persecutor
(the Taliban), a “persecutee” (the applicant), a motive for persecution (that
the applicant worked for the Afghan authorities) as well as measures of perse-
cution the applicant had suffered (the death threats, beating and abduction).
He has also quoted a passage from the APPA to justify his decision: “Inten-
tional attacks on people collaborating with the Afghan government or seen to
do so occur frequently”.5 In addition, with reference to the claimant’s credi-
bility, he has written that the claimant told his story with a lot of detail and
that the story seemed largely plausible, coherent and substantiated. However,
he also notes that there were a lot of contradictions in the story, which prob-
ably meant that the applicant had invented parts of the story (especially the
part about being abducted). But, he writes, the contradictions could have
also arisen from the fact that a lot of time has passed between the events in
Afghanistan and the asylum interviews. These remarks are followed by a long
list of material evidence the applicant has submitted, such as identity docu-
ments, a death threat the applicant had received by email as well as a letter
confirming that he used to work as a bodyguard for the government official.
Ben’s case is illustrative in many ways. It exemplifies the unease arising
from the above-mentioned uncertainties in decision-making. Ben feels
equally uneasy about either taking a positive decision in spite of the “severe
contradictions” or else taking a negative decision on the basis of these
contradictions, even though the applicant had told his story in a “very
detailed manner”. Although Ben and I did not talk about this, I assume
that one reason for his unease with taking a negative decision despite his
uncertainties has to do with him knowing what potential consequences his
decision could have on the asylum seeker’s life. Likewise, as I will discuss in
more detail in Chapter 5, he wants to avoid having the decision quashed by
the Federal Administrative Court. The reason for his unease with taking a
5Internal form for positive decisions, field document, my own translation.
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positive decision in spite of his uncertainties, have to do with the ideological
environment in which Ben works or, in other words, with the ethics and
ethos of the office (see Eckert 2020). For Ben, it is important not to be
perceived as “too easily” taking a positive decision and not “too naively”
believing applicants. Also, in order to get the decision past his superior, Ben
needs to convince the latter that his decision is “correct”. All these issues are
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. What is of interest for this chapter, in turn,
is rather how Ben goes about overcoming his uncertainties.
The unease Ben feels is something I often encountered in the SEM.
Commonly, in order to turn ambiguous situations into unambiguous deci-
sions, caseworkers turn to so-called experts for help or ask colleagues—and
sometimes their superiors—for their opinion and advice. The latter they
usually do by orally describing the ‘case’ to their colleagues or superiors and
asking them for their impression, but occasionally they also ask them to take
a look at the minutes of the asylum interview or at the whole case file. Ben has
chosen a different solution here, namely to conduct a third supplementary
interview. This is not a very popular strategy since supplementary interviews
are often perceived as hindering effective decision-making because they cost
both time and money, but it is also not uncommon for decision-makers to
opt for this solution.
Ben’s case shows how the APPA on Afghanistan helps him manage his
uncertainties in two different ways. First, the APPA provides him with
“country knowledge” that helps him assess whether what the applicant has
told him is likely to have happened in that way or not. Second, it provides
him with an “on-file fact”, a fragment of text that can be used for writing and
reasoning the final decision. Furthermore, Ben’s case draws attention to the
important role the asylum interview plays in helping decision-makers gain
enough certainty for taking clear-cut either/or decisions. This has mainly to
do with the production of what I call “on-file facts” in the interviews through
the usage of specific questioning techniques. The technique Ben uses of
starting with questions about family, education and life “at home”, then going
on to more and more specific questions about the reasons for applying for
asylum and finally to confronting the applicant with contradictions is exem-
plary of how I observed all but two—very experienced—decision-makers
proceed and plays a crucial role in the production of “on-file facts”. But
interviews are not only important because of that. They are also vital for
decision-makers to develop a better “feeling” of the ‘case’ and to gain a
personal impression of the asylum applicant, which Ben’s example also hints
at.
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In the end, Ben’s final written decision was not quite unambiguous, since
on the internal form for positive decisions Ben noted that he had doubts
about some parts of the applicant’s story. This is not uncommon for posi-
tive decisions. However, final negative decisions never make reference to such
ambiguities. This has to do with the fact that, different to positive decisions,
the reasoning for negative decisions is sent out to the applicants, leaving no
room for ambiguities. Any ambiguities, I was told, would leave the SEM
vulnerable to attack and open the door to an easy appeal. This does not
mean that there are never any ambivalences and doubts which arise while
taking negative decisions. However, in the process of fitting ‘cases’ into legal
categories, they are made to disappear. With positive decisions, in turn, if
decision-makers feel that there are “still” ambiguities, they will often mention
them in case their superior examines the case file closely before the final deci-
sion is counter-signed or in case someone else reads the case file. They want
to make sure that anyone who appraises the case file sees that they were aware
that there were “indicators of non-credibility” in the applicant’s statement—
and, thus, possible reasons for rejecting the claim—but that, in the light of
the overall picture, they considered these to be irrelevant for the decision.
“Country Knowledge”
Where applicants come from is crucial for decision-making because the
applicants’ so-called “country of origin” constitutes an important factor of
eligibility. Both the “evaluation of their ‘well-founded fear of persecution’
[…] and the possibility of enforcing an expulsion in case of a negative
decision” greatly depend on the “country of origin” applicants are associ-
ated with (Poertner 2018: 182; see also Bohmer and Shuman 2008; Cabot
2014; Poertner 2017). My sample of case files provides a clear picture of
this. The decisions were taken for applicants from nineteen different coun-
tries. The claimants who in the end received a positive decision came from
only six different countries. Hence, this shows that where the asylum seekers
are from is a very strong factor in determining whether they will (or could
even) receive asylum (and temporary protection) or not. In this sense, APPAs
provide decision-makers with significant guidance. APPAs are internal guide-
lines on how to decide asylum cases from specific countries or regions and
with specific flight motives. They identify certain profiles of people at risk
of future persecution. There are APPAs for all the most common “countries
of origin” in the SEM. They are created and kept up to date by the Feder-
führungen. In the SEM, the term Federführungen refers to a person or group
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of people in the SEM responsible for a particular “country of origin”.6 They
are involved in setting the institution’s decision-making practice for dealing
with ‘cases’ from “their” country and—to some extent—try to monitor other
decision-makers’ practices regarding ‘cases’ by applicants from the country
they are responsible for.7
APPAs are always built up the same way. They consist of an introduc-
tory part with general remarks on the situation in the country at issue,
one part each on how to conduct the first short asylum interviews and
the second longer interviews, a section on different asylum motives and the
corresponding decisions, and the same for the issue of removal where, for
example, the (un-)reasonableness of return for certain groups of people or
to certain regions within the country is determined. The part on asylum
motives usually includes different possible motives for claiming asylum. Each
motive is followed by a guiding principle as to whether in that particular case
asylum should be granted or not. The principle is then explained in more
detail and recommendations are made on what needs to be examined. In
order to create these APPAs and keep them updated, the Federführungen try
to keep track of all the relevant judgements by the FAC regarding cases from
the country they are responsible for and to see whether they have any effect
on the institution’s practice. They also work closely together with the SEM’s
country analysts and use the information the latter produce in their so-called
country of origin reports to upgrade the APPAs. The country analysts work
in a different division of the SEM, namely the division “analysis and services”,
and are responsible for writing and updating the internal country of origin
reports (COIs) as well as for making COIs written by their counterparts in
other countries internally available.8 They do not take any decisions and do
6In German, the phrase “‘die Federführung haben’ means ‘to have the lead’” (Affolter et al. 2019:
270).
7Changes to practice doctrine with potential major impacts are, however, “negotiated in higher-level
meetings” in which senior officials not only from the SEM but also “from other Federal Departments,
notably that of Foreign Affairs, […] [as well as] senior staff of the UNHCR and the Swiss Refugee
Council” take part in (Poertner 2018: 240).
8Country of origin reports (COIs) are expert reports on the “political, economical, and human rights
situation” in particular countries. According to the SEM website, the reports offer “an in-depth view
on gender-based issues and health care in countries of origin”. Furthermore, the information in the
reports is stated to be “[c]urrent, factual and impartial” and findings in them are “documented in
keeping with scientific practice” (https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/en/home/internationales/herkunftslae
nder.html, last accessed 11.02.2020). For academic research on (the production of ) COI reports, see
Robert Gibb and Anthony Good (2013), Damian Rosset (2015) as well as Damian Rosset and Tone
Liodden (2015).
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not set the institution’s decision-making practice. However, decision-makers
can consult the analysts in individual cases, as I will show below.9
As Ben’s case indicates, APPAS—and “country knowledge” in general—
may not only be useful for assessing asylum seekers’ eligibility to refugee status
or subsidiary protection, but may also help decision-makers assess the credi-
bility of asylum claims. Country knowledge is mainly used in three different
ways for determining the credibility of asylum claims. Firstly, it is used to
assess whether applicants are ‘really’ from the place/country they claim to
be from. Secondly, they are used to assess whether what the applicants are
saying is plausible or, in other words, whether what they claim happened to
them could feasibly have taken place in the way described. Thirdly, decision-
makers use country knowledge in order to know what kind of behaviour
(for instance, concerning manner of speaking or topics of conversation) can
or cannot be expected from applicants from different countries. The type
of country knowledge used for this varies. There is the country knowledge
decision-makers themselves hold. It is knowledge they have acquired through
experience on the job, by having dealt with many ‘cases’ from a particular
country; and through their preparation work for individual ‘cases’, by having
read APPAs and country of origin reports; from having studied maps (nearly
all the offices I entered at the SEM had at least one map of the world or a
particular region hanging on the wall); and from having done research on
the Internet. Furthermore, many decision-makers also try to keep up to date
on countries they are dealing with by reading news reports and watching TV
documentaries. There is also county knowledge so-called experts hold, which
caseworkers can refer to for decision-making. These experts are mainly the
SEM’s country analysts, the external language specialists employed by the
LINGUA unit of the SEM and to some extent also the Federführungen.
Determining Applicants’ “Country of Origin”
“Finding out” where asylum seekers are from is crucial for the reasons
discussed above. Or rather, what is important to “find out” is whether asylum
seekers are “really” from where they say they are since, if the applicants are, in
the end, considered not to be from that place by the decision-makers, their
“actual” origin becomes irrelevant for decision-making. All that matters then
is that their stated “country of origin” is not credible. Usually, the assessment
of applicants’ “country of origin” is done in the first short asylum interviews
which take place at the reception and processing centres (RPC). If asylum
9Occasionally, country analysts and sometimes also the Federführungen go on so-called “fact-finding
missions” to the countries they are responsible for (see also Dahlvik 2018: 134).
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seekers do not hand in identity documents which decision-makers believe
to be genuine, this assessment is done through what Thomas Scheffer calls
an examination of applicants’ “membership knowledge” (2001: 146–127; see
also Griffiths 2012; Poertner 2018: 183–185). This test consists of questions
about things that people coming from a certain country or place are expected
to know, as this extract from the minutes of a first asylum interview illustrates:
Q : What is the international dialling code of Morocco?
A: 00212.
Q : What is the name of the king of Morocco?
A: (asylum seeker smiles) That’s Mohammed the sixth. I am a real Moroccan.
Q : What’s the name of his wife, the queen?
A: I know she’s from Fes. When he got married, I wasn’t in Morocco.
Q : What are the places surrounding Kneitra called?
A: Kneitra lies about 40 km away from Rabat. There’s an American base camp
in Kneitra. The surrounding places are called Sidi Yahia, Sidi Suleiman and
Sidi Kassem.10
The decision-makers then check asylum seekers’ answers against their own
country knowledge that they have acquired from previous experience or
from doing research on the Internet and studying maps, often as part of
the preparation of the interview, but occasionally I also observed decision-
makers directly checking the asylum seekers’ answers on the Internet during
the interview. It is then up to the decision-makers to set the bar for applicants
to pass this test, which in the case cited above, the applicant did (see also
Poertner 2018: 183). For caseworkers, it is often more important how appli-
cants answer their questions rather than whether their answers are correct or
not as indicated in the following statement made by Angela, a SEM official
working in one of the RPCs: “I might ask the claimant how far it is from
village A to village B. This is not something I can check, that we can find
out whether it is true or not, but that doesn’t really matter. What is much
more decisive is how the claimants react and whether what they then say
seems realistic”.11 Nevertheless, sometimes the “correctness” of the answers
does play a decisive role. Yet, because the information decision-makers use to
assess applicants’ answers is potentially also available to the latter—anybody
can look it up on the Internet, I was often told—decision-makers do not
always automatically equate “correct” answers with credibility. This becomes
apparent in the following statement made by Klaus:
10Minutes of a first asylum interview, field document, my own translation.
11Angela, caseworker, reception and procedure centre, field notes, my own translation.
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I have this case, a Somali, but I’m not sure he’s Somali. […] He could tell me
the colour of the number plates; he could name villages, the distances between
them […]. He could tell me where the buses leave from, where to buy the
ticket […]. All this he knew. But there are two radio stations in Somalia and
one TV station and those he didn’t know. Maybe he was in Somalia a long time
ago. Maybe he’s not even Somali, but Kenyan and just went to visit someone
in Somalia, maybe he has relatives there, maybe he was there, but didn’t grow
up there. So how can we evaluate this? I mean, you can look the number
plate up. Maybe he heard that we were doing country tests and looked up a
couple of things on Wikipedia. But the radio stations he should know. And
he gave me the international dialling code of Ethiopia. So what I did then was
to look at the minutes and to underline everything in green that was correct
and everything in red that wasn’t. And now I have to make an evaluation of it
and that is difficult. But according to the interpreter I asked, he should really
know the two radio stations.12
Because decision-makers, like Klaus, often suspect asylum seekers of having
prepared for the “country tests”, it is common practice to regularly keep
changing the questions asked during the interviews, with ideas for new ques-
tions being frequently exchanged amongst colleagues. In Klaus’s case, it was
very important for him to know whether the applicant was from Somalia or
not because it determined whether the latter was to be granted temporary
protection or not. Therefore, Klaus’s solution was to weigh all the things the
applicant had known against the things he had not known and he had also
turned to the interpreter for help. The latter is something decision-makers are
officially not supposed to do, but, at least in the two RPCs I did fieldwork
in, this was quite a common practice. While the opinions provided by the
interpreters cannot be used for reasoning final decisions in writing, decision-
makers nevertheless perceive them as useful guidance for determining the
credibility of applicants’ stated “countries of origin”.13 What Klaus could
have done instead of asking the interpreter for help, would have been to
request a so-called LINGUA test. However, as he explained to me, he had
decided against that because for applicants from Somalia there was quite a
long waiting list and he wanted to decide the ‘case’ as quickly as possible
since it had already been on his desk for quite a while.
LINGUA reports are done by so-called external experts, which are
commissioned by the LINGUA unit of the SEM, “a specialised unit for
12Klaus, caseworker, reception and processing centre, interview transcript, my own translation.
13This seems to be different in the Austrian first-instance asylum procedure where interpreters can
be officially requested to provide reports (see Dahlvik 2018: 137).
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analysis of origin”. These experts examine the applicants’ speech and their
“culture knowledge” in order to “determine the country and/or region or, at
least, the milieu, which have had the biggest influence on the […] [asylum
applicants] in […] [their] process of socialization”.14 They then send a report
with their assessment to the decision-maker in charge of the ‘case’. From
what I observed in the SEM, the LINGUA experts’ assessments are generally
accepted as a fact, meaning that they are not challenged and are used as “facts”
to legitimise and reason final written decisions (see also Dahlvik 2018: 134).
Finally, decision-makers also have the possibility to ask the Swiss embassy
in the applicant’s “country of origin” to try and find out whether the appli-
cant is really from a particular place in that country. However, as Ephraim
Poertner writes, embassy enquiries are “considered the ultima ratio of clarifi-
cation” because they are “a very costly and time-consuming form of gathering
information” (2018: 185). Furthermore, such embassy enquiries can them-
selves potentially “create a well-founded fear of persecution by placing the
applicant on the radar of local authorities” (ibid.). Caseworkers can, there-
fore, only request that such enquiries be carried out with the permission of
their superiors.
Assessing Reasonable Likelihood
Country knowledge is not just used to determine asylum seeker’s “country
of origin”. It is also put to use in trying to find out whether what the appli-
cants are saying could have happened in the way they describe and, to some
extent, assess asylum seekers’ “overall credibility”. Often, decision-makers rely
on country information they themselves have access to and knowledge they
have acquired through “experience in the service” (Weber 2013 [1978]: 225)
in order to appraise whether what the applicants have told them could be
possible or not. This was one of the reasons why Ben read the APPA for
Afghanistan before conducting the interview. He said he needed information
he could then compare with the applicant’s answers. He also said that if one
already knew the country well—which in this case he did not—it was not
necessary to read the APPA and prepare oneself as extensively as he had for
the interview. Thus, often country knowledge for assessing the plausibility of
stories also comes from decision-makers’ experience (see Dahlvik 2018: 57;
Jubany 2017: 146). As an example, in one ‘case’ I observed, the decision-
maker did not test credibility at all in the asylum interview. When I asked
14https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/en/home/publiservice/service/sprachanalysen/lingua.html, last
accessed 11.02.2020.
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her about it she said: “I just looked at the minutes [of the first interview] and
knew it was credible. [The applicant] mentioned so many things we know
about Sri Lanka”.15 However, while stories fitting with what decision-makers
know from experience about a country are—as in the example above—
usually considered as an indicator of credibility, stories which are seen to be
“too standard” are sometimes also read as a sign of non-credibility.16 At the
time of my research, examples of what were commonly referred to as “stan-
dard stories” were Iranians claiming to have become known to the authorities
due to their political activities in exile, Nigerians claiming to have been perse-
cuted on the grounds of their homosexuality and Tibetans claiming to have
been persecuted after participating in a rally: “They were all at a rally, waved
around a Dalai Lama flag and then heard that they were being persecuted.
That’s the standard story with Tibetans”.17 Decision-makers took such “stan-
dard stories” to mean that they were not true but had been prepared by the
asylum seekers because the latter knew that with such stories they could be
granted asylum.
Like with the assessment of asylum seekers’ “country of origin”, decision-
makers sometimes also turn to so-called experts for help in determining the
probability of something having happened in the way it was described by the
applicants. Hence, they might go to the Federführung and ask them what they
think or they might request help from a country analyst. Decision-makers
are not allowed to ask the country analysts for recommendations on how to
decide a particular case or for assessments of whether something could be
“true” or not, but they can ask them for specific information, for instance, if
it is possible to buy a certain medicine in a particular county or if documents
are (or could be) genuine and official. In one ‘case’, for example, the decision-
maker posed the following questions to the country analyst:
Is marriage forbidden in Egypt between a Christian [man] and Muslim
[woman]? If so, does the law order punishment for people trying to enter
into such a marriage? […] If a Christian [man] and a Muslim [woman] have
children together, who is regarded as the legal guardian of those children? Can
an unmarried couple live together in Egypt and have children?18
15Ursula, caseworker, reception and processing centre, field notes, my own translation.
16This is something Thomas Scheffer also found in his ethnographic research on German asylum
administrations (2001: 165–167; 2003: 443–444), Tone Liodden has shown with regard to asylum
decision-making in Norway (2016: 224) and Olga Jubany describes for asylum decision-making in
the UK as well (2017: 159).
17Klaus, caseworker, reception and processing centre, interview transcript, my own translation.
18Internal consultation form, field document, my own translation.
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The decision-maker was, thereby, trying to find out whether it was
likely that the applicants had been persecuted due to their “mixed-religion”
marriage. In this case, the decision-maker furthermore decided to request
an embassy enquiry, asking the officials at the Swiss embassy in Egypt to
investigate the following:
Does the copy of the family register which the applicants have handed in corre-
spond with the records of the registry office in X, respectively is the family
register genuine? What can be found out about the people named on the family
register (stay, current residence, job, identity, etc.)? Are the applicants known
at the above-mentioned address in Y? What can be found out on-site about
the time of departure, their reasons for leaving and other useful [aspects], such
as professional activities, family background, religious affiliation?19
The decision-maker finally ended up rejecting the asylum claim following
the response she received from the embassy, namely that the family register
which the applicants had handed in was a fake.20
Assessing Demeanour
Officially, caseworkers in the SEM are instructed to ignore asylum seekers’
demeanour and emotions and to not let them influence their decision-
making. However, caseworkers’ stance towards this is ambivalent. Many
agreed that this should be the aim, while several others explicitly stated that
they found applicants’ behaviour a useful source of information for assessing
credibility. However, regardless of these different opinions conveyed to me,
in practice I observed that applicants’ demeanour does very often serve as an
indicator and useful source of information for assessing credibility, even if
this is not something that can be used to reason final written decisions with
(see also Jubany 2011, 2017: 157).
[T]he more you have seen, the better you can judge… Especially with nations
- Asians just behave differently to Africans [laughs], Arabs different to Persians.
[…] [A]t the beginning I found this very difficult. […] But the longer you do
this kind of thing, the better you feel what is culturally driven and what just
simply isn’t true.21
19Embassy enquiry form, field document, my own translation.
20Written asylum decision, field document, my own translation.
21Patricia, caseworker, headquarters, interview transcript, my own translation.
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Regarding applicants’ manner of speaking I was, for instance, told by
several decision-makers that Iranians spoke in an over-embellished way, but
that did not necessarily mean that what they were saying was true, that one
could expect Sri Lankans to give detailed accounts of what had happened
to them and that Eritreans were not very talkative and could not always be
expected to provide many details. This type of country knowledge may, there-
fore, also influence how high decision-makers set the bar for different groups
of asylum seekers to fulfil the credibility requirements.
So far, I have shown how “institutional practice”—or practice doctrine—
in the form of APPAs as well as country knowledge help decision-makers’
reduce uncertainties, providing them with what Thomas Scheffer (2003) calls
“power of judgement” (Urteilskraft ) which allows them to take and justify
decisions. Whereas the country knowledge which exists in writing—the
LINGUA and embassy reports, country analysts’ answers to consultations,
COIs and country of origin information in the APPAs—can be used to
reason final decisions, country knowledge decision-makers have themselves
acquired through “experience in the service” (Weber 2013 [1978]: 225)—
for instance, knowledge of what “standard” or typical stories are or of how
people from certain places typically speak and/or behave—cannot. However,
this does not mean that this kind of knowledge does not play an essential
role in overcoming uncertainty and producing clear-cut either/or decisions.
On the contrary, it plays an important part in guiding decision-makers’ prac-
tices: what arguments they dig for in the interviews; how they do so (e.g. if
they ask many questions to test an applicant’s credibility or if they refrain
from doing so because they “already” believe an applicant); and what argu-
ments they look for in the minutes when writing decisions, for instance. But
country knowledge is not the only type of knowledge to do so, as the next
section of this chapter brings to light.
Producing Decisional Certainty: The Role
of Professional-Practical Knowledge
This part of the chapter is essentially about decision-makers’ “gut feeling”,
which plays a crucial role in assessing asylum seekers’ credibility as numerous
researchers writing about asylum administrations have shown (see, for
instance, Dahlvik 2018; Fassin and Kobelinsky 2012; Fassin 2013; Johan-
nesson 2017; Jubany 2011, 2017; Kelly 2012; Liodden 2016; Macklin
1998; Miaz 2017; Thomas 2009). However, this is not specific to asylum
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administrations. Anne Lavanchy (2014), for instance, describes how “feel-
ing” essentially guides officers’ work in Swiss registry offices when trying
to assess the genuineness of marriages—or to “debunk” so-called “bogus
marriages”—and Vincent Dubois shows how “instinct” shapes how French
welfare workers engage with their “clients” (2010: 98–100).
“Gut feeling”, I argue, can be understood as an expression of what Andreas
Reckwitz calls “practical knowledge”. He defines “practical knowledge” as a
type of know-how which already forms part of what the practice itself is.
It cannot be thought of independently from the practice. It is embodied
and incorporated knowledge; a conglomerate of everyday techniques; and a
practical sense of self-evident understanding (Reckwitz 2003: 289–294; see
also Dahlvik 2018: 57–62; Wagenaar 2004: 651).22 Thus, this knowledge
forms part of “the doing” itself (Dahlvik 2018: 57). The “gut feeling” which
guides asylum decision-makers’ credibility assessments constitutes precisely
this kind of knowledge. This is nicely exemplified by a SEM decision-maker
saying to Jonathan Miaz that she could not really explain to him how she
took decisions, that was just something one did, just like skiing (Miaz 2017:
212; see also Bloch 1991: 189). Hence, this is why I draw on Reckwitz’s
term. However, I add the word “professional” to Reckwitz’s term, making it
professional-practical knowledge, to stress the fact that the type of knowl-
edge I am referring to develops on the job and grows out of decision-makers’
profession.
Professional-practical knowledge is not something that can be used for
reasoning final decisions. This means that decision-makers cannot write in the
final decision: “The claim is credible (or non-credible) because I just know
or I can feel that it is”. However, like I described for country knowledge
above, it essentially guides decision-makers’ practices. Furthermore, it plays
a crucial role in helping decision-makers feel certain about their decisions.
More explicit knowledge—like country knowledge—can over time also turn
into professional-practical knowledge once it becomes so incorporated by
decision-makers that it becomes self-evident and, through this, very difficult
to verbalise (see also Miaz 2017: 213).
Since the data I draw on in this book is “conversational in nature” (Affolter
et al. 2019: 266), approaching professional-practical knowledge is method-
ologically challenging (see also Chapter 2). Hence, as soon as we ask a person
to put such “gut feelings” into words, we provoke a kind of ex-post ratio-
nalisation. Nevertheless, I argue that we should try and come as close as
22This is similar to what Michael Polanyi has called “tacit knowledge”, which he understands as a
type of knowledge that is more about “knowing how” than “knowing that” (Polanyi 1962 [1958],
1966; see also Ryle 1951).
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possible to analytically describing this type of knowledge and the role it plays
in bureaucratic decision-making because, as Georg Breidenstein et al. (2013:
36) argue, what counts as “normal” and “self-evident” is precisely what we
should attempt to grasp as researchers. Furthermore, such ex-post rationalisa-
tions can tell us a lot about what decision-makers think they should be doing
which is important for understanding bureaucratic work (see Eckert 2020).
All the decision-makers I spoke to in the SEM told me that they preferred
interviewing asylum seekers themselves rather than having to decide upon
‘cases’ in which the interview was conducted by a “pooly” or another case-
worker.23 One important reason for this is the “feeling” they get when
listening to asylum seekers’ stories during the interviews. During breaks in
asylum interviews when I asked decision-makers if they already knew what
decision they were going to take, it was common that they explained their
decision by referring to their impressions about authenticity, like Ben did.
They would claim that an applicant’s story (or parts of a story) was either
“authentic” or “not-authentic”, that a story was “clearly true” or that there
was something “off” about a story. This was also reflected in the answers I
got from many officials when I asked them in a more abstract way how they
knew—in general—whether a claim was credible or not. The following state-
ment by Andrea represents a common response I got to this question: “It’s
more like a feeling. And then I look for it in the text”.24 What Andrea means
by “And then I look for it in the text” is that she looks at the minutes of the
asylum interviews to see if she can find any fragments of texts in them that
confirm her “feeling” and allow her to develop legal arguments for reasoning
her decision with. Professional-practical knowledge structures how and what
arguments are looked for in the minutes but also what questions are asked
in the interviews, and when and how thoroughly credibility is tested. My
reaction to officials telling me that credibility decisions usually started with
a feeling was to ask them: “Well ok, yes, but how do you feel this?” The
following two statements by Theodor and Ralph indicate how difficult it
often was for decision-makers to articulate this feeling:
I don’t really know, maybe some who’s new could [explain how to assess cred-
ibility to you] better. I just do it “out of feeling or intuition” (aus dem Gefühl
heraus). […] With experience you just somehow know, for instance, that it is
“incompatible with practical experience” (erfahrungswidrig ), or I don’t know,
23“Poolies” are people employed by the SEM who only conduct interviews (and are paid by the hour
to do so) but do not take any decisions (see Chapter 3).
24Andrea, caseworker, headquarters, field notes, my own translation.
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you just know what arguments there are for non-credibility. […] I mean, it’s
not just “intuitive” (gefühlsmässig ). Your common sense also develops.25
Well, I have to say, in interviews you realise quickly if it’s credible or not, if a
person has experienced something or not. Um, it’s difficult to put into words.
It has substance and, you know, such “reality criteria” and the narrative is just
different from a person’s who is lying.26
Apart from showing how Theodor and Ralph struggle to verbalise their
professional-practical knowledge, their statements also attest that profes-
sional experience is crucial for developing professional-practical knowledge.
Furthermore, in the explanations they offered me, they rationalise their deci-
sions just like they would in writing final decisions, as I show later on in
this chapter. By stating that there are “arguments for non-credibility” and
that if something was “incompatible with practical experience” then that was
an indicator of non-credibility, Theodor makes reference to criteria from the
Swiss Asylum Act and case law. Ralph, in turn, refers to the reality criteria
from Criteria-Based Content Analysis. What I mean by criteria from the
Asylum Act and case law is the following: article 7 of the Asylum Act sets out
the subsequent denominations of non-credibility: “unfoundedness in essen-
tial points”, meaning that asylum seekers cannot speak in a detailed manner
about events relevant for asylum; “inherent contradictions”; “contradictions
to facts” (Tatsachenwidrigkeit ) and “forged or falsified evidence” (Art. 7, para-
graph 3, AsylA). Thus, credibility is defined negatively. Further criteria are
provided by case law, most notably by a judgement made in 2004 by the
Commission for Asylum Appeals (now the Federal Administrative Court). In
the judgement, it is declared that applicants’ statements are credible if they
are sufficiently substantiated, coherent and plausible. Their statements should
not be limited to vague descriptions and there should not be any contradic-
tions in the main issues of their stories. Moreover, they should not lack what
is called an “inner logic” and should also not contradict facts and “general
experiences” (EMARK 2004/1). Finally, the judgement reads that the appli-
cants themselves must appear credible, which is particularly declared not to
be the case if they base their claims on forged evidence; conceal or deliberately
change important facts (Tatsachen); change or up their claims and add parts to
their stories without good cause; do not show sufficient interest in the proce-
dure; or refuse to cooperate (ibid.). For all of these criteria, decision-makers
have boilerplates at their disposal for reasoning negative asylum decisions.
25Theodor, caseworker, reception and processing centre, interview transcript, my own translation.
26Ralph, caseworker, reception and processing centre, interview transcript, my own translation.
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Boilerplates are fragments of pre-written text that can be used to develop
legal arguments.27
The reality criteria Ralph, in turn, refers to are indicators of credibility
rather than of non-credibility. They come from Criteria-Based Content Anal-
ysis (CBCA), a method/theory from forensic psychology which was originally
developed to evaluate testimonies of “victims of child sexual abuse” (Amado
et al. 2016: 201). CBCA identifies nineteen “reality criteria” (Realkennze-
ichen) which are seen as indicators of the statements being based on events
that the narrator has experienced.28 At the time of my research, all new
decision-makers learnt about these reality criteria in their initial training; and
professional development courses were regularly taught by Swiss university
forensic psychologists on the method.29 In theory, according to CBCA, narra-
tives need to be systematically analysed in order to see whether any reality
criteria can be found, which should then be read as an indicator for cred-
ibility. However, this is not how credibility is done in practice in asylum
proceedings, with the focus being on trying to find markers of non-credibility
and, rather in the absence of these, finding accounts credible, as I will show
later on in this chapter.
What role exactly CBCA plays in credibility determination in the SEM
remained somewhat of a puzzle to me. One impression I got was that pre-
eminently CBCA gives credibility determination a scientific legitimation.
This is clearly illustrated in a comment made by Hannah, a head of an
asylum unit at an RPC, when I told her what I was working on: “Credi-
bility determination, that is truly an interesting topic. Especially if you take
into account how it has developed. In the past, we just did it any old way.
Today it is done on the basis of scientific findings”, she said.30 Nevertheless,
27In the SEM, there are boilerplates for the following criteria: “unfoundedness”, “contradictions to
known facts”, “contradictions to general experience”, “contradictions to the inner logic of acting”,
“inherent contradictions”, “belated assertions”, “no longer mentioned assertions”, “forged evidence”
and “unqualified evidence”. “Contradictions to general experience” and “contradictions to the inner
logic of actions” are usually used together and stand for the plausibility of certain actions.
28These nineteen criteria are: “1. Logical structure, 2. Unstructured production, 3. Quantity of details,
[…] 4. Contextual embedding, 5. Descriptions of interactions, 6. Reproduction of conversation, 7.
Unexpected complications during the incident, […] 8. Unusual details, 9. Superfluous details, 10.
Accurately reported details misunderstood, 11. Related external associations, 12. Accounts of subjective
mental states, 13. Attribution of perpetrator’s mental state, […] 14. Spontaneous corrections, 15.
Admitting lack of memory, 16. Raising doubts about one’s own testimony, 17. Self-deprecation, 18.
Pardoning the perpetrator, […] 19. Details characteristic of the offence” (Amado et al. 2015: 4).
29As Stephanie Schneider describes, this also applies to decision-makers working in the German
asylum administration (2019: 295).
30Hannah, head of asylum unit, reception and processing centre, interview transcript, my own
translation.
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I also found that to some extent knowledge of the reality criteria is incorpo-
rated into decision-makers’ professional-practical knowledge as my encounter
with Theodor illustrates:
Laura: Could you tell me what makes a case so clearly credible for you? […]
Theodor: There are documents for that. If you want to, I can send them to you.
I’m not so up to date (à jour ) with that. Well, credible [accounts] are, for
instance, nuanced, really well described, and mention minor matters. […] If
it’s not just a smooth story, if there are stumbling blocks (Stolpersteine ) and
irrelevant details. For instance, if [the applicant] says that the light flared and
suddenly the light went out. You know, things like that. […] And substance,
particularly with events that had a traumatising effect. Not with regard to
the traumatising event, but with what happened around it; that one focuses
on a particular [aspect] of the man appearing, for instance: “I saw that he
had sweat beads on his forehead”. You know, something special like that.
But I would have to [look for] some [documents]. I can’t tell you just like
that.31
In his description, Theodor brings up the narration of “minor matters”,
“stumbling blocks” and the applicant mentioning some of the perpetrator’s
physiological responses (the sweat beads on his forehead). Each of these
issues bears resemblance with one of the nineteen reality criteria. Thus, the
mentioning of “minor matters” fits with the reality criterion of “superfluous
details” and the “stumbling blocks” can be read as the reality criterion “unex-
pected complications during the incident”. As a further point, Theodor’s
“sweat beads” reminded me of one of the training courses when the partici-
pants were told that the narration of perpetrators’ physical responses (like the
sweat beads) formed part of the reality criterion “attribution of perpetrator’s
mental state”. Theodor himself did not use the word “reality criteria” and
did not make any explicit reference to CBCA. However, the documents he
kept referring to were about CBCA and reality criteria. The way I interpret
this quote, is, therefore, that Theodor, like many other decision-makers, has
selectively internalised this knowledge of the reality criteria; not necessarily
by memorising it, but possibly by using the documents on CBCA to assess
the credibility of asylum claims when he was new to the job and had not
acquired enough professional-practical knowledge to “simply” know whether
a claim was credible or not and by learning from others, who had also been
schooled in CBCA, in what credible accounts “looked like”. Theodor strug-
gles to verbalise what exactly characterises credible stories. That is why he
31Theodor, caseworker, reception and processing centre, interview transcript, my own translation.
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wants to show me the documents on CBCA because they explicitly describe
this. However, it becomes apparent that for his day-to-day work, he does
not need the documents. Despite looking for them on the SEM’s internal
server for over ten minutes, he is unable to find them, indicating that in
his daily practice he never, or at least only very rarely, needs to look them
up. He already knows due to his practical experience and internalised knowl-
edge what makes a story credible. Many other decision-makers, like Louis
for example, defined credible accounts as creating a feeling as if one were in
a film: “[…] if a story’s credible, it’s just a flood of words. Everything just
figures. When you listen to them talk it’s just like being in a film. These
stories, they really live”.32 Furthermore, credible stories were said to be told
“straight from the heart” and that, therefore, in such ‘cases’ it was not neces-
sary to ask many questions, because those stories “just came pouring out”.
Hence, in the words of one official, all one had to do was to “lean back and
listen to them talk”33 (see also Pelosi 1996: 59).
By allowing decision-makers to intuitively know whether asylum claims
are (probably) credible or not, such knowledge provides caseworkers with
a kind of “felt certainty”, which is crucial in the light of the “known
unknowns” introduced at the beginning of this chapter. Professional-practical
knowledge helps decision-makers feel certain that they are taking the “right
decision”. This becomes apparent in the following example in which case-
worker Andrea—a caseworker who had at the time already been working at
the SEM for a couple of years—has lost faith in her “feeling”:
Andrea and I are sitting together during a coffee break. She tells me that there’s
soon going to be a training session on credibility assessment that she recom-
mends me to attend. She tells me that she would really like to go, but that she’s
not allowed to because only two people from each section can take part. She
says she would have really liked to have gone, because she was going through
a bit of a crisis at that time because she couldn’t really trust her intuition
anymore: “Not so long ago I had this woman from Turkey”, she tells me. “She
didn’t know anything and she barely spoke any Turkish. I was so sure that she
wasn’t from Turkey. But then I asked for an ‘embassy report’ and it turned
out that it was all true”. Andrea explains that this has really thrown her off
balance, because she had been so sure about it not being true. If she hadn’t
had this possibility for investigation she would have said it wasn’t credible. She
tells me that, because of this, she currently feels so insecure about her assess-
ments that the other day she told a colleague who had wanted her opinion on
32Louis, caseworker, headquarters, field notes, my own translation.
33Daniel, caseworker, reception and processing centre, interview transcript, my own translation.
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a ‘case’ because he thought he might be biased, to go and ask someone else for
help.34
For Andrea, no longer being able to trust her “feeling” was a problem,
hindering her from carrying out her everyday credibility assessment tasks as
she used to. She therefore hoped that she would soon regain confidence in
her “intuition” again.
Producing On-File Facts: The Asylum Interview
Even though professional-practical knowledge plays a vital role in case-
workers’ decision-making, it does not appear in the final written decisions.
Hence, if we were to solely analyse final written decisions, we would not
learn much about the reasons for reaching a certain decision. What we would
instead learn about are the justifications for the decision at stake (see Kelly
2012: 762; Miaz 2017: 327; Poertner 2018: 194). Thus, every decision a
caseworker takes, must be justified in writing. There are two main formats for
this. In the case of positive decisions, applicants are informed about the deci-
sion and what this means in terms of rights and obligations, but not about the
“reasons” for the decision. These “reasons”, or rather justifications, are listed
solely on the internal application form that goes into the applicant’s case file
and might potentially be checked by the head of the asylum unit before the
positive decision is sent out. With negative decisions, a letter is sent to the
applicants informing them of the outcome of the decision, but also providing
them with the decision’s legal reasoning. The part which outlines the legal
arguments for the decision in these letters is always structured in the same
way:
The considerations always begin (in the case of decisions that enter into the
substance) with an introduction: “The decision of the SEM on your asylum
application is based on the following considerations: Switzerland grants asylum
to applicants if they make a persecution in the sense of Art. 3 Asylum Act at
least credible (Art. 7 Asylum Act) and no grounds for exclusion exist”. The
next set phrases state the legal content of Article 3 or 7 of the Swiss Asylum
Act or both […]. The argumentative part consists commonly of a number of
syllogisms – formal legal arguments – that have the structure of: (A) the legal
norm (major premise) → (B) the specific facts of the case […] (minor premise)
34Andrea, caseworker, headquarters, field notes, my own translation.
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→ the application of the legal norm on the specific case (consequence or legal
subsumption). (Poertner 2018: 200–201)
The “specific facts of the case” Ephraim Poertner refers to are fragments of
texts decision-makers can use to reason their decisions with as well as docu-
ments they can refer to, which is why I have opted to call them “on-file
facts”. The previous parts of this chapter have brought to light some poten-
tial on-file facts: the LINGUA and embassy reports, country analysts’ answers
to consultations and country of origin information reports. Furthermore, any
material evidence asylum seekers hand in may also become an on-file fact. An
observation I made in the SEM—similar to what Julia Dahlvik describes for
the Austrian Federal Asylum Office (2018: 141)—is that material evidence
handed in by asylum seekers is often met with suspicion and that the authen-
ticity of such documents is frequently doubted. This does not necessarily
mean that such material evidence no longer functions as an on-file fact, but
rather that it is turned into a different kind of “fact”, namely one which attests
the non-credibility of the applicant rather than what is stated on the docu-
ments themselves (see also Jubany 2017: 166). The most important on-file
facts, however, are asylum seekers’ statements as they are recorded in writing
in the minutes of asylum interviews (see also Jubany 2017: 134). In the SEM,
during the first short asylum interview at the RPCs, it is the decision-makers
themselves who write the minutes on a standardised form at their disposal for
this purpose. During the second (and potential third) longer asylum inter-
views, the minutes are written by minute-takers who are employed by the
hour for their work and are often university students. At the end of the
interviews, asylum seekers are requested to sign each page of the minutes—
after they have been read back to them by the interpreters—to confirm the
veracity of the recorded statements. Through this, the recorded statements
become authoritative facts (Dahlvik 2018: 133), enabling the justification
of final decisions. That is why decision-makers are very reluctant to ques-
tion the veracity of such recorded facts. For example, Mauro, deputy head of
an asylum unit at the headquarters, explained to me that, of course, some-
times when asylum seekers complained that something had not been correctly
translated in the first interview and one could see from the minutes that there
really were communication problems, then once could not use this against the
asylum seekers. But, he added,
on the other hand, we have to be really careful when asylum seekers claim
things like that, we cannot really accept that. We say: “We have the written
minutes, we translated everything back to you, you have signed the minutes so
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now they are legally valid (rechtsgültig ) and can be used”. Because if we start
questioning everything then we might as well just stop.35
Mauro’s statement shows that the authoritative character of the minutes
is vital for decision-making. Without such “facts”, turning uncertain situ-
ations into decisional certainty would be impossible. But for minutes to
be viable for decision-making they must meet certain expectations. This is
one of the reasons why decision-makers prefer interviewing asylum seekers
themselves rather than relying on interviews conducted by “poolies” or other
caseworkers. That way they can steer the interview better and ask questions
that will produce the arguments they need for the final decision; this is what
is called “goal-oriented questioning” (zielorientiertes Fragen). Many decision-
makers, furthermore, explained to me that during the interviews they always
had the decision in mind and, only when they thought they had enough
arguments for reasoning, stopped the interview.
Writing about asylum procedures in different countries such as Canada,
Germany, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the USA, scholars have argued that
the focus of asylum interviews is on uncovering lies (Jubany 2017: 137),
“checking for discrepancies” (Bohmer and Shuman 2008: 136), identifying
weaknesses inherent in asylum stories (Jubany 2017: 135) and “searching for
untruth” (Kelly 2012: 765).36 Thus, decision-makers focus more on finding
indicators of non-credibility than of credibility (see also Johannesson 2017:
12). This is something I also observed in the SEM and is a practice I have
elsewhere opted to call “digging deep” (Affolter 2020; see also Affolter 2017:
155). Digging deep refers to the practice whereby decision-makers interro-
gate asylum seekers until they have enough arguments to reject an asylum
claim on the basis of non-credibility, or are convinced that the applicant’s
story is true “after all”. This is how asylum interviews are usually done, but
in some cases decision-makers might also decide not to dig deep because they
already know from professional experience that the asylum seeker is telling
“the truth”. Samuel’s statement illustrates this practice of “digging deep”.
Talking about how to properly conduct asylum interviews he explained: “And
then you have to probe [the asylum seekers]. You can’t content yourself with
an answer that doesn’t convince you. But then there might still be something
to [what they have told you]. So you have to probe them until you’re either
35Mauro, deputy head of an asylum unit, headquarters, interview transcript, my own translation.
36See also Jessica Anderson et al. (2014), Rosemary Byrne (2007), Ilene Durst (2000), Olga Jubany
(2011), Michael Kagan (2003), Audrey Macklin (1998), Thomas Scheffer (2001: 184; 2003: 455),
James Souter (2011), Robert Thomas (2009) and Trevor Trueman (2009: 296).
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convinced that it’s true or that it isn’t.37 Two distinct metaphors were used
by decision-makers to describe what I have called “digging deep”: “It is like a
funnel (Trichter )”,38 one said and another one compared it to the “tightening
of a noose (Zuziehen einer Schlinge )”.39 The first metaphor seems to indicate
that through this kind of questioning one gets closer and closer to the heart
of the matter; “the truth” (or “non-truth”) of what happened.40 The second
metaphor fits with the prevalent “institutional mistrust” I encountered, with
the assumption that asylum seekers can and will often lie, which is an issue I
deal with in detail in Chapter 6.
In what follows, I now turn to how “digging deep” works in practice
and how through “digging deep” on-file, facts are created in order to justify
written decisions. I do so by showing on the basis of a specific example, how
one such a viable on-file fact is generated in the asylum interview. The case
concerns a man in his early-forties from Eritrea. The caseworker in charge,
Bernard, who is an “old stager” working in one of the RPCs, rejected the
man’s asylum claim on the grounds of “non-credibility”. The sole legal crite-
rion Bernard used to justify his decision was that of “inherent contradictions”,
which, as my research showed, is the criterion must commonly applied for
reasoning negative credibility decisions. One of the on-file facts Bernard refers
to in justifying his decision is this one:
Whilst in your free narrative you said that about 20 days to a month passed
between the first time the authorities came to your house and the time the
military searched your house (see file A9, p. 8), you later said that only two
to three days had passed between the questioning by the authorities and the
searching of the house. (see file A9, p. 22)41
37Samuel, caseworker, headquarters, interview transcript, my own translation.
38Tom, caseworker, reception and processing centre, interview transcript, my own translation.
39Gabriel, caseworker, headquarters, interview transcript, my own translation.
40Decision-making is, of course, not really about “finding out the truth”, as I was repeatedly told by
caseworkers and is nicely exemplified by Peter’s statement: “In the training courses – but that was
mere provocation, you have to understand – I used to always say: ‘If someone manages to convince
you of their eligibility to asylum even if they are lying they deserve to be granted asylum according to
the law and if someone tells you the truth, but does not manage to render their story credible, then
they deserve a negative decision’. I always used this to teach the new caseworkers that they should
not look for the truth. No-one requires us to do that. The law just requires us to assess whether
something is credible or no. We don’t have to find out the truth, otherwise we could never take a
decision. […] If you look for the truth, you will never find it, [or] hardly ever” (Peter, caseworker,
headquarters, interview transcript, my own translation). However, a few newcomers confided in me
that not trying to find out “the truth” was something they really struggled with and that they often,
nevertheless, tried to do so even if they were aware they could never fully achieve that.
41Asylum decision, field document, my own translation.
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But how was this particular on-file fact created? When Bernard brought me
the applicant’s case file a few days prior to the interview, he told me that he
thought his ‘case’ would probably lead to a negative decision (with temporary
admission). He told me that he had already found a couple of contradic-
tions in the minutes of the first short interview and, therefore, thought there
was probably nothing to the applicant’s story. Because of this he planned on
asking some “mean questions”—as he called them—in order to see whether
they would lead to further contradictions in the second interview. On the
day of the interview, Bernard, as usual, started the part about the appli-
cant’s reasons for applying for asylum in the interview with an open question:
“Ok, so now you can freely tell me about what happened to you personally
in Eritrea and why you left Eritrea”.42 In his narrative, the asylum seeker
mentioned the following event: “Two or three armed people came to my
home. They asked me questions. They insulted me verbally. Then they beat
me. I don’t remember what happened after that […]. They left us alone for
roughly 20 days to a month. […] The soldiers then searched our house”.43
Later on in the interview, Bernard began asking the asylum seeker “wh-”44
and “yes or no questions”:
Q : To confirm, just a quick question: If I’ve understood you correctly, the
authorities came to your house twice. The first time you were interrogated
and beat and the second time your house was searched. Is that correct?
A: Yes. They knew I had contact with X. The government has spies everywhere.
Q : How much time passed in-between these two events, roughly?
A: A short time; about two or three days. They really wanted to know what X
had said to me.
Q : Can you name the date your house was searched and you left [your home
town]?45
Finally, at the end of the interview, Bernard confronted the applicant with
contradictions:
Q : You said today that you were left alone for about 20 days after the first
interrogation by the authorities. Later you said that two or three days passed
between the two interrogations. Which one is true?
42Minutes of second asylum interview, field document, my own translation.
43Minutes of second asylum interview, field document, my own translation.
44“Wh- questions usually start with a word beginning with wh-, but ‘how’ is also included. The wh-
words are: what, when, where, who, whom, which, whose, why, and how” (https://dictionary.cambri
dge.org/de/worterbuch/englisch/wh-question, last accessed 13.02.2020).
45Minutes of second asylum, field document, my own translation.
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A: It was two or three days. If last time I said 20 days I was referring to the
time span when I left [my home town]. There were so many problems.
That’s why I can’t remember everything too clearly.46
Bernard already had an idea what decision he was going to take before
the interview. Thus, he already knew what “direction” his questions would
go in, before even starting the interview. This is something I came across
frequently. What makes decision-makers already have such preconceptions
differs. Sometimes, as with Bernard, it is because they have found contradic-
tions in the minutes of the first interview or because of a particular “feeling”
when reading the minutes of the first interview. And sometimes it is related to
what—from experience—they expect from applicants “belonging” to certain
groups.
Another typical aspect the example brings to light is the questioning tech-
nique used to test credibility. It is common for decision-makers to start
the part about applicants’ reasons for leaving their country and applying
for asylum in the interviews with an open question such as “Why did you
leave country XY and apply for asylum in Switzerland?”.47 After that the
decision-makers follow-up up with specific “wh-questions” and some yes
or no questions. And, at the end of the interview, decision-makers usually
confront asylum seekers with contradictions they have found in their story,
which already counts as granting applicants the right to be heard (rechtliches
Gehör gewähren). This technique is taught to all decision-makers in the initial
training they receive. The open question at the beginning is intended to give
asylum seekers the opportunity to tell their stories. At the same time, several
decision-makers told me that this strategy of starting with an open ques-
tion was useful because in their “free narrative” (freien Erzählung ) asylum
46Minutes of second asylum interview, field document, my own translation.
47The part on applicants’ reasons for applying for asylum usually constitutes the second part of
the interviews. In the first part, asylum seekers are asked questions about their “life at home”; their
family, living situation, occupation, educational background, etc. These questions serve three different
purposes. First, decision-makers need this kind of information for assessing the “reasonableness” of
return in order to know, for example, if applicants have a support network “at home” and/or the
means to survive. Second, many decision-makers told me that these questions served to create a
“friendly”, “unthreatening” atmosphere in which asylum seekers would feel more comfortable to talk.
Thus, I frequently observed decision-makers stopping asylum seekers who, right at the beginning of
the interview, started taking about their reasons for leaving their countries and telling them that they
“would come to that later”. Third, several decision-makers told me that those questions were useful
because one could compare the applicants’ ways of narrating the answers to those “unthreatening”
questions with the ways in which they talked about their reasons for applying for asylum. This fits
the method of “structure comparison” (Strukturvergleich) from forensic psychology which is taught in
the training modules both for new and “old” employees (for the method of structure comparison,
see, for instance, Greuel et al. 1998; Volbert and Steller 2009).
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seekers tended to get tangled up in contradictions—“if the story was not
true” (see also Jubany 2017: 136; Poertner 2018: 161–162). One purpose
of the follow-up questions (the wh-questions in particular) then is to enable
the decision-makers to collect all the necessary information for taking their
decisions (e.g. who exactly the persecutors were and what might have been
motives for persecution). Another purpose of these questions is to see whether
asylum seekers can talk in detail about certain events they are asked about
(e.g. “please tell me in detail about the daily routine in prison”) or to generate
answers the decision-makers can then compare with “facts” they can look
up (e.g. “what was the name of your church that was bombed?”). Both
these things—depending on whether asylum seekers manage to answer them
adequately or not—serve as indicators of credibility or non-credibility; if they
are found as non-credible, the corresponding criteria would be “unfounded-
ness” and “contradiction to facts”. Finally, as Bernard’s example shows, these
questions allow for comparisons.48 Hence, in order to “be able to” reason
non-credibility decisions on the basis of contradictions, decision-makers need
on-file facts that they can compare with. Three possibilities for comparison
are created through the asylum procedure. Decision-makers can compare
asylum seekers’ recorded statements from the first interview with those from
the second (and possibly third) interview. They can compare the statements of
people who share certain experiences, such as siblings or spouses, for example,
and they can make comparisons between statements from the one and the
same interview, as Bernard did (see also Dahlvik 2018: 144; Scheffer 2001:
160–165; 2003: 438–443).
Writing Asylum Decisions: The Final Creation
of Legal Facts
If interviews are “done well”, writing asylum decisions is usually not very
difficult anymore I was often told by decision-makers, as exemplified by
Ralph’s statement: “If the interview and your preparation work was good,
then the decision itself does not require so much effort. I mean, then it’s just
committing to paper what you’ve found out. […] The most elaborate and
time-consuming part happens before. By the time you write the decision,
you’ve already made up your mind” (see also Kelly 2012: 762).49 Yet, occa-
sionally, even after having carried out the asylum interview, decision-makers
48This fits the method of “consistency analysis” (Konstanzanalyse ) from forensic psychology (see, for
instance, Greuel et al. 1998; Volbert and Steller 2009).
49Ralph, caseworker, reception and processing centre, interview transcript, my own translation.
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are still unsure how to decide. I never observed this happening in practice
during my fieldwork, but several caseworkers told me that in such cases they
usually just started writing a decision to see if they could find enough argu-
ments for it and, if not, they would try taking a different type of decision until
they found one that worked (see also Poertner 2018: 194). Thus, as Jonathan
Miaz argues, “in sum, the civil servants take a certain decision because they
have the arguments for justifying it” (cited and translated by Poertner 2018:
196; see Miaz 2017: 327).
Asylum decisions consist of two main parts. The first part describes the
“facts of the case” (Sachverhalt ) and, in the second part, the legal justifi-
cations for taking a particular decision are outlined. All decision-makers I
observed writing decisions kept going back and forth between writing the
two parts, adding bits and pieces that they had found from reading through
the documents in the case file and adapting the first part which describes the
“facts of the case” so that it would fit the reasoning part. This is important
because, in the end, the first part should only indicate aspects that are then
also mentioned in the legal justifications part. Ephraim Poertner fittingly calls
this process “decision-editing” rather than “decision-making” (2018: 194).
The example below shows how Manuela, a historian who, when I met her,
had been working at the SEM for just over two years, struggles but finally
succeeds in finding the necessary on-file facts in the minutes for justifying
her decisions:
I am sitting next to Manuela at her desk. She is writing a decision for a
woman from Sri Lanka. Manuela tells me that for her it is clear what the
decision is going to be. She will not grant the woman asylum, but temporary
admission. She says that the ‘case’ is clearly not credible; the woman’s state-
ments completely unfounded. However, she explains that upon every question
the applicant added some more information, which makes it difficult for her
to take a negative decision solely on the basis of “unfounded-ness”. Manuela
regrets that there aren’t any contradictions in the asylum seeker’s story, because
this, she says, would have made reasoning the ‘case’ with non-credibility much
easier. She tells me that she has also had a quick look at the applicant’s brother’s
case file, just to see whether it confirms her feeling, which it does.
Manuela starts by summarising the “facts of the case”. Then she selects two
boilerplates: one for Article 3 and one for Article 7. She starts working on
the Article 7 argument, selecting the boilerplate for “unfoundedness”. For this,
she then starts looking for on-file facts which show the “unfoundedness” of
the applicant’s claims in the minutes of the asylum interviews. Every time she
finds one, she makes a bullet point of it in the reasoning part of the deci-
sion and then goes back to the part on the “facts of the case” to make some
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changes. When looking for such text passages she discovers some contradictions
between statements in the minutes from the applicant’s case file and those from
the applicant’s brother’s. She makes a note of those contradictions and adds
the boiler plate for “inherent contradictions” to the decision. She explains to
me that this comparison is important because otherwise she would not have
enough arguments for the decision. Other [caseworkers] might have already
been satisfied with “unfoundedness”, she says, but she just didn’t feel secure
enough about it. Because she has to grant the applicant the right to be heard
on these contradictions if she wants to use them for her decision, she can’t
finish the decision just yet. Thus, she sets the case file aside and starts working
on something else.50 (field notes)
What does this example show us? Although for Manuela it was clear from
the beginning what the decision was going to be (even before she started
writing it), she could, at first, not find sufficient on-file facts to reason
her decision. Her professional-practical knowledge told her this story was
“unfounded”; a credible story sounded different; it was much more detailed—
she was sure about that. However, at the same time, Manuela struggled to
find arguments for justifying, on the basis of specific examples from the
minutes, that the applicant had been unable to provide any detailed informa-
tion on what she had experienced. In this ‘case’, she found this particularly
difficult because whenever she had asked the applicant about “details” (e.g. by
asking her how she had received the job as a secretary to a LTTE general; how
she had met this general; and why he had given her this job), the applicant
had added new information, but this information still did not seem detailed
enough to Manuela. However, she did not really know how to show this. In
the end, Manuela managed to find some contradictions (her favourite non-
credibility criterion as she told me) because she was able to use the brother’s
case file for comparison. With the contradictions she discovered, her justifi-
cation became complete. Manuela did not know what had “really happened”
to this woman in Sri Lanka. She suspected that the applicant maybe had
experienced problems in Sri Lanka due to being a single woman or maybe she
had been forced to get married. But for Manuela it did not matter that she
did not know this. Her duty was to achieve enough decisional certainty for
producing a clear-cut, justifiable either/or decision. And that she had done.
50Field notes, my own translation.
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Managing Uncertainty: The Importance
of Credibility Determination
So far, this chapter has evidenced that professional-practical knowledge,
country knowledge decision-makers themselves have acquired, expert knowl-
edge and reports, the production of on-file facts in asylum interviews through
the use of specific questioning techniques and the assembling of on-file facts
with legal criteria in the process of writing decisions all enable asylum case-
workers to overcome the uncertainties inherent in asylum decision-making.
This then allows them to take clear-cut either/or decisions that they feel
comfortable with, in the light of the emotional burden asylum decision-
making poses, and which for them also seem justifiable towards “the outside”,
as I will show in more detail in Chapter 5. In this final part of the chapter, I
want to argue that credibility determination in itself constitutes an important
means for dealing with and overcoming uncertainty.
Because negative asylum decisions are registered with the same code regard-
less of whether they are taken on the basis of non-credibility or on the
basis of asylum seekers being regarded as not eligible to refugee status or a
combination of both, it is not possible to draw statistics on the frequency
of these different decisions. However, all the decision-makers I spoke to
were of the impression that the majority of negative decisions are based on
non-credibility, which is also something that has been described for other
asylum administrations in the Global North (see introduction to this book).
In accord with this, the SEM online manual on asylum and return states
that the majority of rejections are attributable to asylum seekers’ claims
lacking credibility.51 The argument presented here by the SEM, therefore, at
least implicitly, suggests that the reason for the majority of asylum seekers
being refused refugee status is that most of them lie (see Affolter 2018).
However, this seemingly tautological assumption is something I question. As
this chapter has demonstrated, so-called “liars”, “lies” and elements of non-
credibility are produced through the questioning techniques used in asylum
interviews themselves, independent of asylum seekers’ motivations (see also
Crawley 1999: 52; Sbriccoli and Jacoviello 2011: 184–185; Scheffer 2001,
2003).
One reason why the majority of asylum claims are rejected on the basis
of non-credibility has to do with the “official” policy in the SEM to take
negative decisions on the basis of Article 7 whenever possible. Or, at least,
51https://www.sem.admin.ch/dam/data/sem/asyl/verfahren/hb/c/hb-c61-d.pdf, last accessed
14.02.2020. Furthermore, the analysis of my sample of case files shows that out of forty-two
negative decisions, twenty-nine were inter alia argued on the basis of Article 7 AsylA.
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that seemed to be the case in most of the asylum units during my fieldwork,
while some decision-makers from one of the RPCs told me that they had
never heard of this policy. The reason that was commonly given to me for
this policy was that Article 7 arguments were much more difficult to chal-
lenge successfully on appeal level by the asylum seekers (and their lawyers).
Hence, the decision-makers claimed that if they argued on the basis of the
applicant’s recorded statements in the minutes that there were contradictions
in the narrative or that what the applicant had said contradicted “given facts”
(Tatsachen) that was then very difficult to confound. The policy is, there-
fore, linked to fact creation and, as I will outline in the following, creating
non-refutable facts for Article 7 decisions is often easier than for Article 3
decisions. At the same time, and in seeming contradiction to what I have just
claimed, I argue that the “subjective quality” ascribed to credibility assess-
ments by decision-makers additionally reinforces this policy. I observed in
the SEM that having an Article 3 decision quashed by the Federal Adminis-
trative Court was often valuated as significantly worse than having a decision
quashed by the court because of an “erroneous” credibility assessment. In the
latter case, it was deemed expectable that in some cases the judges might
“subjectively” evaluate an applicant’s credibility differently.
Basing negative decisions on Article 7 AsylA rather than on Article 3 AsylA
is, however, not just an institutional policy. Most caseworkers I spoke to
claimed that this was also their personal preference. I argue that there are two
main reasons for this. The first reason is that uncertainties are more easily
overcome with such decisions. Or, in other words, it is often easier to achieve
decisional certainty for non-credibility decisions than for negative decisions
based on non-eligibility to refugee status:
Testing the credibility is especially important if they [the asylum seekers] come
from states that act in an arbitrary manner [willkürliche Staaten]. […] Or
broadly speaking, the worse the situation in a country, the more we have to
focus on the credibility of the claim, or the more we tend to argue on the
basis of credibility. I guess we have to. Because in such countries even a minor
political activity can quickly result in the person being persecuted.52
For instance, a mafia story: is it relevant for asylum or not? […] Because […]
the state [of origin] is not really capable of protection (schutzfähig ). [Yet,] there
is no real motive for asylum behind it. […] But if you just say, this is all not
credible, then you kind of cover your back.53
52Samuel, caseworker, headquarters, interview transcript, my own translation.
53Daniel, caseworker, reception and processing centre, interview transcript, my own translation.
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In their statements, Samuel and Daniel insinuate that often as a decision-
maker one has no way of knowing whether an applicant might be in danger
of future persecution in their “country of origin” or not—anything could in
some countries potentially lead to someone being persecuted. In contrast, for
the reasons presented in this chapter, for them there is a way of sufficiently
knowing whether an asylum seeker’s claims are credible or not. The second
reason why decision-makers prefer rejecting asylum claims on the basis of
non-credibility rather than on non-eligibility to refugee status is because it is
emotionally easier. One caseworker, for instance, told me that it sometimes
felt so cynical to her to say to someone from Syria, for example: “You have no
reason to be afraid” of going back to Syria. But she felt that pointing out the
contradictions in asylum seekers’ statements and raising doubt about a whole
story instead was easier.54 Another decision-maker, Helen, too expressed this
in an even more explicit way: “But I can also tell you why [I prefer arguing
negative decisions on the basis of non-credibility]. It’s for my conscience.
If someone tells you rubbish [dir einen Stuss erzählt ], then you don’t have
such a guilty conscience”.55 Helen and Patricia’s statements indicate how,
through reasoning with Article 7, the responsibility for the outcome of the
decision is shifted to the asylum seekers: it is their fault for not telling
“the truth”.56 Thereby, the emotional burden of taking such life-changing
decisions is lessened.
Concluding Remarks
Decision-makers are requested to reach clear-cut either/or decisions. Thus,
they must classify asylum seekers into one of four categories: refugee with
asylum, refugee with temporary admission, non-refugee with temporary
admission and non-refugee without temporary admission. These classifica-
tions have major impacts on asylum seekers’ lives since they lead to different
rights and obligations. Not only do they have an impact on whether a person
is legally allowed to reside in Switzerland or not, they also affect whether a
person has the right to immediately apply for family reunification or whether
they must first wait for at least three years before they can apply for it. Hence,
54Patricia, caseworker, headquarters, interview transcript, my own translation.
55Helen, caseworker, headquarters, interview transcript, my own translation.
56This allocation of responsibility can also clearly be seen in the standard way asylum seekers are
informed about their “duty to collaborate” at the beginning of asylum interviews: “You have the duty
to say the truth and the duty to collaborate in the process of gathering the facts for the evaluation
of your application. You bear responsibility for your statements. If you make untrue statements, this
might have negative consequences for you” (Poertner 2018: 153–154).
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if asylum seekers’ stories are classified as non-credible and, due to this, the
applicants are granted temporary admission rather than asylum, this means
that they can only apply for their spouses and unmarried children under the
age of eighteen to be granted temporary admission after three years, and only
if they do not depend on social welfare and are, thus, able to provide for
their families by themselves.57 For recognised refugees who have been granted
asylum, on the other hand, there are no such restrictions.
This chapter has shown how decision-makers go about reaching such
clear-cut decisions and how, in order to do so, they try to overcome the
uncertainties inherent in asylum decision-making. Law requires clear-cut
categorisations. As such, it constitutes a fundamental structural condition
of bureaucratic decision-making. The chapter has brought to light how
this structural condition shapes SEM caseworkers’ practices. Furthermore,
it has shown how through the classification into clear-cut legal categories,
in the process of which ambiguities and doubts are reduced and often
become hidden from sight, new legal facts and “truths” are created. And it
has pointed to the crucial role intuitive and incorporated knowledge plays
in decision-making. It helps decision-makers acquire enough certainty for
reaching decisions in a twofold way. On the one hand, decision-makers very
much trust their intuitive knowledge, gaining a sense of “felt security” from
it. On the other hand, by guiding decision-makers’ actions in dealing with
case files, conducting asylum interviews and writing decisions, it also plays
an essential role in overcoming uncertainties through the production of legal
facts.
This knowledge, which lies in “the doing” of actions itself (see Dahlvik
2018: 57), constitutes part of decision-makers’ institutional habitus. But not
only is the institutional habitus constituted in this way by decision-makers’
everyday practices, it is also constitutive of the latter, as this chapter has
shown. By creating the legal “truths” decision-makers intuitively set out to
look for through their everyday practice, the institutional habitus is contin-
uously reaffirmed. However, it is important to note that this self-sustaining
production of “truths” is not something that is (for the most part) carried
out consciously and mean-spiritedly, but should rather be understood as the
workings of the institutional habitus. Nevertheless, decision-makers’ prac-
tices are, of course, not structured in a deterministic way (see also Hitchings
2012). They are also—and must to some extent always remain—creative;
allowing decision-makers to deal with asylum applications on a case-by-case
57https://www.refugeecouncil.ch/asylum-law/legal-status/temporary-admission-of-foreigners.html, last
accessed 28.02.2020.
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basis, dealing with the particular uncertainties as they arise from the indi-
vidual ‘cases’ and situations (see also Bourdieu 1990: 55; Dahlvik 2018: 62;
Shove and Pantzar 2007). Yet, what for decision-makers comes to constitute
“normal”, acceptable and doable ways of dealing with and assessing ‘cases’ is
shaped by what they know (and can and cannot know) as well as the organi-
sational, legal and ideological structures they are embedded in. It is set by the
limits of their institutional habitus (Wacquant 1992: 19).
References
Affolter, Laura. 2017. “Asyl-Verwaltung kraft Wissen: Die Herstellung von Entschei-
dungswissen in einer Schweizer Asylbehörde.” In Asyl verwalten. Zur bürokratis-
chen Bearbeitung eines gesellschaftlichen Problems, edited by Christian Lahusen,
and Stephanie Schneider, 145–171. Bielefeld: transcript.
Affolter, Laura. 2018. “Der grösste Teil von [unserem] Job ist Unglaubhaftigkeit.”
Terra Cognita – Schweizer Zeitschrift zu Integration und Migration 32: 92–94.
Affolter, Laura. 2020. “Keeping Numbers Low in the Name of Fairness. Ethos
and Ethics in a Swiss Asylum Administration.” In The Bureaucratic Production
of Difference, edited by Julia Eckert, 27–57. Bielefeld: transcript.
Affolter, Laura, Jonathan Miaz, and Ephraim Poertner. 2019. “Taking the ‘Just’
Decision: Caseworkers and Their Communities of Interpretation in the Swiss
Asylum Office.” In Asylum Determination in Europe. Ethnographic Perspectives,
edited by Nick Gill, and Anthony Good, 263–284. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
Amado, Barbara G., Ramon Arce, and Francisca Fariña. 2015. “Undeutsch Hypoth-
esis and Criteria Based Content Analysis: A Meta-Analytic Review.” The European
Journal of Psychology Applied to Legal Context 7 (1): 3–12. https://doi.org/10.
1016/j.ejpal.2014.11.002.
Amado, Barbara G., Ramon Arce, Francisca Fariña, and Manuel Vilariño. 2016.
“Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA) Reality Criteria in Adults: A Meta-
Analytic Review.” International Journal of Clinical and Health Psychology 16 (2):
201–210. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijchp.2016.01.002.
Anderson, Jessica, Jeannine Hollaus, Annelisa Lindsay, and Collin Williamson.
2014. The Culture of Disbelief: An Ethnographic Approach to Understanding an
Under-Theorised Concept in the UK Asylum System. Working Paper Series No. 102.
Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre. https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/files-1/wp102-cul
ture-of-disbelief-2014.pdf, last accessed February 3, 2020.
Asylum Act, (AsylA), of 26 June 1998 (Status as of 1 January 2020). 142.31.
Bloch, Maurice. 1991. “Language, Anthropology and Cognitive Science.” Man
(New Series) 26 (2): 183–198. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2803828.pdf, last
accessed March 13, 2020.
Bohmer, Carol, and Amy Shuman. 2008. Rejecting Refugees: Political Asylum in the
21st Century. London: Routledge.
112 L. Affolter
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1990. The Logic of Practice. Translated by Richard Nice. Stanford:
Stanford University Press.
Breidenstein, Georg, Stefan Hirschauer, Herbert Kalthoff, and Boris Nieswand.
2013. Ethnografie. Die Praxis der Feldforschung . Stuttgart: UTB.
Byrne, Rosemary. 2007. “Assessing Testimonial Evidence in Asylum Proceedings:
Guiding Standards from the International Criminal Tribunals.” International
Journal of Refugee Law 19 (4): 609–638. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eem056.
Cabot, Heath. 2014. On the doorstep of Europe: Asylum and Citizenship in Greece.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Crawley, Heaven. 1999. Breaking Down the Barriers: A Report on the Conduct of
Asylum Interviews at Ports. London: Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association
(ILPA).
Dahlvik, Julia. 2018. Inside Asylum Bureaucracy: Organizing Refugee Status Determi-
nation in Austria. IMISCOE Research Series. Cham: Springer.
Downs, Anthony. 1967. Inside Bureaucracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
Dubois, Vincent. 2010. The Bureaucrat and the Poor: Encounters in French Welfare
Offices. Translated by Jean-Yves Bart. Farnham: Ashgate.
Durst, Ilene. 2000. “Lost in Translation: Why Due Process Demands Deference to
the Refugee’s Narrative.” Rutgers Law Review 53: 127–179. https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=269166, last accessed February 26, 2020.
Eckert, Julia. 2020. “The Office. Ethos and Ethics in Migration Bureaucracies.” In
The Bureaucratic Production of Difference, edited by Julia Eckert, 7–26. Bielefeld:
transcript.
EMARK. 2004/01. https://ark-cra.rekurskommissionen.ch/assets/resources/ark/
emark/2004/01.htm, last accessed February 26, 2020.
Fassin, Didier. 2013. “The Precarious Truth of Asylum.” Public Culture 25 (1 (69)):
39–63. https://doi.org/10.1215/08992363-1890459.
Fassin, Didier, and Carolina Kobelinsky. 2012. “How Asylum Claims Are Adjudi-
cated: The Institution as a Moral Agent.” Revue française de sociologie 53 (4):
444–472. https://doi.org/10.3917/rfs.534.0657.
Gibb, Robert, and Anthony Good. 2013. “Do the Facts Speak for Themselves?
Country of Origin Information in French and British Refugee Status Determina-
tion Procedures.” International Journal of Refugee Law 25 (2): 291–322. https://
doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eet015.
Greuel, Luise, Susanne Offe, Agnes Fabian, Peter Wetzels, Thomas Fabian, Heinz
Offe, and Michael Stadler. 1998. Glaubhaftigkeit der Zeugenaussage: Theorie und
Praxis der forensisch-psychologischen Begutachtung . Weinheim: Beltz.
Griffiths, Melanie. 2012. “‘Vile Liars and Truth Distorters’. Truth, Trust and the
Asylum System.” Anthropology Today 28 (5): 8–12. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.
1467-8322.2012.00896.x.
Hitchings, Russel. 2012. “People Can Talk About Their Practices.” Area 44 (1):
61–67. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4762.2011.01060.x.
4 Knowledge as Practice: Producing Decisional Certainty 113
Johannesson, Livia. 2017. In Courts We Trust. Administrative Justice in Swedish
Migration Courts. Stockholm University. http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/
diva2:1072557/FULLTEXT01.pdf, last accessed February 03, 2020.
Jubany, Olga. 2011. “Constructing Truths in a Culture of Disbelief: Understanding
Asylum Screening from Within.” International Sociology 26 (1): 74–94. https://
doi.org/10.1177/0268580910380978.
Jubany, Olga. 2017. Screening Asylum in a Culture of Disbelief: Truths, Denials and
Sceptical Borders. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kagan, Michael. 2003. “Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder? Objective Credibility
Assessment in Refugee Status Determination.” Georgetown Immigration Law
Journal 17 (3): 367–415. https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub/633, last accessed
February 03, 2020.
Kelly, Tobias. 2012. “Sympathy and Suspicion: Torture, Asylum, and Humanity.”
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 18 (4): 753–768. https://doi.org/10.
1111/j.1467-9655.2012.01790.x.
Kelly, Tobias. 2015. “Afterword.” In Of Doubt and Proof: Ritual and Legal Practices
of Judgement , edited by Daniela Berti, Anthony Good, and Gilles Tarabout, 183–
192. Farnham: Ashgate.
Lahusen, Christian, and Stephanie Schneider. 2017. “Asyl verwalten: Eine
Einleitung.” In Asyl verwalten. Zur bürokratischen Bearbeitung eines
gesellschaftlichen Problems, edited by Christian Lahusen, and Stephanie
Schneider, 7–24. Bielefeld: transcript.
Lavanchy, Anne. 2014. “Die Gefühlswelt des Gesetzes. Die kritische Umsetzung von
eherechtlichen Vorschriften im Zivistandsamt.” FAMPRA 1: 92–117.
Liodden, Tone Maia. 2016. “The Burdens of Discretion. Managing Uncertainty in
the Asylum Bureaucracy.” PhD diss. (unpublished), University of Oslo.
Lipsky, Michael. 2010. Street-Level Bureaucracy, 30th Anniversary Edition: Dilemmas
of the Individual in Public Service. New York: Russel Sage Foundation.
Macklin, Audrey. 1998. “Truth and Consequences: Credibility Determination in
the Refugee Context.” Conference Paper. Ottawa: International Association of
Refugee Law Judges. http://refugeestudies.org/UNHCR/97%20-%20Truth%
20and%20Consequences.%20Credibility%20Determination%20in%20Refu
gee%20Context.%20by%20Audrey%20Macklin.pdf, last accessed February 03,
2020.
Miaz, Jonathan. 2017. “Politique d’asile et sophistication du droit: Pratiques admin-
istratives et défense juridique des migrants en Suisse (1981–2015).” PhD diss.
(unpublished), University of Lausanne and University of Strasbourg.
Pelosi, Anna. 1996. “Intercultural Communication in the Refugee Determi-
nation Hearing.” Master Thesis. Montreal: School of Social Work, McGill
University. http://digitool.library.mcgill.ca/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=
27480&local_base=GEN01-MCG02, last accessed July 15, 2017.
114 L. Affolter
Poertner, Ephraim. 2017. “Governing Asylum through Configurations of Produc-
tivity and Deterrence: Effects on the Spatiotemporal Trajectories of Cases in
Switzerland.” Geoforum 78: 12–21. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2016.
11.004.
Poertner, Ephraim. 2018. “Re-Cording Lives: Governing Asylum in Switzerland and
the Need to Resolve.” PhD diss. (unpublished), University of Zurich.
Polanyi, Michael. 1962 (1958). Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philos-
ophy. London: Routledge.
Polanyi, Michael. 1966. The Tacit Dimension. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Reckwitz, Andreas. 2003. “Grundelemente einer Theorie sozialer Praktiken: Eine
sozialtheoretische Perspektive.” Zeitschrift für Soziologie 32 (4): 282–301.
Rosset, Damian. 2015. “Les informations sur les pays d’origine dans les procé-
dures d’asile: construction et négociation institutionnelle de la réalité.” Jusletter
16 (3). http://jusletter.weblaw.ch/en/juslissues/2015/794/le-savoir-sur-les-pa_097
022417f.html, last accessed July 13, 2017.
Rosset, Damian, and Tone Liodden. 2015. “The Eritrea Report: Symbolic Uses of
Expert Information in Asylum Politics.” Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration 5
(1): 26–32.
Rousseau, Cécile, François Crépeau, Patricia Foxen, and France Houle. 2002. “The
Complexity of Determining Refugeehood: A Multidisciplinary Analysis of the
Decision-making Process of the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board.”
Journal of Refugee Studies 15 (1): 43–70. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/15.1.43.
Ryle, Gilbert. 1951 (1949). The Concept of Mind . London: Hutchinsons University
Library.
Sbriccoli, Tommaso, and Stefano Jacoviello. 2011. “The Case of S: Elaborating the
‘Right’ Narrative to Fit Normative/Political Expectations in Asylum Procedure
in Italy.” In Cultural Expertise and Litigation, edited by Livia Holden, 172–194.
Abingdon and New York: Routledge.
Scheffer, Thomas. 2001. Asylgewährung: Eine ethnographische Analyse des deutschen
Asylverfahrens. Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius.
Scheffer, Thomas. 2003. “Kritik der Urteilskraft: Wie die Asylprüfung Unentscheid-
bares in Entscheidbares überführt.” In Migration steuern und verwalten: Deutsch-
land vom späten 19. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart , edited by Jochen Oltmer,
423–458. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Schneider, Stephanie. 2019. “Becoming a Decision-Maker, or: ‘Don’t Turn Your
Heart into a Den of Thieves and Murderers’.” In Asylum Determination in Europe.
Ethnographic Perspectives, edited by Nick Gill, and Anthony Good, 285–306.
Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
Shove, Elizabeth, and Mika Pantzar. 2007. “Recruitment and Reproduction: The
Careers and Carriers of Digital Photography and Floorball.” Human Affairs 17
(2): 154–167. https://doi.org/10.2478/v10023-007-0014-9.
Simpson, Bob. 2006. “‘You Don’t Do Fieldwork, Fieldwork Does You’: Between
Subjectivation and Objectivation in Anthropological Fieldwork.” In The SAGE
4 Knowledge as Practice: Producing Decisional Certainty 115
Handbook of Fieldwork, edited by Dick Hobbs, and Richard Wright, 125–137.
London: Sage.
Souter, James. 2011. “A Culture of Disbelief or Denial? Critiquing Refugee Status
Determination in the United Kingdom.” Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration 1
(1): 48–59.
Sweeney, James A. 2007. “The ‘Lure’ of Facts in Asylum Appeals: Critiquing the
Practice of Judges.” In Applying Theory to Policy and Practice: Issues for Critical
Reflection, edited by Steven R Smith, 19–35. Hampshire: Ashgate.
Thomas, Robert. 2009. “Refugee Roulette: A UK Perspective.” In Refugee Roulette:
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication and Proposals for Return, edited by Jaya Ramji-
Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz, and Philip G. Schrag, 164–186. New York:
New York University Press.
Trueman, Trevor. 2009. “Reasons for Refusal: An Audit of 200 Refusals of Ethiopian
Asylum-Seekers in England.” Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law
23 (3): 281–308.
Volbert, Renate, and Max Steller. 2009. “Die Begutachtung der Glaubhaftigkeit.”
In Psychiatrische Begutachtung: Ein praktisches Handbuch für Ärzte und Juristen,
edited by Klaus Foerster, and Harald Dressing, 817–850. München: Elsevier,
Urban & Fischer.
Wacquant, Loïc J.D. 1992. “Toward a Social Praxeology: The Structure and Logic
of Bourdieu’s Sociology.” In An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, edited by Pierre
Bourdieu, and Loïc J.D. Wacquant, 1–59. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Wagenaar, Hendrik. 2004. “‘Knowing’ the Rules: Administrative Work as Practice.”
Public Administration Review 64 (6): 643–656. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-
6210.2004.00412.x.
Weber, Max. 2013 (1978). Economy and Society. Edited by Guenther Roth, and
Claus Wittich. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/),
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any
medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s)
and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if
changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the
chapter’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line
to the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons
license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds
the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright
holder.
5
Getting in Linewith the Office
The habitus—people’s dispositions of thinking, acting, feeling and desiring—
is, according to Pierre Bourdieu, “socialized subjectivity” (Bourdieu and
Wacquant 1992: 126). This chapter is about how (new) decision-makers
are socialised in the SEM and thereby acquire an institutional habitus or, in
other words, “socialised subjectivity”. It looks at how decision-makers learn
the appropriate ways of fulfilling their role and how they learn to “properly”
interpret the law.
In their famous article “Toward a theory of organizational socialization”,
John Van Maanen and Edgar Schein define organisational socialisation as “the
process by which one is taught and learns ‘the ropes’ of a particular organiza-
tional role. In its most general sense, organizational socialization is then the
process by which an individual acquires the social knowledge and skills neces-
sary to assume an organizational role” (1979: 211).1 Moreover, in a more
general sense, Christina Toren describes socialisation as “the process through
which people […] are made to take on the ideas and behaviour appropriate
to life in a particular society” (2002: 512). Hence, socialisation stands for the
process through which people, particularly novices, appropriate “acceptable”
1For further theoretical approaches to “organisational socialisation” see Blake Ashforth et al. (2007),
Sue Ashford and Samir Nurmohamed (2012), Georgia Chao (2012), Roy Lewicki (1981), Peter
Manning and John Van Maanen (1978) as well as Connie Wanberg (2012). Several authors, such
as Julia Dahlvik (2018), Josiah Heyman (1995), Olga Jubany (2011, 2017), Tone Liodden (2016),
Jonathan Miaz (2017a, b), Zachary Oberfield (2014), Johanna Probst (2012) Stephanie Schneider
(2019) as well as Stephanie Schneider and Kristina Wottrich (2017) have also dealt with officials’
socialisation in asylum administrations and street-level bureaucracies in more empirical terms. These
authors’ work has been crucial to informing my way of approaching institutional socialisation in the
SEM in this chapter.
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ways of acting, thinking and desiring. If we want to understand how novices
come to appropriate such ways, we thus need to look closely at three crucial
points, salient in the definitions above.
First, the definitions show that socialisation is essentially about learning.
Novices must learn the necessary skills and (social) knowledge for fulfilling
their role within the organisation and they must learn the acceptable and
appropriate ways to behave within their “society”. Thus, we must concern
ourselves with how new decision-makers learn to do their job and what is
expected from them. Second, Toren writes that people are made to take on
certain ideas and behaviours. This does not necessarily mean that novices are
intentionally and explicitly forced to adopt particular ideas and behaviours,
but rather that the appropriation of these ideas and behaviours may also be
the outcome of the powerful influence which some actors have over others.
Hence, we must pay attention to the influence the different actors involved
in asylum decision-making have over each other. Third, the definitions show
that socialisation is necessarily linked to belonging. Thus, in order for novices
to learn the acceptable and appropriate ideas and the behaviours of their
“society”, there must be a “society” they affiliate themselves with (or are affil-
iated with) and are trying to fit into. Consequently, we need to explore what
belonging means for decision-makers in the SEM. The chapter is structured
around these three different aspects. In the first part, I explore how people
become members of the office; the different affiliations and allegiances they
develop within the office; as well as what this means in terms of “belonging”.
The second part of the chapter then sets out how newcomers to the office
acquire the necessary knowledge and skills to fulfil their roles as decision-
makers. And in the third part, I show how accountability towards superiors
and peers, but also beyond that towards politicians, media and “the public”,
shapes what decision-makers do. Finally, I argue that only by looking at these
above-mentioned processes together can we come to understand how certain
things become self-evident for decision-makers to do, think and want.
Becoming a Member of the Office
In order to become socialised in the office, decision-makers must first become
part of it. This section of the chapter explores who the people working in
the asylum units of the SEM are and what their motives for doing the job
are. I set forth patterns in decision-makers’ profiles that I observed and link
them to recruitment procedures in the SEM. I thereby show what quali-
ties the (different) heads of asylum units look out for in new recruits. This
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provides a first image of what, in the eyes of superiors, constitutes a “good
decision-maker” and what is, therefore, expected from new caseworkers once
they have joined the office. Because it is mainly the heads of the individual
asylum units themselves (together with the deputy heads) that recruit new
decision-makers, this has a substantial impact on the composition of their
teams, which, in turn, leads to the consolidation of ideas on “how to [best]
interpret the law” and best fulfil the role of decision-maker, and to the devel-
opment of “‘shared repertoires’ of knowledge” within the different units, as I
will show in the last part of this section (Affolter et al. 2019: 265; see Wenger
2003). Thus, “belonging” may mean different things to different decision-
makers working in the SEM. At least in part, this has to do with the different
“groups”, or what elsewhere—building on Wenger (2003)—we have called
“communities of interpretation” that co-exist within the office (Affolter et al.
2019).
Who Are the Decision-Makers?
Gabriel is a political scientist who works as a decision-maker at the headquar-
ters. This is his first “proper job”. During his studies, he worked as a social aid
representative and therefore already knows the asylum proceedings quite well.
I met him on the first day of the training session, which was his first day at his
new job. Two months later I interviewed him and asked about his motivations
for applying for the job at the SEM. He replied: “I am interested in foreigners,
other cultures. The basic idea is to help these people, even if we do – of course
– reject many of them”.2
Claire is a jurist. When I met her she had been working at one of the reception
and processing centres (RPCs) for slightly more than a year. Prior to this she
had worked as a clerk at a regional court for many years. She had considered
taking her bar exams before joining the SEM, but then decided instead to look
for a job in which she could do “something social”, while still practising law.3
Patricia is a social anthropologist. After completing her studies she was an
intern with UNHCR in an African country. In the long term her ambition is
to work for a renowned international NGO, but, at the moment, she thinks
that she needs more work experience for which the job at the SEM “proved to
be a good opportunity”. “I mean, the job does interest me”, she told me in an
2Gabriel, caseworker, headquarters, interview transcript, my own translation.
3Claire, caseworker, reception and processing centre, field notes, my own translation.
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interview, “but it’s mainly just an entry point”. When I met her she had been
working in one of the units at the headquarters for a couple of months.4
Helen is a lawyer. She applied to the SEM after a friend of hers told her about
an employment opportunity. At the job interview she told the employers that
she could not promise that she would stay for more than a year. But now,
15 years later, she is still doing the same job. She thinks it is too late for her
to change jobs now. “I have probably become too specialised in asylum law to
be able to work elsewhere”, she told me.5
The four profiles above exemplify the main patterns I found amongst
decision-makers in the SEM’s asylum units.6 First, with the exception of one
person, all the decision-makers I spoke to in the SEM held a degree from
university, which is hardly surprising since having a university degree is nowa-
days a formal requisite for becoming a caseworker in the SEM. Out of the
thirty-one decision-makers from my sample, thirteen had a law degree. The
same number had a background in humanities, with more than half of those
being social anthropologists. Thus, social anthropology was second to law as
the most common educational background in my sample. A second salient
point is that for half of my interaction partners, the job at the SEM is their
first “proper job” (see also Miaz 2017a: 187–188). However, many of them
had done one or several internships previously, mostly “in the field of migra-
tion”. This connects with the third pattern I observed, namely that prior to
working in the SEM, many decision-makers had already gained experience in
the “field of migration and asylum”. Several had worked part-time in some
capacity in the asylum process while they were still at university: as social
aid representatives, minute-takers or “poolies”. Others had worked for the
UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) or different
cantonal migration offices. And others had come into contact with asylum
proceedings through internships in Swiss embassies. My material shows that
this is especially true for non-jurists. While several of my interaction partners
with a legal background were employed as decision-makers without having
any previous experience in the “field of migration”, this was only the case for
very few non-jurists.
4Patricia, caseworker, headquarters, interview transcript, my own translation.
5Helen, caseworker, headquarters, interview transcript, my own translation.
6Similar patterns are also described by Jonathan Miaz who did research in the SEM between 2010
and 2012 (see Miaz 2017a: 188–190).
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People apply for the job as a decision-maker for several different reasons.7
Many decision-makers stated a general interest in migrants and asylum
seekers and in wanting to help them. A couple mentioned that this interest
came from their personal experience: their parents had come to Switzer-
land as refugees. For most, however, this interest came from having worked
with refugees (or migrants in general) previously. A main reason for applying
for the job for those people was that they wanted to have a say in asylum
decision-making and to not remain passive bystanders. Thus, they wanted
to take on more responsibility themselves. Furthermore, several found the
job appealing because it enabled face-to-face contact with people. The latter
was especially often mentioned by decision-makers with a legal background.
Many of whom had come to the SEM because they had wanted to do a
job that contained not only legal but “social” aspects. Finally, for several, the
job was a convenient entry-point into the professional world. For jurists in
particular the job represents one of the few opportunities for directly going
into practising law without taking the bar exams.
In my interviews with “old stagers” of the office, I would often ask them
somewhat provocatively not why they had applied for the job, but why there
were still there. Some of the reasons given for remaining closely resemble the
initial motivations—or rather, as Jonathan Miaz has argued, the ex post ratio-
nalisations of motivations (2017a: 193, 201)—described above, but there are
also others:
Because I think my job is great. Every job is monotonous in a way, no matter
what you do. But the situation in the world keeps changing. There are always
adjustments and so you must always make sure to keep yourself up to date.
The situation in Kosovo isn’t the same as it used to be 15 years ago, but instead
we’ve got other “trouble spots” (Krisenherde ) now. […] And then every person
is different. Even if you’ve heard the same story a hundred times, you’re still
always dealing with an individual being and I find this having to engage with
people very interesting. If we didn’t have this customer contact I don’t think
I’d be working here anymore. […] And, of course, the working conditions are
great. We’ve got a lot of holidays, which I think we really need and the salary
is good.8
Like Klaus, many officials mentioned “contact with people” as one of the
things they like most about their job and, therefore, as one of the main
7What I describe here closely matches Jonathan Miaz’s findings from his research in the SEM (see
Miaz 2017a: 192–201, 219). Furthermore, Johanna Probst shows that decision-makers in France have
very similar motivations (2012: 226–227).
8Klaus, caseworker, reception and processing centre, interview transcript, my own translation.
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reasons for remaining in the job. Another thing they enjoy is the variability
and the changing nature of their job. Hence, they like that they do not just
have various different tasks to fulfil, but that the situation in the world keeps
changing and that, by being required to keep up to date, they learn so much
about the current situation. Another reason that came up frequently in the
discussions—particularly with jurists—was that, after a while, one could no
longer really leave the job because the prospects of finding a job elsewhere
were relatively low. Many jurists explained to me that once one had become
too specialised in asylum law, it became difficult to gain a foothold in a
different legal field. Furthermore, they said that asylum law had low status
in the legal sphere and, hence, once one had got into it, it was difficult to
get out of it again (see also Miaz 2017a: 203). Finally, the good working
conditions were amongst the main reasons many of my interaction partners
gave as to why they stay on the job. They thought that elsewhere—especially
outside Federal administration—it would probably be difficult to encounter
such good working conditions.
Recruiting New Decision-Makers
It being an attractive job for the above-mentioned reasons, many people
usually apply for the role of asylum decision-maker when jobs are advertised.
In the last ten to fifteen years, a large volume of new caseworkers have been
employed in the SEM’s asylum units as the sample of my interaction part-
ners clearly indicates (see Chapter 2). On the one hand, this has to do with
a relatively stable rate of turnover in the office. On the other hand, it has
to do with recent reorganisations and with the fact that the SEM’s asylum
directorate has been growing constantly since 2007. Or, at least, that was the
case between 2007 and 2017, with the number of decision-makers increasing
every year in an attempt to reduce the number of pending ‘cases’.9 As stated
above, it is the heads and the deputy heads of the different asylum units who
decide whom to employ. However, the final decision is not entirely up to
them. The heads must provide their direct superiors with a justification of
their reasoning for employing a particular person. Only if the latter agree is
the applicant eventually employed.
Although the wording of the recruitment advertisement is consistent and
always states that applicants with a law degree are preferred, in practice the
individual heads have divergent preferences about educational background
and previous experience. Thus, some heads told me that for them it was
9Hence, during that time the full-time equivalent of the directorate doubled from 254.0 in 2007 to
512.4 in 2017 (numbers given to me by the statistical service of the SEM, 15.06.2017).
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essential that decision-makers have already gained some sort of experience
working with migrants or asylum seekers. For others, in turn, it is central
that decision-makers have travelled and know how “things work elsewhere”,
while for others it is more important that decision-makers are experienced
jurists:
Laura: What is important to you when employing new people? What do you
look for?
Nadia: That is quite subjective. Every head of division has different prefer-
ences. For me it isn’t mandatory that this person is a jurist and versed in
law (rechtlich sattelfest ). Maybe that they have a bit of an idea, but that is
really secondary. I prefer someone with life experience, someone who knows
how things work abroad and not just in Russia, America or France, but in
Bangladesh or Uganda for example. […] Someone who can free themselves
from a euro-centric perception and who has life and people skills.10
Well, I try to evaluate their social competence. […] I look at what kind
of experience they have. I don’t like taking people fresh from university. I
think that for the work we do here it is important that someone has work
experience. On the other hand, I don’t find it important whether people
have travelled around the world much or not. I like jurists, because we
deal with juridical questions here and I think that someone with a legal
background is better equipped for dealing with these things.11
Job applicants that are shortlisted are not just invited to a job interview
but also are required to do a test which consists of two parts. In the first part,
applicants have to write an asylum decision within a limited time. For that
they receive a copy of the Swiss Asylum Act (AsylA) and the Federal Act on
Foreign Nationals (FNA) as well as the minutes from an initial short asylum
interview and its corresponding second longer interview. In the second part,
the job candidates are requested to write a letter in the name of the Federal
Councillor in charge of the SEM (for instance, as a response to a letter “from
the public”). These tests are used to assess what are perceived as essential
qualities for the job. One such quality is “decisiveness”; a job applicant’s
ability to take a decision and to assume responsibility for it. The tests are also
intended to reveal the ability of an applicant to make a decision in a particular
direction and argue it through to a conclusion. Furthermore, an applicant’s
capacity to capture the aspects deemed crucial for taking a decision, to use
10Nadia, head of asylum unit, headquarters, interview transcript, my own translation.
11Oliver, head of asylum unit, reception and processing centre, interview transcript, my own
translation.
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the law correctly and to write well and error-free (mistakes are counted) are
qualities assessed through these tests. Moreover, the tests are about showing
whether an applicant is capable of performing as the office and, thus, is able
to speak in the name of the SEM. Finally, as Jonathan Miaz has argued, the
tests are also perceived by the superiors as being a useful indicator of whether
job applicants are able to reach a decision without letting their “ideological
views interfere” and/or their “conscience getting in the way” (see Miaz 2017a:
204–206).12
When new decision-makers are employed, they first work on temporary
contracts. Thus, during the first three years of their employment, caseworkers
get fixed-term contracts, which have to be renewed annually. Only after three
years do they receive an open-ended contract. This enables the office to flex-
ibly react to rising and falling numbers of asylum seekers, with respect to
pending ‘cases’. Furthermore, it has an impact on how new employees are
disciplined in the office, as I will show later on in this chapter.
Communities of Interpretation
Socialisation is “the process through which people […] are made to take on
the ideas and behaviour appropriate to life in a particular society”, Cristina
Toren argues (2002: 512). In this case, the “society” is the SEM. However, as
we have shown elsewhere, “[i]t is important not to perceive the office solely
as a unified whole. Rather, it appeared to us to be divided along compli-
cated and evolving lines of affiliations and allegiances” (Affolter et al. 2019:
276). Building on Etienne Wenger (2003), we opted to call these lines of
affiliation “communities of interpretation”. Such communities may arise situ-
ationally, but they can also take on a more permanent form. Furthermore,
while different perceptions of what constitutes good decision-making might
prevail in these communities, we should at the same time not overestimate
such differences. There is also a lot of “mutual understanding” between these
different communities of interpretation (Affolter et al. 2019: 276). Finally,
these communities do not form dividing lines in an absolute sense. “Officials
in the office are affiliated to multiple ‘communities’ and may ‘change sides’”
(ibid.). In this part of the chapter, my focus is solely on the affiliation and
identification with the specific divisions decision-makers work in: the head-
quarters or the RPCs as well as the subdivisions within these centres. These
12In connection to this, Jonathan Miaz argues that a quality they look out for in the recruitment
process is that potential employees are neither too left- nor too right-wing (2017a: 205–206). While
this never came up in my conversations with SEM officials with regard to recruitment, it was often
mentioned as part of the ethos of being a good decision-maker (see Chapter 6).
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affiliations seem to have the strongest influence on decision-makers’ “sense
of belonging” since they are official organisational units that are each lead
by a superior and that have their own place within the SEM’s organisational
hierarchy. In addition, many of these divisions are located physically apart
from each other. Thus, at the time of my research, the RPCs were situated in
five different areas in Switzerland and, at the headquarters, the different units
partly worked on different floors of the same building.
In my fieldwork, I found that most decision-makers tend to primarily
identify themselves with the particular centre they work in: the headquar-
ters or (one of ) the RPCs. This shapes their view of what it means to work in
line with the office. Both at the headquarters and in the RPCs, officials often
complain about the respective others and the ways in which they conduct
their work. Officials in the RPCs also make distinctions between the different
RPCs (for instance, some are said to be much stricter than others). However,
those differences were stressed much less in the conversations I had with offi-
cials. Mostly they spoke of “we in the RPCs and them up there in Bern”,
while, at the headquarters in Bern, talk was often of “us and the RPC-ians”.
The most common critique I observed at the headquarters about “RPC-ians”
was that the latter conducted their work in a hurried and inaccurate (husch
husch) way and that they did not stick to institutional practice. Mostly, in
their critique of RPC caseworkers’ so-called husch husch approach, the head-
quarter officials referred to the “RPC-ians” as not asking enough (relevant)
questions in the first short interviews, as well as to the minutes of those
interviews being sketchy and inaccurate. They complained that this made
decision-making more difficult for them. First, because they then lacked a
solid basis for making comparisons between asylum seekers’ statements at
different moments in the procedure. Second, they feared that because of the
sketchy minutes, when appealing a negative decision, applicants could claim
that they had not actually said what was recorded in the minutes and possibly
win their case. Officially, decision-makers at the headquarters are in charge
(through the Federführungen) of developing institutional practice. However,
many decision-makers working at the headquarters complained about “RPC-
ians” not sticking to the practice set by them. Furthermore, some of my
interaction partners at the headquarters felt that their counterparts at the
RPCs were too strict or “hardline”. In that respect, one decision-maker once
told me that when he had gone to do his one-week “internship” at one of the
RPCs he had been really taken aback by the disrespectful language the people
there used to speak about asylum seekers.13 As part of their “initial” training,
13Andrea, caseworker, headquarters, field notes, my own translation.
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new decision-makers working at the headquarters go to work at one of the
RPCs for a week and conversely new decision-makers from the RPCs spend
a week at the headquarters. This usually happens after they have already been
working at the SEM for a couple of months.
In many ways, the critiques I frequently heard at the RPCs about “the
ones up there in Bern” were the obverse of the above-mentioned critiques.
Headquarter officials are often criticised by the RPC-officials for “taking the
easy way out”. By “taking the easy way out”, they mean that decision-makers
try to avoid taking harsh, strict decisions. People at the RPCs, therefore, often
make fun of the decision-makers who come from the headquarters to do their
“internships” at the RPCs for being unable to look asylum seekers in the eye
and inform them verbally of a negative decision14:
And sometimes we feel here, and maybe also in the other RPCs, that the people
in Bern take the easy way out. […] That they, how should I say, don’t make
very strict judgements. […] Sometimes, people from Bern come here for a
week and there I’ve realised that they often don’t want to inform asylum seekers
‘directly verbally’ (direkt eröffnen) of a negative decision like we sometimes do
here. […] And that shows me that they prefer taking positive decisions. Good,
I also like taking positive decisions better, but taking negative decisions is part
of the job.15
A second common critique I often came across at the RPCs was that even
though the caseworkers at the headquarters were those who supposedly set
the institutional practice with their Federführungen, they were always “a bit
behind”. The caseworkers at the RPCs felt that the “close contact” they had
with asylum seekers, deriving from their offices being located on the premises
where the asylum seekers lived, enabled them to pick up new trends, like,
for instance, that “many Eritreans are not really Eritreans, but Ethiopians
pretending to be Eritreans”,16 and adapt their practice accordingly much
faster than the caseworkers at the headquarters could. To give an example,
one RPC official once told me that they were soon going to be trained by
someone from the headquarters on how to deal with applications by Tibetans,
14Occasionally, decision-makers verbally inform applicants of the decision immediately after the inter-
view. At the headquarters this is very rarely done and then mostly only in “clear positive cases”. It is
a bit more commonly done at the RPCs, however, more with “clear negative” and DAWES decisions.
15Daniel, caseworker, reception and processing centre, interview transcript, my own translation.
16Klaus, caseworker, reception and processing centre, interview transcript, my own translation.
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because they “could” now in some cases also be rejected. He found this ridicu-
lous because it had been his centre that had started “rejecting Tibetans” in the
first place.17 What is at stake here are
different notions of “expertise” that are considered necessary for correct and
fair decision-making. Officials in the reception centres perceive their expertise
to derive from their “close contact” with asylum seekers and the vast number of
conversations they have with them (since they conduct both the short and long
asylum interviews, whilst the decision-makers in Bern only do the latter). Many
decision-makers at the headquarters, on the other hand, consider their expertise
to be greater and of more value, because they hold all the Federführungen and,
therefore, have all the experts and their expertise “in house”. (Affolter et al.
2019: 277)
The following example illustrates how Daniel, a decision-maker at one of
the RPCs, challenges the expertise and authority of the Federführungen at the
headquarters:
Daniel : Those in the “country teams”, they’re supposed to be the specialists.
But then someone who’s been working at the SEM for half a year or so tells
you what to do. […]
Laura: You mean that someone who’s new takes on a Federführung ?
Daniel : Yes, exactly. […] To give you a specific example; I once interviewed
a woman from Somalia. She couldn’t [tell me] anything. So I asked the
Federführung in Bern how this works with Somali women, whether I could
give her a removal order. And then someone [from the Federführung ] wrote
back to me and said: “As a woman she [belongs to] a vulnerable group”.
As a woman you’re not per se vulnerable! […] I didn’t do it. I gave her a
removal order anyway. And I was backed up.18
In this case, Daniel questions the Federführung ’s expertise mainly because
of her institutional age. Daniel has been working at the SEM for much longer
and, thus, he feels that he knows better what “the right” decision to take is.
He ends by saying that he was “backed up”. Unfortunately, at the time of
the interview I did not ask him by whom. However, as will become apparent
in this chapter, it can only mean two things. Either he was referring to his
decision being approved by his superior or to his original decision being
17Susanne, caseworker, reception and processing centre, interview transcript, my own translation.
18Daniel, caseworker, reception and processing centre, interview transcript, my own translation.
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confirmed by the Federal Administrative Court after it had been appealed
against. Thus, for him, this means his practice was “right”.
While the strongest identification seems to be with the centre they work in,
decision-makers, especially within the headquarters, also often affiliate them-
selves with their units and distance themselves from others. The individual
sections have different reputations and there is a lot of internal gossip about
this. There are the so-called “hardliner” and the so-called “softy” sections and
those that are seen to be somewhere in-between. The same terminology is
also applied to individual decision-makers. Thus, within a “hardliner” section
there will again be decision-makers with a reputation of being either “soft-
ies” or “hardliners” and the same, of course, also applies to so-called “softy”
sections. However, what it means in those sections to be a “softy” or a
“hardliner” differs. Hence, decision-makers who are in their own “hardliner”
section called a “softy” will often not be considered as such by decision-
makers from a “softy” section. “Softies”, in a general sense, are defined as
those who “want to save the world” and “would like to grant asylum to every-
one”. They are criticised for not following the law strictly enough and for not
“digging deep enough” when testing credibility. On the other hand, those
decision-makers who “see contradictions everywhere”, follow the law “too
strictly” and, thus, hardly ever take positive decisions are called “hardliners”
or “no-sayers” (Neinsager, see also Miaz 2017a). They are criticised for being
“cynical”. I often observed that decision-makers and units that were said to
follow a “legalistic approach”—which were incidentally mostly people with a
background in law and units in which many employees were jurists—were
called “hardline” by people from other units. Decision-makers themselves
mostly tend to position themselves and their units in the “neutral centre”
and would not speak of themselves as either “hardliners” or “softies”, but
they might well be called that by others (see also Miaz 2017a: 374–375).19
However, what I observed during fieldwork was that sections and individual
decision-makers who had a reputation of being “hardliners” often criticised
their co-workers and other sections for not following the law “strictly enough”
whereas a common critique made by so-called “softy” decision-makers or
decision-makers from “softy” sections was that their co-workers were cynics
and behaved like the “Sherlock Holmes” of asylum. Hence, in some ways
they seemed to self-identify themselves with the ascriptions made to their
unit, mostly through discrediting other stances.
19There were very few exceptions to this. Only two of my interaction partners referred to themselves
as being “a bit of a softy” and one decision-maker reluctantly “admitted” that if strictly following the
law equated to being a “hardliner”, then, yes, he was one.
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This frequent gossiping about other sections and decision-makers and their
respective stances, I argue, has an impact on what it means for decision-
makers to “belong” to their part of the office; on what it means for them
to fit in and, therefore, on the practices and norms of good and profes-
sional decision-making that they adopt. From an analytical standpoint, the
ways in which decision-makers dissociate themselves and their units from
others, therefore, brings to light the values that are associated with “good
decision-making”, which are discussed in Chapter 6. What is at stake here is
less that different values subsist in different units, but rather that the impor-
tance given to different values may vary from one unit to another. Since it is
the heads of the different units themselves that recruit new decision-makers
and, as I will show in the following, institutional socialisation largely takes
place within caseworkers’ “local communities” (see also Jubany 2017: 121),
such tendencies tend to become reinforced. Furthermore, Ephraim Poertner,
who did fieldwork in the SEM between 2012 and 2014, argues that “as the
office went through a series of reorganisations and caseworkers had to apply
for the ‘new’ sections with only the heads of sections appointed, they usually
chose a head of section with a similar notion of ‘normalcy’. This led to a
certain convergence of ‘views’ inside the sections, and arguably increased the
divergence between the sections” (2018: 264).
What also comes out of the above discussed is that the demarcation
from other decision-makers and units happens through affiliating these
so-called others with certain “extremes”. These “extremes” are generally recog-
nised as constituting “bad decision-making”. Thus, both “naively believing
everybody” and “easily” granting asylum but also “seeing contradictions every-
where” and disbelieving nearly everybody are regarded as qualities of bad
decision-making. As a consequence, such demarcations allude us to the kind
of uncontested, self-evident understandings of good decision-making that are
not associated with either “extreme” and that are generally—and often rather
subconsciously—held by decision-makers in the SEM.
Belonging is important for many reasons. As I will show in the following
parts of this chapter, novices learn a lot from their immediate surroundings,
for instance by observing and imitating their co-workers as well as by listening
to them tell work stories and criticise or make fun of other decision-makers’
practices. Furthermore, through the monitoring and trust they experience
from their superiors, they learn what acceptable and unacceptable practices
are. The different stances and reputations of superiors also influence which
decisions are perceived by caseworkers as being “easy” or “difficult” to get past
their superiors and, thus, how decision-makers, to some extent, also come to
“auto-control” their practices.
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Learning the Ropes of Asylum Decision-Making
Every practice is “first and foremost a knowledge-based activity” (Dahlvik
2018: 57). Institutional socialisation is, therefore, largely about how novices
acquire the necessary skills and knowledge for fulfilling their new role within
the organisation. In Chapter 4, I showed how knowledge that is developed
on the job plays a crucial role in allowing decision-makers to overcome the
“known unknowns” inherent in asylum decision-making and reaching clear-
cut either/or decisions. Such knowledge can take on a verbalisable form,
like country knowledge, or a non-verbalisable form, like the more “intu-
itive” professional-practical knowledge. Building on Max Weber, I argue
that together these types of knowledge can be termed “Dienstwissen”. Thus,
according to Weber, the main characteristic of Dienstwissen is that it is only
accessible to “insiders”. It is a form of “specialist” and “official” knowl-
edge (Lassman and Speirs 1994: 373) acquired through “experience in the
service” (Weber 2013 [1978]: 225). This kind of knowledge shapes decision-
making practices in three different way: first, by allowing decision-makers
to ascribe meanings to objects, persons and situations; second, by providing
decision-makers with procedural know-how; and third, by enabling decision-
makers to know what is appropriate and desirable (Dahlvik 2018: 58).
Weber distinguishes Dienstwissen from Fachwissen, which, in turn, he defines
as “technical knowledge” that decision-makers need in order to carry out
their job (Weber 2013 [1978]: 225). Different to Dienstwissen, Fachwissen
is publicly accessible.
This part of the chapter is about how decision-makers acquire the neces-
sary Dienstwissen to carry out their job. Thus, as Olga Jubany argues, “[t]he
ability to understand and distinguish elements only meaningful to the group
[…] is core to the idea of becoming a ‘true’ group member” (2017: 155).
Furthermore, Georgia Chao has called for scholars studying organisational
socialisation to pay more attention to how novices acquire professional-
practical knowledge (or what she refers to as “tacit knowledge”) when they
enter the job (2012: 607; see also Ashford and Nurmohamed 2012: 14). This
is challenging because professional-practical knowledge cannot be put into
words and is therefore inherently difficult to determine. Moreover, learning
too is, at least in part, an invisible mental process, which remains inaccessible
to us as researchers and indeed, inaccessible even to the learners themselves
(see Good 2011: 116). Therefore, I adopt a twofold approach to respond to
Chao’s challenge. First, because it is difficult to show how decision-makers
learn (particularly because I was not able to accompany my interaction part-
ners over a long period of time, which would have allowed me to observe
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changes in their everyday practices and possibly their ways of thinking20),
I focus instead on how the different forms of knowledge and skills are
taught and passed on to the new decision-makers. Secondly, I explore how
Dienstwissen in general (not just the non-verbalisable professional-practical
knowledge) is imparted. I argue that we can infer much about the acqui-
sition of professional-practical knowledge from analysing the passing on of
verbalised Dienstwissen (such as when officials share “cultural knowledge” or
their knowledge of questioning techniques) because Dienstwissen in its artic-
ulate form appears to partly become non-verbalisable professional-practical
knowledge with the passage of time. To illustrate this I return to Theodor,
quoted in Chapter 4. Theodor told me to go and ask someone newer about
how to know whether a story was credible or not, because he just did it
“out of intuition”, through the “common sense” he had developed, and there-
fore could not really tell me anymore how he knew. This example illustrates
how Theodor believes that once he would have been able to articulate how
he knows what he knows but now it is inexpressible. He directs me to a
newcomer because he believes they will still have words to explain what has
now become professional-practical knowledge to him.
“I mainly ‘learnt the trade’ (Handwerk lernen) through one-to-one
coaching. The training courses are more general education; so you get an
idea of the subject matter”.21 In this statement, Joe, a caseworker at one
of the RPCs, differentiates between two types of learning he experienced
as a newcomer. He identifies them as knowledge of the subject matter and
knowledge of the trade. Both forms of knowledge are necessary for decision-
making. Knowledge of the trade for Joe means that he knows how to carry
out his job. Thus, that he knows, for instance, how to carry out an asylum
interview, how to assess a claimant’s credibility, and how to write an asylum
decision. Knowledge of the subject matter, in turn, refers to knowing what
asylum decision-making is about or, in other words, knowing the legal basis of
decision-making. To some extent, the two types of knowledge Joe identifies,
therefore, resemble MaxWeber’s distinction between Fachwissen—knowledge
of the subject matter—and Dienstwissen—knowledge of the trade.
Joe says he learnt what he knows through training and one-to-one
coaching. By “training”, Joe is referring to the 15 “A-module courses”, which
form part of the initial three-week training for new decision-makers. All
novices are required to take part in these courses, ideally within the first
20However, I have privately known some decision-makers at the SEM for a few years. Our friendship
and numerous conversations have given me some insights into their learning process.
21Joe, caseworker, reception and processing centre, interview transcript, my own translation.
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month of their employment.22 The majority of the modules teach the legal
basics for taking different parts of asylum decisions while the remainder teach
the underlying skills involved in fulfilling a decision-maker’s duties. Modules
include topics such as “determining refugee status”, “credibility assessment”,
“issuing removal orders”, “the roles of the different participants in asylum
interviews”, “writing decisions” and “country of origin information”, for
example. At a later stage of their training, new decision-makers attend B-
and C-module courses. B-modules are organised internally in the individual
asylum units and the content is largely administrative encompassing tasks
such as how to file ‘cases’ and classify the different documents in the case
files. C-modules (like the A-modules) are for decision-makers from all the
different centres. They take place about a year after the initial A-module
training and cover topics of more “advanced decision-making” such as the
uses of LINGUA analyses and taking decisions on family reunification, for
instance.23 Most of the courses are taught by officials in senior positions,
who have previously worked as decision-makers themselves.
The modular training is complemented by what Joe describes as “one to
one coaching”. Every new recruit is allocated an individual coach who is
an experienced decision-maker from the same unit. However, occasionally,
the heads of the asylum units will also do the coaching themselves. In their
first weeks or months on the job, new decision-makers spend a lot of time
working with their coaches because, as Joe told me, this is how they learn to
“think the right thoughts”.24 They sit in on a coach’s asylum interviews and
often a coach will also organise for the novice to observe other experienced
decision-makers’ asylum interviews. Furthermore, it is common practice for
new decision-makers and coaches in the early stages to prepare asylum inter-
views together and for coaches to sit in a novice’s interview so that they can
help out if necessary and to enable them to give the novice feedback. After
the interview, the coach and novice review the interview together, discuss the
potential decision and the coach checks the novice’s written decision before
it is passed on to the head of the section for checking and counter-signing.25
Joe states that he learnt the skills of the trade—the necessary Dienst-
wissen—through the one-to-one coaching rather than in the initial training
22When I attended the three-week training session, for roughly half of the participants the first day
of training was also their first day at their new job. The other half had, at the time of the course,
already been working at the SEM for a couple of weeks or months.
23As part of my research, I participated in 10 A-module courses and one C-module course.
24Joe, caseworker, reception and processing centre, interview transcript, my own translation.
25Similar processes of institutional learning are also described for the Federal Asylum Office in Austria
by Julia Dahlvik (2018: 55) and with regard to the training of immigration officers in the UK by
Olga Jubany (2017: 112, 120).
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courses. However, in the following, I show that Dienstwissen is not only
acquired through the sharing of experiences in one to one coaching, as Joe
identified, but also develops whenever novices imitate their more experi-
enced colleagues and indeed, is also formed through the modular courses
whenever instructors share their personal experiences with the novices (see
also Jubany 2017: 113–120). All three components play a part in shaping a
novice’s Dienstwissen and therefore in their subsequent decision-making prac-
tice. This idea is explored on the basis of two examples. In the first I look at
how new decision-makers gradually learn what questions to ask in asylum
interviews, and in the latter, I examine how new decision-makers learn to
assess the credibility of asylum claims.
Learning What Questions to Ask
Within the SEM there is a common image of good asylum interviewing.
Good decision-makers conduct asylum interviews in a goal-oriented way,
meaning their questioning produces on-file facts, which can then be used
for arguing a certain decision. The good decision-maker does not follow a
pre-defined set of questions but is able to engage with the applicants and
question them with dexterity and spontaneity. This ideal was shared with
me by many of my interaction partners: new and “old” ones alike. Thus,
several fairly new decision-makers quite apologetically explained to me that
they were still using questionnaires with pre-defined questions when I went
to sit in in their interviews, but that they were working towards becoming
more spontaneous in their interviews.
What questions to ask—or how to know what questions to ask—is not
really addressed in the initial training courses. There newcomers learn the
three-step-questioning technique of starting with open questions, then going
on to ask wh-questions and finally to asking yes or no questions if neces-
sary (see Chapter 4). And they are warned against posing leading questions.
Moreover, in one of the courses I participated in, the newcomers practised
developing questions to ask in a fictional interview, but the interaction itself
was not actually practised—unlike the role-plays Olga Jubany describes soon-
to-be asylum officials doing in training sessions in the UK (2017: 111–112).
Whenever the novices asked in the training courses how they would know
what questions to ask in the actual interviews, they were told by the instruc-
tors that this was something that they would just come to know with time.
Hence, several decision-makers told me that the first time they had conducted
an interview by themselves, they had felt as if they had been “thrown in at the
deep end”. Nevertheless, by the time novices do their first interview, they have
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already observed a few of their coaches’ interviews and possibly interviews
conducted by other experienced colleagues. Many of my interaction partners
told me that they had “adopted the style” of their coaches or one of the other
co-workers they had observed and had copied the type of questions they had
asked. Some decision-makers explained to me that, in the beginning, they
had read the minutes of interviews conducted by more experienced decision-
makers with the express purpose of getting some ideas on what questions to
ask. Finally, the way new decision-makers ask questions is also shaped by the
feedback they receive from their coaches when preparing interviews together
or discussing past interviews. Thus, one coach told me that, at the start, it
was important not only to teach newcomers what to ask but also when to
ask certain questions and when to “dig deeper”. She explained this with the
following example:
New [officials] often don’t work with the criterion of “contradicts an inner
logic” [for reasoning credibility decisions]. To give you an example: In one
case, an applicant said that his father had asked him to deliver letters to another
person. And he didn’t just do that once, but more like four to five times a week
for about half a year. Now the [new] decision-maker did not think to ask the
applicant what was in those letters, so when we were preparing the interview
together I told her she had to ask him that. When she did, the applicant said
that he had never asked his father that out of respect. And that is just not
logical. If I were your father and I gave you a letter to take to someone nearly
every day, you would ask me, even if you respected [me]. You would say: “Of
course I’ll take the letter, father, but what are those letters you’re asking me
to deliver”. That’s the obvious thing to do. Now, say the applicant had asked
his father and the father had said: “That’s none of your business”, that would
have been relatively plausible. But that he didn’t even ask his father is just
not logical. And that’s a strong argument [for the decision]. So that’s what I
mean when I say that [new caseworkers] need to learn to ask good and suitable
questions.26
This example shows how coaches teach newcomers when and how to ask
questions. When preparing the interview with the trainee, Teresa felt that the
novice had missed a crucial “detail” which, if probed, might provide useful
information for taking the decision and producing a solid argument. Thus,
Teresa sees her duty in training the new decision-maker as making her spot
such important “details”. Through this she is also teaching the novice to be
sufficiently suspicious and alert towards indicators that there might be some-
thing “off” about the story (see also Jubany 2017: 155). Furthermore, she
26Teresa, caseworker, headquarters, interview transcript, my own translation.
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is conveying a clear idea of what merits suspicion and what assumptions are
deemed common sense when defining behaviour as “normal” and “abnormal”
or “logical” and “illogical”. The novice is taught that this particular common-
sense assumption (of it being illogical to not ask about the letters) will make
for a strong argument, but that coming up with such arguments is depen-
dent upon the questions she asks. Hence, learning how to conduct asylum
interviews is very much linked to learning how to assess credibility, the issue
I turn to in the next subsection of this chapter. However, before doing so, I
want to briefly explore Teresa’s example from another angle.
Common-sense assumptions (like the one of the letters) being used for
taking decisions have received much criticism for being insensitive towards
different cultural contexts (see, for instance, Good 2009; Kälin 1986;
Rousseau et al. 2002; Shuman and Bohmer 2004; Spijkerboer 2000). This
critique is well known and, to some extent, also shared by the decision-
makers themselves. Thus, on several occasions during the training sessions
for new employees, the decision-makers were warned against basing deci-
sions on “eurocentric” assumptions. Furthermore, what exactly constitutes
“normal” or “logical” behaviour is an issue that is often contested within
the office. Hence, for example, while one caseworker told me that for her
it was just not plausible that an applicant would stay hidden in a village
where he knew his persecutors could come looking for him again at any
time, another caseworker criticised precisely this kind of thinking of some
of his colleagues. Moreover, I also observed different stories of how asylum
seekers escaped from prison lead to discussions during coffee breaks of what
were possible actions in a particular country (e.g. running out of a prison
because there were only three walls) and what behaviours were normal or
not (e.g. bribing a prison guard). Teresa, too, told me that as a decision-
maker it was important not to base decisions on “eurocentric” common-sense
assumptions. However, the example of the letters, for her, was not “eurocen-
tric” common sense but general common sense. This shows that although
decision-makers are aware of the critique of cultural insensitivity and often
stress its importance, in practice they must still make use of such generally
applicable pre-concepts in order to make ‘cases’ decidable. Furthermore, while
some common-sense assumptions are highly contested within the office, there
are also other common-sense assumptions which are never or only very rarely
questioned by the decision-makers. One such widespread assumption is that
all applicants want to tell their stories and another one is that traumatised
people can to some degree also talk about their experiences (see also Good
2011: 102–103). I argue that these common-sense assumptions are widely
held by the decision-makers and are rarely contested because otherwise it
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would inhibit credibility assessment as it is usually done and would make
‘cases’ undecidable (see Chapter 4).
Learning to Test Credibility
Credibility assessment, my interaction partners told me, was something else
that they had learnt more on the job than in the initial training course. Thus,
in the feedback round at the end of the three-week training modules, a few
newcomers doubted their readiness to assess the credibility of asylum claims
properly. However, they hoped that they would learn to do so over time
because that was something the instructors had told them at several points
during the training courses. Hence, whenever the newcomers asked things
like: “But how will we know which parts of the story are true if applicants
mix the truth with lies?”, the instructors answered that these were things they
would come to know with experience.27
As I showed in Chapter 4, credibility assessment in practice works through
officials probing for reasons to doubt the veracity of a claim and only, if no
such reasons can be found, do they assume that it is credible (unless their
“intuition” clearly tells them that the story is “true”). Hence, for carrying
out credibility assessments in practice, it is such testing strategies that the
new decision-makers must acquire. Furthermore, they must obtain “cultural
knowledge” in order, for instance, to know whether something is possible or
where it is especially important to “dig deeper”. And they must develop the
necessary “intuition” (professional-practical knowledge), which guides their
decision-making and gives them a feeling of certainty that they are taking the
right decision. Once again novices develop this professional-practical knowl-
edge by learning from the experienced decision-makers; by observing them
work; by imitating them; by being coached by them and, as well, by the expe-
rienced decision-makers sharing their experiences and ideas with the novices.
The views on what stories to be particularly suspicious of are frequently
shared amongst co-workers. I show this with two examples.
My first example is a comment from an instructor during one of the initial
training courses I took part in. We were discussing the different reasons for
recognising applicants as refugees but excluding them from asylum—one
of them being that “[r]efugees shall not be granted asylum if they became
refugees in accordance with Article 3 only by leaving their native country
27What the new decision-makers do learn in the initial training are the three methods from forensic
psychology which can be used to assess credibility. Those methods are “criteria-based content analysis”
after Max Steller and Günter Köhnken (1989), “consistency analysis” (Konstanzanalyse ) and “structure
comparison” (Strukturvergleich) (see, for instance, Greuel et al. 1998; Volbert and Steller 2009).
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or country of origin or due to their conduct after their departure” (Art. 54,
AsylA)—when the instructor said:
Lots of Iranians say that they have been politically active in Switzerland, partic-
ipating in protest actions and rallies against their government. It’s like they’ve
invented this becoming politically active in exile. […] There are exile-political
groups here that offer this kind of service. They help you create your ‘subjec-
tive post-flight grounds’. You just have to pay them a fee and then you become
a member and can buy photos that you can hand in as evidence.28
The second example occurred at one of the RPCs. One day, when I was
sitting in the break room with some decision-makers, one of their colleagues
walked in somewhat bemused by a Nigerian applicant he had just inter-
viewed. He commented “This one had the full program: ghosts, voodoo,
homosexuality…”, thus making it clear that he did not believe anything the
applicant had told him, since the applicant’s story had consisted of what “all
the Nigerians were saying”, for instance, that they were being persecuted on
the grounds of their sexual orientation.29
So, what can we make out of these examples? Both suggest pejoratively that
there is a “typical story”. The implication is that the applicants have created
stories they believe would lead to the granting of asylum. In the first example,
the instructor’s comments were serving as a warning to novices whereas, in
the second example, the decision-maker related his story with no specific
purpose: the story was merely a brief moment of office banter. Nevertheless,
in both examples we can see how Dienstwissen is passed on whether the inten-
tion was to instruct or not. New decision-makers listening to such stories will
learn to expect and to anticipate “Iranians pretending to have become politi-
cally active in Switzerland” or “Nigerians pretending to be homosexuals” for
example. The “typical stories” make them sceptical possibly even before they
have dealt with their first ‘case’ of a Nigerian or Iranian applicant themselves.
Furthermore, the undercurrent in these shared experiences is that decision-
makers have to “dig deep” in these ‘cases’ in order not to come across as
being naïve (see Chapter 6). Hence, this in a way pre-shapes the experiences
the decision-makers have on the job and, thus, the Dienstwissen they acquire.
In addition to such stories about the content of asylum seekers’ narratives,
decision-makers also tell each other about applicants’ typical and atypical
ways of narrating their stories and behaviours. Hence, if Patricia (who I
quoted in Chapter 4) after only two months of working at the SEM says
28Training instructor, A-modules, field notes, my own translation.
29Field notes, my own translation.
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she knows how Asians, Africans and Persians behave and, thus, whether their
way of performing in the interviews is “culturally driven” or an indication of
something “simply not being true”, her knowledge should be understood in
this context.
The examples have shown that knowledge and the requisite skills for
decision-making are acquired by learning and copying from more experienced
colleagues and through the informal sharing of ideas and experiences amongst
co-workers. This is how decision-makers develop the knowledge and skills
that make their ‘cases’ decidable. I have shown that the Dienstwissen growing
out of this “experience in the service” (Weber 2013 [1978]: 225) is, therefore,
knowledge which is collectively developed: through the sharing and imitation
of ways in which to carry out tasks and ways of thinking about particular
issues at stake. Of course, as already described in Chapter 4, this sharing is
not something that simply stops after new decision-makers’ first months on
the job. Rather, decision-makers continue to ask each other for advice on
how to proceed with “difficult cases” and share stories with each other during
breaks. Hence, all these moments of sharing contribute to certain normal
behaviours becoming further consolidated over time. Therefore, this is one
way in which decision-making practices are regulated without this regulation
being the outcome of explicit orders or written rules.
Accountability
An important aspect of socialisation, as Christina Toren argues, is how
people are made to take on certain ideas and behaviours as members of a
specific group (2002: 512). This pressure to conform with certain ideas and
behaviours can be strong and explicit, but often it is also very subtle and
barely consciously noticeable for members of the group themselves (see also
Dahlvik 2018: 59; Martinez 2009: 118). In this part of the chapter, I explore
how pressure to conform shapes what decision-makers do. I argue that ques-
tions such as “What will others think?”, “How will others react?” and “What
will or would others do?” substantially guide SEM officials’ everyday prac-
tices (see also Dahlvik 2018: 59; Liodden 2016: 228; Wagenaar 2004: 650).
I thereby draw on Tone Liodden who argues that
[s]imply put, when people make a decision, they take into consideration how
the social surroundings will react to it, and decisions are shaped by a desire
to protect both one’s social image and self-image […]. People are “generally
motivated to maintain the approval and respect of those to whom they are
accountable” (Tetlock 1985: 309). Accountability is thereby the “implicit or
5 Getting in Line with the Office 139
explicit expectation that one may be called on to justify one’s beliefs, feelings,
and actions to others” (Lerner and Tetlock 1999: 225). (2016: 228)
As a consequence, I argue that decision-makers, on the one hand, orient
their practices towards what their colleagues do—or what they expect them
to do (see also Dahlvik 2018: 56, 59). On the other hand, when taking
decisions, caseworkers try to anticipate the reactions of others—mainly their
direct superiors and the Federal Administrative Court, but, to some extent,
also their peers and the broader public—which leads them to auto-control
their own decision-making behaviour, as Jonathan Miaz nicely shows in
his work (see Miaz 2017a: 339–358; see also Liodden 2016: 231). In the
first part of this chapter’s section, I explore decision-makers’ felt account-
ability towards their peers. The second part then analyses how accountability
towards superiors, who are themselves tied into a chain of accountability (see
Liodden 2016: 213–214), shapes caseworkers’ everyday practices.
Peer Pressure
As J. Michael Martinez (2009: 118) argues, when “everyone is expected to
perform certain chores or behave in certain ways, an individual is pressured,
subtly and not so subtly, to conform” (cited in Dahlvik 2018: 59). To a
considerable extent, pressure to conform is exerted by peers, as other authors
working on asylum administrations have also argued (Liodden 2016: 293;
Miaz 2017a: 340; 2017b: 274). This is exemplified in the following state-
ment made by an interviewee in a study by Colin Campbell and Graham
Wilson (1995: 225): “It’s not necessarily the hierarchy, it’s the peer group
you account to… it’s how you’re seen in the eyes of your colleagues… it’s
actually how you’re viewed by your colleagues is the thing that would drive
me” (cited in Liodden 2016: 228).
My interaction partners were rarely as explicit as this. Helen’s statement is
an exception in this regard:
And then this case with in dubio pro [refugio] (“when in doubt, for the
refugee”). Sometimes you feel really bad [doing this]. Because […] people
speak about you behind your back: “Oh, she chose the easy way out; just
quickly taking a positive [decision]”. But maybe you really struggled with [the
decision]. Because sometimes, even though the story is not at all convincing,
but if you don’t find any arguments – truly not and not just out of laziness
– your only choice is to take a positive [decision]. Well, ok, maybe you could
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show the case to someone else first. Luckily, this hasn’t happened to me so
often up to now.30
In Helen’s statement we can see that she is concerned about people—
meaning her co-workers—talking badly about her decision-making behind
her back. Furthermore, her statement indicates that this may have an influ-
ence on her decision-making practice. Her distress about what others might
think of her clearly came across when we were having this conversation.
Although other caseworkers did not share this concern with me as explicitly
as Helen did, I observed that in their everyday practices they often appeared
to be affected by what others might think of them.
During my fieldwork I observed decision-makers gossiping about others
on numerous occasions, both about people from the same sections and about
officials working in other sections and centres. Such talk often emanates
from officials coming across decisions taken by colleagues and their corre-
sponding case files. Furthermore, some decision-makers (and units) over time
gain a certain reputation, which is continually reinforced through gossip. For
instance, I once heard some decision-makers fret over the “juridical weak-
ness” of decisions from another asylum unit and, on another occasion, I
overheard some caseworkers’ making fun of the “silly questions” some of their
co-workers posed in interviews.31
In addition to gossip, which is something that decision-makers are well
aware of, I argue that peer pressure is also exerted through decision-makers
openly making fun of each other, mostly in a joking way, as Lucy’s quote
indicates:
We sometimes tease each other a bit. If one of us takes a rather strict decision:
“Oh, what a hardliner”. And if someone says that they had to turn a blind
eye or take an in dubio pro [refugio] decision: “Oh my (oh jöh), what a wimp
you’ve become”. I think it’s important to find a middle ground somewhere. So,
that you don’t slide towards one extreme, you see?32
What decision-making behaviours or attitudes are more prone to be criti-
cised or made fun of varies according to how certain decision-makers identify
themselves and their unit’s style of decision-making in comparison with that
of others, or, in other words, according to the “communities of interpreta-
tion” they affiliate themselves or others with. Hence, regardless of whether
30Helen, caseworker, headquarters, interview transcript, my own translation.
31Field notes, my own translation.
32Lucy, caseworker, headquarters, interview transcript, my own translation.
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it is through gossip or making fun of each other in a joking way, ideas are
conveyed about what it means to behave in an appropriate way and, thus,
to fit into the office. As Helen’s statement above indicated, such ideas have
an impact on decision-makers’ practices, leading caseworkers to adopt certain
norms of what it means to do one’s job well.
Helen fears being judged by her colleagues for not adhering to an impor-
tant norm: that of “digging deep”—and, hence, of taking the time and trying
hard enough—to find arguments for reasoning the non-credibility of a claim.
She is afraid of being pegged as “lazy”; as someone who likes choosing “the
easy way out”. Because of that she feels pressured not to take an in dubio
pro decision for the above-mentioned reasons. It is not that she fears being
judged by her colleagues for taking a positive decision per se. If she herself
feels certain that a claim is credible, she does not have a problem with taking
a positive decision. But with in dubio pro decisions, where she herself is
unsure whether to believe the applicant or not, she fears being judged by her
colleagues for not having put enough effort into decision-making in order to
find out whether the story really can or cannot be believed. Moreover, Helen’s
quote shows that this pressure is not just something which is exerted through
her co-workers; she has also internalised it. She knows that her co-workers are
unlikely to read her decision: thus, so long as she does not tell them about her
decision, they will not know about it. However, she still feels uneasy taking
such a decision, because “lightly” taking a positive decision is not the right
thing to do. And, while she might know that this was not the case, and that
she had tried really hard to find reasons for rejecting the case, her fear is still
that her colleagues will not.
Interestingly, Lucy too uses the example of in dubio pro decisions as an
example of bad decision-making. Taking this kind of decisions makes case-
workers “wimps” (even if it is only meant in a teasing way). Her expression
“Oh jöh” indicates that she uses “wimp” in a belittling sense; for someone
who does not have the courage to take strict decisions.33 Since being belit-
tled is not something the decision-makers want, here we can also see pressure
not to take such decisions.
Accountability Towards Superiors and Beyond
Before final decisions are sent out to asylum seekers, they must be signed not
only by the decision-maker in charge of the ‘case’ but also by the head of the
33The Swiss German expression “jöh” is very difficult to translate. It is often used, for example, if
small children do something cute (e.g. “Oh jöh, the baby has just smiled at me”).
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respective asylum unit. On the occasions when I observed superiors check and
counter-sign decisions, I noted marked differences in the way the decisions
were treated. With some, the superiors just glanced at the letter, checking to
see who had written the decision and who it was for before signing them, with
others they quickly read through the decision, checking the arguments and,
in a few cases, they opened the case file and leafed through the documents
inside it (including the minutes of the asylum interviews). If the heads agree
with the decision and its reasoning, they sign it and it is sent out. If not, they
take the decision back to the decision-maker to work on again. In general,
this does not happen very often and, when it does, superiors usually just
ask a decision-maker to work on particular arguments rather than change
the decision. However, the latter does occasionally also happen as I show in
Chapter 6.
It is difficult to discern general patterns of whose decisions are checked
more closely. One superior, for instance, told me that he tended to check
the decisions of some of his employees who granted positive decisions “too
readily” more closely.34 Another superior (himself a jurist) told me that he
usually looked at his non-jurists’ decisions a bit more closely than those of
his jurists35 and yet another head said that he usually took a quick look at
the decisions taken by a couple of his employees who tended to become quite
cynical.36 One pattern, however, I observed generally; namely that institu-
tional age is a decisive factor in determining how thoroughly a caseworker’s
decisions are checked.
With those who haven’t been here long I look a bit more closely. We monitor
them carefully especially regarding credibility. There I do look at the minutes
once in a while and check whether the arguments work, whether they are
correct and whether they are really the best ones to use. Because I think you
can still form these people; you can put certain principles through. […] With
experienced caseworkers who are three years away from retirement I don’t try
to change the decision in such […] things that they have always done like
that.37
34Chris, head of asylum unit, reception and processing centre, interview transcript, my own
translation.
35Nora, head of asylum unit, headquarters, interview transcript, my own translation.
36Jenny, head of asylum unit, reception and processing centre, interview transcript, my own
translation.
37Jenny, head of asylum unit, reception and processing centre, interview transcript, my own
translation.
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The quote shows that the less time decision-makers have been working at
the office, the more often and thoroughly their decisions are checked because
superiors believe that new employees have to (and still can) be formed. At
the same time, the quote shows that experienced officials’ decisions are often
not checked. Here Jenny is saying that there is no point in checking them
because it is no longer possible to change “old stagers’” ideas and behaviours.
However, I argue that there is also another reason why experienced decision-
makers’ decisions are often not checked: not simply because their practices
cannot be changed but also because there is no need for them to be changed
because those decision-makers have already been sufficiently formed. As a
consequence of this, instead of thoroughly checking experienced decision-
makers’ practices, superiors simply trust them to do the right thing. Chris,
a head of section at one of the RPCs, explains that if experienced decision-
makers say a story is credible in a positive decision, there is no need for him
to check that against the minutes of the interview:
If you read a decision and you see from the Sachverhalt (the written ‘facts’ of
the case noted in the final decision) that there was persecution and then it
is written that the applicant’s statements were coherent, realistic and without
contradictions, […] I don’t go and check that in the minutes. I must trust my
employees.38
The following statement made by another head, Nora, that was already
quoted at the very beginning of this book, is similar to that of Chris in that
she too says that if experienced decision-makers claim that a story is credible,
this assessment can be trusted. What is particularly interesting here is how
she explains this:
All these terms [like “plausible”, “comprehensible”, “logical” and “realistic” for
example] are used [for reasoning positive decisions]. For me that is ok. […]
I mean, if someone uses a word like that who only started [working here]
three months ago, I might ask: “Hey, what does that mean for you?” But if
[the decision] comes from someone whom I consider to be a valuable, serious,
good employee, then I’ll allow it, because I know, I can imagine what it means
for them.39
We can see from this that the reason Nora trusts (some of ) her experienced
employees is because she has known them for a long time and, thus, knows
38Chris, head of asylum unit, reception and processing centre, interview transcript, my own
translation.
39Nora, head of asylum unit, headquarters, interview transcript, my own translation.
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how they work. But Nora is saying more than that. “I can imagine what this
means for them”, she claims. With this statement, Nora is indicating that
she shares an understanding with those decision-makers of what it means
for an asylum seeker’s story to be “realistic”, for example. Thus, what makes
Nora (and her fellow superiors) trust their employees is that they have been
sufficiently socialised by the office, which allows them to think and act in
ways which are familiar to the heads and with which they agree. On the
other hand, with new decision-makers, the superiors see it as their duty to
form them and, thus, to make sure that they acquire an institutional habitus,
so that they can eventually also be trusted.
Jonathan Miaz writes that over time decision-makers acquire “institutional
capital”, meaning that their decisions are less frequently checked, leaving
them with more marge de manoeuvre or “autonomy” for taking decisions
(2017a: 396–397). I agree with Miaz that if “common institutional prac-
tice” is challenged (e.g. by granting asylum to an applicant from a country
where the recognition rate is nearly zero per cent), then this will generally be
done by experienced decision-makers who have acquired institutional capital.
However, I would argue that not having their decisions checked, does not, per
se, make decision-makers more “autonomous” in the sense that they (can)
take decisions more independently from the office. Rather, by the time they
have acquired this institutional capital, they will also have acquired an insti-
tutional habitus (the latter being the reason for gaining institutional capital
in the first place). Hence, this makes their decisions (or choices) less “free”
than it might at first seem. What are perceived as possible courses of action
will already be pre-shaped by the institutional habitus they have developed
(see Wacquant 1992: 19).
Apart from observing that new decision-makers’ decisions by tendency
fall under closer scrutiny than those of their more experienced colleagues,
I noticed two further common patterns. First, I found that, rather unsur-
prisingly, “unusual” decisions particularly drew superiors’ attention. Thus, if,
at the time of my research, a decision-maker had issued a removal order for
an applicant from Eritrea or had granted asylum to a Nigerian asylum seeker,
these decisions would very likely have been prone to close scrutiny.40 Second,
I noticed that negative decisions based on non-credibility are usually less thor-
oughly checked than those based on non-eligibility to refugee status. When I
40At the time of my research, the protection rate (thus, including asylum and subsidiary protection)
was 3.1% for Nigerian applicants in 2014 and 2.3% in 2015, while for Eritrean claimants it was
70.3% in 2014 and 83.9% in 2015 (see https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/de/home/publiservice/statis
tik/asylstatistik/archiv.html, last accessed 24.2.2020).
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asked a superior who the previous day I had observed checking decisions in
precisely that way about this, he explained:
Hmm, that’s a good [question]. Article 7 is about credibility and the scope
for discretion (Ermessenspielraum) is much bigger there. It’s more a question of
persuasion; it has more to do with [producing] convincing arguments. […]
There are these criteria (Merkmale ) for non-credibility [listed in Article 7,
AsylA; …], which are quite vague. [But] there I know how my people reason,
so I will often be more easily willing to just “wave [the decision] through”.
Article 3 arguments I tend to look at more closely, to see whether [my people]
have really understood [the issue at stake], because [those arguments] must be
legally trenchant. Article 7 arguments, on the other hand, depend more on the
authors’ writing style, their power of persuasion.41
The fact that Oliver, the head of an asylum unit, ascribes much bigger
interpretative leeway to credibility assessments, yet does not check these deci-
sions more closely, is telling in many ways. On the one hand, I argue that this
is linked to superiors themselves also being accountable to those above them
in the institutional hierarchy. The heads of the asylum units keep records of
their employees’ decisions that were quashed by the Federal Administrative
Court. The asylum directorate, in turn, keeps statistics of the numbers of
decisions quashed for each asylum unit. It is considered bad decision-making
to have too many decisions quashed by the court. However, not all quashing
is considered equally bad. Hence, at a team meeting I attended in one of
the asylum units, the superior informed his employees that the institutional
aim was to not receive more than two per cent of “avoidable quashings” from
the courts and that every single decision-maker was expected to contribute
to achieving this aim (see also Affolter et al. 2019: 270). He cited decisions
quashed because of “formal mistakes”, such as forgetting to grant the asylum
seeker the proper right to be heard (rechtliches Gehör ) or not sufficiently
establishing the “facts of the case” (Sachverhalt ), as examples of “avoidable
quashings”. Furthermore, he instructed that decision-makers should avoid
their decisions being quashed for not adhering to the practice set by the
Federal Administrative Court (unless they had good reasons for challenging
the court’s practice). In contrast, he considered diverging assessments of cred-
ibility to be unavoidable.42 This has to do with credibility assessment being
to some extent seen as something “subjective”. Thus, it is regarded as normal
that what one person might find believable, another one might not. It is for
41Oliver, head of asylum unit, reception and processing centre, interview transcript, my own
translation.
42Field notes of asylum unit meeting, my own translation.
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this reason that it makes sense for superiors to most thoroughly check those
decisions that could potentially lead to so-called “avoidable quashings”, which
credibility decisions are, as I have just shown, not.
On the other hand, another reason why negative Article 7 decisions fall
under less scrutiny than Article 3 decisions is that Article 7 argumentations
are by tendency more difficult to refute because of the way “facts” are created
in credibility determination, as I showed in Chapter 4. Thus, the assessment
of credibility depends largely on how the “facts” of the ‘case’ were generated
which mainly happens in and through the asylum interview during which
superiors are generally not present (see also Liodden 2016: 260). Superiors
tend to trust that experienced decision-makers are capable of professionally
conducting asylum interviews.
Patterns of how superiors check their employees’ decisions have an impact
on the shaping of the latter’s practices. Over time, decision-makers learn what
decisions are easier and which are more difficult to get past their superiors and
come to anticipate their heads’ reactions. This may mean several different
things. It can mean decision-makers taking a decision they think their supe-
riors will probably not approve of but then putting a great deal of effort into
the reasoning behind it in order to convince the superior that the decision can
be justified (see also Miaz 2017b: 387–389). But it can also mean the oppo-
site: decision-makers knowing that a particular decision and certain argument
will most certainly be approved of and, therefore, putting less effort into it.
Or it can mean decision-makers wanting to grant temporary protection, for
example, but then deciding not to do it because they assume they would never
“get it past” their superiors. Hence, knowing that superiors might check their
decisions influences not only what decisions the caseworkers take, but also the
arguments they use as well as the amount of time they put into taking those
decisions. Furthermore, for experienced decision-makers that have gained the
trust of their superiors and can, therefore, count on superiors generally not
questioning their decisions, it is important to retain this trust. Hence, Claire
a decision-maker working at the headquarters once told me that if she had
several cases she wanted to decide positively, she would not give them to her
superior all at once, but would keep some of them back for when she also
had some negative decisions. This was important because she did not want
her boss to think she took positive decisions easily and simply waved cases
through without checking them properly.43
Not having one’s decisions returned by the superiors is important in terms
of efficiency. As discussed in Chapter 6, decision-makers work under a lot of
43Claire, caseworker, headquarters, field notes, my own translation.
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pressure to not only produce qualitatively “good decisions”, but also adequate
quantities. But it is also about more than that. Every year, decision-makers’
performance is evaluated by the superiors of the individual asylum units. The
evaluation forms are then passed up the institutional hierarchy and can have
an effect on decision-makers’ salary. Hence, caseworkers’ salary can be either
raised or remain the same as a consequence of these evaluations (see also
Miaz 2017a: 346). Receiving good evaluations is, furthermore, particularly
important for new employees working on fixed-term contracts if they want
to ensure that their contracts are renewed at the end of the year. Thus, in one
of the training modules I attended, the novices were told: “It is important that
you work well, so that your contract will then be renewed”.44 From what I
observed and was told by SEM officials, contracts normally get renewed, and
“it takes a lot to get fired” from the SEM. Nevertheless, the impact of this
form of pressure should not be underestimated.
As stated above, decision-makers are not only accountable to their supe-
riors, but are integrated into a chain of accountability that reaches up to
the Federal Councillor in charge of the Federal Department of Justice and
Police (FDJP). For example, at a division meeting I attended, in which the
heads of several asylum units participated, the division head informed the
heads of the units that he had randomly checked a few decisions from each
unit. In general, he was pleased with the quality of decision-making, but
he did instruct the heads of the units to make some changes in order to
improve decision-making. In addition, as several authors have pointed out,
accountability also reaches beyond the administration (see Jubany 2017: 212;
Liodden 2016: 247–250; Miaz 2017a: 357; Poertner 2018: 288). SEM offi-
cials are, to some extent, also accountable to the general public. This became
clearly apparent during my fieldwork when, in the run-up to the parlia-
mentary elections in 2015, the handling of applicants by Eritreans became
one of the major themes of several political parties’ election campaign. This
led numerous members of parliament to demand a report from the Federal
Councillor in charge of the FDJP, and, thus, of the SEM, which explained
and justified the SEM’s “Eritrea practice”. Such requests by politicians are
usually passed down the organisational hierarchy to the Federführungen45
who draft a first response, which is then again passed up the hierarchical
line with people working in different positions within the office adding to it
44Training instructor, A-modules, field notes, my own translation.
45Federführungen are decision-makers who are in charge of a particular “country of origin”. They
are involved in setting the institution’s decision-making practice for dealing with ‘cases’ from “their”
country and—to some extent—try to monitor other decision-makers’ practices regarding ‘cases’ by
applicants from the country they are responsible for (see Chapter 4).
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until it is ready to be sent out to the parliament. Furthermore, one SEM offi-
cial told me that sometimes there were public events in which the practice of
dealing with specific asylum applications had to be justified to a public audi-
ence. However, he said that such events were above his and even his direct
superior’s wage group. Hence, it was not up to people holding the Feder-
führung for specific countries to go and defend the SEM’s practice at such
events. That was the responsibility of people further up in the organisation’s
hierarchy, he explained.46
In 2015, the issue of how asylum applications by Eritreans were dealt with
and decided on by the SEM also started to draw a lot of media attention.
Criticism on the SEM’s practice was voiced, which claimed that asylum was
granted to Eritrean asylum seekers “too easily”, and demanded that inquiries
be made into whether, in some cases, removal orders could be issued for
Eritrean applicants. This is something I was, unfortunately, unable to follow-
up on systematically. However, it is important to note that following this
considerable political pressure, at a “country situation assessment meeting”
(Poertner 2018: 240), a new institutional practice for dealing with asylum
applications by Eritreans was established in 2016. An order was given to
decision-makers that from then on, all Eritrean applicants who had either
never been drafted into the army or had been released from military service
were no longer to be regarded as being eligible to refugee status and could
therefore be issued a removal order as long as this was reasonable. Of course,
this does not tell us what exactly this meant with regard to everyday decision-
making practices; whether and/or why, for example, following this order
decision-makers became more suspicious of asylum seekers saying that they
had left Eritrea while still in active military service or whether this order had
an effect on how, in practice, the decision-makers assessed the reasonableness
of return and so on. Also, we do not know what other factors might also
have influenced this change in practice. Nevertheless, what this example does
point to, is how the SEM’s accountability towards politics and the media
contributes to the shaping of asylum decision-making practices.
A Brief Summary: Acquiring an Institutional
Habitus
In this chapter, I have argued that how organisational socialisation works can
only be understood if we take three crucial factors into account and see how
46Nick, caseworker, headquarters, interview transcript, my own translation.
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they interplay: how decision-makers learn to do their job; how they are made
by other actors to take on certain ideas and behaviours; and what belonging
to the office means for them. I have shown that decision-makers affiliate
themselves to and are affiliated with different communities within the office.
They either try hard to fit into these communities or not to be associated
with them. Primarily, decision-makers identify themselves with the centre
they work in—the headquarters or one of the RPCs—and with the specific
asylum unit they belong to. It is important to take this sense of belonging
into account because it has an influence on other aspects of socialisation; on
what decision-makers learn from their co-workers; on how they are coached
to take decisions; on why they are teased; on what it means to fit in; and
on how superiors monitor their employees’ work. Hence, it influences what
decision-makers come to understand as normal and appropriate practices or,
to put it differently, it influences the institutional habitus they acquire.
The concept of institutional habitus assumes that the dispositions to
understand, act, think and desire in a particular way are shaped by the expe-
riences the holders of the habitus have had on the job. Enquiring into how
decision-makers acquire such an institutional habitus on the job is there-
fore crucial because it allows us to understand how decision-makers come
to interpret law in practice—thereby shaping and making it—when fitting it
with specific ‘cases’ or situations. In this book, I argue that we need to pay
attention to the shaping and structuring of decision-makers’ discretionary
practices, since “applying” written law to specific situations requires discre-
tion. However, when decision-makers use discretion to interpret written law
and fit it to a ‘case’, we should not assume that their interpretations of written
law are based on “free”, “autonomous” choices; on what decision-makers “per-
sonally” see as fit. One reason for this—and this is what has come out of this
chapter—is that what decision-makers come to “personally” see fit is shaped
through the office; through them acquiring an institutional habitus through
the socialisation processes I have described.
The chapter has set forth that SEM officials are disciplined, incentivised
and at times also compelled to act in certain ways. At the same time, however,
caseworkers are also “ideationally conditioned to conduct themselves” in
those ways (Gill 2009: 219–220). Thus, in the words of Gill, they come to
volitionally align themselves with the office (ibid.: 215). Hence, it is through
this that the state officials—who through their daily actions make and shape
the state—are governed by the institution (see also Affolter et al. 2019: 264;
Gill 2016; Mountz 2010).
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As I have shown in the previous two chapters, digging deep is the epitome
of professional decision-making. Digging deep refers to the practice whereby
decision-makers interrogate asylum seekers during asylum interviews in a way
that is aimed at “discovering” indicators of so-called non-credibility; most
notably inconsistencies. Hence, decision-makers ask as many questions in
asylum interviews and/or undertake as many extra investigations until they
have enough arguments for rejecting a claim or they are convinced that a story
is true “after all”. This practice is not only characteristic of the SEM, but of
asylum administrations in the Global North in general, as many authors have
shown (see Bohmer and Shuman 2008: 136; Johannesson 2017: 12; Jubany
2017: 135–137; Kelly 2012: 765).
Helen’s example in Chapter 5 showed that she fears being judged by her
co-workers for not digging deep enough and “lightly” granting an applicant
asylum on the basis of the principle in dubio pro refugio (“when in doubt, for
the refugee”), which means that if decision-makers do not know whether an
applicant’s claims “are” credible or not they should decide in favour of the
applicant. Helen does not want to be seen as taking decisions in an unprofes-
sional way. Taking positive decisions is not per se an unprofessional and “bad”
thing to do. To the contrary, it is an essential part of why decision-makers do
the job—and why they like doing it. However, as the following statement by
SEM official Denise further exemplifies, in order to take positive decisions
with a “clear conscience”, digging deep is a necessity:
Sometimes you do an additional interview when technically everything indi-
cates that a story could be true but there are two, three contradictions in it. In
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such cases it just feels strange to grant asylum when there are still some uncer-
tainties, some open questions. So, then you do [an additional interview] so
that if you then get an answer that really satisfies you, you can write a positive
decision with a clear conscience.1
In theory, the principle of in dubio pro refugio would allow Helen and
Denise to grant the applicants asylum without digging deep. Yet, they
feel uncomfortable doing so. Furthermore, from Denise’s statement we can
deduce a kind of moral obligation she feels to dig deep. Her professional
conscience requires it. But why, and where does this moral “obligation” come
from? These are the questions I pose in this chapter.
I argue that the professional values that guide decision-makers’ work—and
that are, as Helen’s and Denise’s examples show, incorporated by the case-
workers, forming a “personal” sense of what it means for them to morally do
the right thing—are shaped by decision-makers’ understanding of what their
duty and that of the office as a whole consist of. Bureaucracies operate in
ideological environments and they develop their own ideologies (see Downs
1967: 243–244). Hence, as Julia Eckert argues, “ideological projects” always
underpin and are “translated and produced in administrative practice” (2020:
9). This chapter explores the ideological environment underlying and being
produced by SEM officials’ work. It analyses what it means for SEM officials
to professionally fulfil their duty, perform their tasks and align themselves
with the office (see Eckert 2020; Gill 2009: 215).
In this sense, the distinction Julia Eckert—drawing on Max Weber—
makes between ethos and ethics is helpful. According to Eckert,
[e]thos denotes the assemblage of values that underpin procedures, such as, for
example, rule orientation, consistency, efficiency, efficacy, equality before the
law and depersonalisation. […] Ethics, on the other hand, concerns orienta-
tion towards “the good”. In the case of bureaucratic ethics, values and norms
associated with the substantive goals of a bureaucratic apparatus are geared
towards ideas of a good society, a good life, welfare or justice. (2020: 11–12)
Both ethos and ethics must, therefore, be taken into account if we want
to understand how administrative decision-making works. Hence, in this
chapter I show not only what the procedural values associated with asylum
decision-making are but, more importantly, also how they are shaped by
the ethics of the office. I argue that decision-makers’ understanding of what
1Denise, caseworker, headquarters, interview transcript, my own translation.
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their role is, shapes their understanding of how to carry it out profession-
ally. Furthermore, since what administrative caseworkers think they should
do informs their everyday practices, and their everyday practices shape and
mediate the policies and laws they are charged with implementing (see, for
instance, Silbey 2005: 324; Wedel et al. 2005: 34), we need to explore the
ethics and ethos of the office in order to understand how asylum law and
policies work.
I start this chapter with an anecdote from the field in which two SEM offi-
cials—a supervisor and his employee—discuss the rightfulness of a decision.
From it I extract what the officials consider their duties as decision-makers to
be, which then forms the basis from which I work out the ethics of the office.
Following this, I discuss the different norms of what it means to be profes-
sional in the SEM and how these norms are connected to and influenced by
the two substantial goals of the office: that of protecting the abstract, “noble”
value of asylum and that of protecting Switzerland’s “borders”, meant here
not in a territorial sense, but in terms of access to rights and goods.
Negotiating “the Right” Decision: A Field
Anecdote
A decision-maker, Rebecca, and her superior, Alberto, are discussing a deci-
sion she has made. As Rebecca’s superior, it is Alberto’s duty to check and
countersign her decisions before they are sent to the applicants. In this case,
he does not agree with Rebecca’s decision to grant temporary protection
to a family from Iraq. I quote this excerpt from my field notes in detail
because it brings to light several aspects of what Alberto and Rebecca believe
professional decision-making involves.
I am sitting in Alberto’s office, watching him go through his employees’
decisions and case files. The documents he appraises, decisions that need
his signature before they can go out, were left by his employees on a table
outside his office. The first decision he picks up is for a family from Iraq.
The decision-maker, Rebecca, has rejected the family’s asylum claim, but has
granted the family temporary protection. For my benefit, Alberto comments
on the decision as he reads through it. I learn that the family came to Switzer-
land a couple of years ago because the husband started work with a human
rights organisation. When the husband’s contract ended, the family stayed on
and filed for asylum.
Alberto tells me that he agrees with the negative decision. He says the
family’s problems do not qualify them as refugees. Then, looking at the
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internal application for temporary protection Rebecca has submitted, he says:
“Ok, the kids are still quite young and they’ve been here for quite a while,
so they haven’t lived in their country of origin for a long time. But someone
else might still have decided differently”. He feels that it is a very “generous”
decision. “I mean”, he goes on, “they’re an upper-class family. It wouldn’t be
a problem for them to be socially reintegrated. […] They’re a family, they’re
together, they can travel. They could go anywhere they want”. Alberto is not
quite sure what to do about the case, but he feels he cannot just let it pass
like that. In the end, he decides to put it aside for two hours and then return
to it. Quickly, he goes through the other decisions from the pile on his desk,
reading through them, flicking through the case files and then countersigning
them. Once he has finished with the other decisions, he turns back to the case
of the Iraqi family even though the two hours have not yet passed.
Seemingly out of the blue, and slightly defensively, he says to me: “The
question of nation states and whether one thinks nation states are good or
not, has nothing to do with what we do here. It cannot be solved by what
we do. I’m all for granting protection”, he continues, “but we don’t have to
hand it to them on a plate” (aber man muss es den Leuten nicht nachschiessen).
He explains to me that seeing so many cases over the past several years has
made him stricter and less naïve. What is important to him is that whatever
leaves his desk is fair. This, he explains, also means protecting the asylum
system from abuse. Saying that, he grabs the Iraqi family’s case file and tells
me he will take the decision back to the caseworker, Rebecca, to discuss it
with her. He says that she will either have to add more reasons for granting
the family temporary protection or reconsider her decision. Alberto asks if I
would like to join him. Slightly hesitant, but also curious, I follow him to
Rebecca’s office.
Alberto explains to Rebecca that he thinks this is a very opportunistic,
upper-class family that does not need temporary protection. Rebecca says
that she can see his point, but she worries that because the children are still
quite young, their decision denying the family temporary protection might be
quashed if the ‘case’ is taken on appeal to the Federal Administrative Court.
“Also”, she argues, “the wife has health problems”. But Alberto does not think
her problems are severe enough. He also does not think the fact that the
young children have not lived in their country of origin would pose a problem
in the event of an appeal, and he feels that the risk is worth taking. Together
they discuss other possible “obstacles to removal”, but Rebecca had already
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ruled them all out after consulting the Federführung .2 The discussion ends
with the following dialogue:
Alberto: “I think the decision is too generous”.
Rebecca: “That’s my problem. I’m too nice.”
Alberto: “I’m also nice.”
Rebecca: “Yes, of course”.3
Alberto and Rebecca agree that she will work on the case again and
rethink her original decision. Before leaving to go back to his office Alberto
asks Rebecca whether she “can live with” this new decision. Rebecca assures
Alberto that she can, and that she will still be able to sleep at night. She
promises that it will not take her long to change the decision.
As Alberto and I set off towards his office again, Rebecca holds me back,
causing Alberto to come back too. She explains to me that this is just a normal
part of the job. Sometimes, though not often, decisions are given back and
one has to work on them again. She says that in this case she was prob-
ably influenced by the fact that she had interviewed the family herself and
that they had come across as being very pleasant. Alberto says that he finds
this understandable and that this is something that has really changed for
him since he was put in charge of the subdivision and stopped doing asylum
interviews himself. “I have become stricter, because I see so many cases”, he
explains, “but I can also see things more clearly now, from a certain distance,
more objectively”.4
This ethnographic vignette could be analytically explored in several
different directions. In this chapter, I limit myself to mapping out both
Alberto’s and Rebecca’s understandings of professional decision-making.
Rebecca and Alberto mention several different aspects of what they believe
professional decision-making involves. From Alberto we learn that profes-
sional decision-making is fair, objective and apolitical. The latter character-
istic he expresses by saying that one’s personal opinion of nation states (and
of the restrictions on freedom of movement and residence associated with
2Federführungen are SEM officials who hold lead positions for particular countries of origin. They are
responsible for (co-)determining and monitoring the institution’s decision-making practices in dealing
with cases from these countries (see Chapter 4).
3I argue that this short dialogue must at least in part be read as an expression of the defensive
position decision-makers at times adopted towards me—and outside actors in general (see Chapter 2;
see also Eule 2014: 104; Lentz 2014: 197).
4Field notes, my own translation.
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them) has nothing to do with their job. He also has clear ideas of what consti-
tutes fair and objective decision-making. For him, fair decision-making relates
to strictly following the law, and objective decision-making to making deci-
sions “from a distance” and not becoming too personally involved in the case.
From Rebecca, we learn that being a good and professional decision-maker
means working fast, not becoming too personally involved in one’s cases, and
making decisions that one can personally endorse. We further infer from this
anecdote that being naïve, “too generous” and “too nice” are considered to
be features of unprofessional decision-making. Protection should be granted,
but not too easily. In Alberto’s words: “It shouldn’t be handed to [asylum
seekers] on a plate”. In order to understand why all of this has come to define
professionalism for Rebecca and Alberto, I turn to the ethics of the office to
demonstrate how it can be derived from what caseworkers understand their
duties as decision-makers and state officials to be.
Ethics of the Office: Decision-Makers
as Protectors of the System
In “Modernity and the Holocaust ”, Zygmunt Bauman (1989: 159) suggests,
as Tone Liodden writes, “that there is a tendency in bureaucracies to shift the
sense of moral obligation from those who are affected by decisions, towards
colleagues and the demands of the system” (2016: 242). In Bauman’s under-
standing, this makes bureaucracies anethical and amoral (see also Graeber
2015; Herzfeld 1992). This shift of moral obligation that Bauman describes
is important and is something I also observed in the SEM. However, I chal-
lenge his interpretation that this makes administrations anethical and amoral.
Rather, following Julia Eckert (2020), I argue that ethics should be under-
stood not in a normative, but rather in an empirical way (see also Fassin
2012: 4). In this sense, “ethics are intrinsic to bureaucracy” (Eckert 2020: 9).
Decision-makers’ sense of moral obligation is ethical, whoever or whatever
they feel it towards.
In his study of different “asylum sector intermediaries” Nick Gill argues
that “states […] command powers that are capable of engendering the will
to act in accordance with state objectives, rather than simply generating the
necessity or imperative to do so” (2009: 215, 219, emphasis in the orig-
inal). This “will to act in accordance with state objectives” was something
I frequently observed. Many decision-makers I spoke to strongly identi-
fied themselves with the office and with what they perceived to be the
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state’s—and, therefore, the office’s—objectives (see also Affolter et al. 2019:
273–274).
According to Max Weber’s ideal-typical bureaucracy, “loyalty to the office”
(Amtstreue ) is a characteristic of bureaucratic rule (2013 [1978]: 705).
Decision-makers in the SEM share this ideal-typical value. Thus, being loyal
to the office is regarded as very important, as exemplified by a SEM official
who in a conversation with Jonathan Miaz said: “I have to do what the office
says, otherwise I will somehow betray the office and I don’t want that either”
(Affolter et al. 2019: 276). Similarly, Olga Jubany observed amongst immi-
gration officers in the UK that “[i]n their exercise of their professional role,
officers’ responsibility and accountability is not directed to the asylum seekers
but to the immigration service and the organisation. Officers’ responsibility
is almost invariably related to their feelings of professional duty” (2017: 192).
This sense of duty she argues “is inextricably linked to defending the system”
(ibid.: 209).
My analysis differs from that of Jubany in that I do not claim that decision-
makers feel no responsibility towards asylum seekers. They do, as I will
show later on in this chapter. However, I concur with her in that decision-
makers often put their responsibility towards “the system” over responsibility
towards asylum seekers (see also Poertner 2018: 288). Or, rather, I argue that
responsibility towards asylum seekers is aligned with and subsumed under the
responsibility to protect the system.
In the field anecdote above, we can see that for Alberto the Iraqi family
does not deserve protection because, as an “upper class family”, they are not
sufficiently vulnerable. They do not fit the image of victims in need of help.5
“They could go anywhere they want”, he claims. From this, we can deduce
decision-makers’ dual duty. On the one hand, decision-makers must make
sure that those “really deserving of protection” receive protection. On the
other hand, they must protect the system from being abused by “undeserving”
applicants. This dual duty of protecting people—but only deserving people—
and filtering out the undeserving in order to protect “the system” becomes
apparent in the wording the SEM uses to describe the “[b]asic principles of
asylum legislation” on its website:
It is the duty of asylum proceedings to identify those asylum seekers among
the new arrivals who are entitled to protection under the terms [of the Geneva
Convention]. Many asylum seekers cannot be classified as refugees or persons
5Several authors have shown that asylum (and immigration) politics, law and decision-making produce
a very particular “‘figure’ (Fassin 2007: 512) of the deserving aid recipient, framing him or her as a
victim in need of protection” (Cabot 2013: 453; see also Ticktin 2006; Zetter 2007).
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displaced by war. On the basis of their situation, they clearly belong to the
group of migrants. They are in search of a better place to live in Switzer-
land. Knowing that they would hardly obtain an entry or work permit, they
cross the border illegally. Many of them invent a dramatic story of persecution
for the hearing by the authorities. With such tactics they hope to be granted
refugee status. From the viewpoint of the person concerned, this behaviour
is understandable, from the perspective of asylum legislation it constitutes
abuse of asylum proceedings. The authorities must reject such applications
without delay and execute removal systematically, making asylum proceedings
unattractive for foreigners seeking employment.6
The quote illustrates a common assumption in the SEM that many (or
even most) asylum seekers will lie. While deemed understandable (“anyone in
that situation would do it”, I was often told), it is, nevertheless, the decision-
makers’ duty to separate the “real” from the “false” refugees, the ones “telling
the truth” from the ones “who are lying” (see also Bohmer and Shuman
2018: 160; Fassin and Kobelinsky 2012: 446; Kobelinsky 2015: 67). This
is regarded as important because the asylum system is only seen to work if
those “not deserving of protection” are denied asylum. The following quote
from Jonathan Miaz’s fieldwork shows this distinction nicely: “I think that
saying ‘no’ to someone who’s not a refugee in the sense of the UNHCR and
of the Refugee Convention contributes to the protection of the asylum insti-
tution. One has to say ‘no’ to those who are not refugees in order to be able
to say ‘yes’ to those who are” (Affolter et al. 2019: 273).
Reserving refugee protection for those “truly deserving of it”, therefore,
becomes a necessity for upholding the value of the asylum system. Thus, as
Didier Fassin and Carolina Kobelinsky argue, “[t]he less frequently [asylum]
is granted, the more precious refugee status becomes” (2012: 464). This
means that in order to maintain the value of asylum, many applications need
to be rejected (ibid.: 465).
Under “basic principles of asylum legislation” the SEM states on its website
that it is decision-makers’ duty to make “asylum proceedings unattractive for
foreigners seeking employment”. I argue that the ethics—understood in an
empirical sense—underlying this is that Switzerland must be protected from
so-called “foreigners” or “outsiders” (see Jubany 2017: 212) by making sure
that not “too many foreigners” come to and are allowed to reside in Switzer-
land. Decision-makers thereby become “guardians of a restricted good”: in
this case, the right to reside in Switzerland (Heyman 2009: 381; see also
Lipsky 2010: 4). As a kind of “meta-message” (Jubany 2017), this duty is
6https://perma.cc/ZG4B-NN6U, last accessed 26.02.2020.
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frequently conveyed in the SEM. This became particularly visible in the
induction training, where it was not explicitly taught, but was consistently
implied, as the following examples show.
In one of the training courses I attended, the instructor presented us with
a graph comparing the number of new asylum applications in Europe and
in Switzerland between 1998 and 2014. The graph showed that, in 2014,
the percentage of asylum applicants in Switzerland was at its lowest point
since 1998, dropping from 8.2 per cent in 2012 to 3.8 per cent in 2014.
Drawing attention to this, the instructor commented: “Switzerland must have
done something right, since the percentage of applications has gone down
like this”.7 The message was quite clear. If Switzerland—through its frontline
decision-makers—did its job well, this reduced the number of applications
(especially in comparison with other European countries).
The second example comes from a course on how to deal with applica-
tions for family reunification. The instructor told the new decision-makers
that the institutional practice for dealing with Eritrean applications was to
request DNA proof that the applicants were indeed related to the people they
intended to bring to Switzerland. The instructor said: “If they do not hand
in DNA proof, the case is ready to be decided, namely negatively. I have seen
that people have still been granted entry in such cases. Please don’t do that.
That’s the worst signal we could be sending out”.8 With this statement, the
instructor urged trainees to make sure their decision-making did not send
out the wrong message to avoid creating a “pull-effect”. The wrong message
would therefore be that Switzerland is a country where family reunification is
easy.
The two substantial goals the office is geared towards can be deduced from
the examples above. As a Federal institution, the SEM—and, therefore, its
staff—are requested to represent “national interests”. On the one hand, this
means fulfilling Switzerland’s duties under international law (particularly the
Geneva Convention and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child)
and maintaining its self-ascribed image as a humanitarian country. Upholding
the noble value of asylum succeeds by excluding those “undeserving” of it.
The scarcer asylum protection becomes, the more precious its value. On the
other hand, it also means securing Switzerland’s “borders” by restricting non-
citizens’ access to rights and goods, and by making sure that there are not too
many “foreigners” residing in Switzerland. My analysis subsumes both sets of
practices within the phrase “protecting the system”, which, via two ostensibly
7Training instructor, A-modules, field notes, my own translation.
8Training instructor, C-modules, field notes, my own translation.
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opposed logics, comes to mean keeping numbers of asylum applicants low.
This is at least partly achieved by keeping acceptance rates low.
My point here is not to say that all decision-makers consciously strive
towards keeping numbers low. Many explicitly do not. Furthermore, many
decision-makers do not per se share the political view that immigration
to Switzerland should be restricted. However, I argue that regardless of
decision-makers’ personal political views and ideologies, the ethics of the
office have an impact on and implicitly shape decision-makers’ understanding
of what it means to do their job well. This explains how and why “dig-
ging deep” becomes subsumed under professional, objective and neutral
decision-making, while “easily believing” asylum seekers is associated with
lazy, naïve, sometimes even politically motivated, and, thus, unprofessional
decision-making.
Ethos of the Office: Professional Norms
and Values
What administrative caseworkers “think they should do shapes what they
actually do as much as other constraints”, Julia Eckert argues (2020: 8).
Decision-makers’ role perception; what they perceive their duty to consist
of; what commonweal or just order they believe they must work towards;
and who or what they feel loyal to are crucial in this regard (ibid.). But also,
the more procedural norms and the dominant values in the office regarding
how decision-makers should carry out their duty as protectors of the system
and the tasks connected to this duty, shape what decision-makers do. In this
part of the chapter I explore such institutional norms and values that prevail
in the SEM; many of which were already brought up by Alberto and Rebecca
in the field anecdote described above.
The aim is not to paint a coherent picture. Good decision-making in the
SEM suggests juggling different norms and values; many of which stand in
(potential) conflict to one another. Hence, good decision-makers both do
justice to the individual ‘case’ and strictly adhere to the law and institutional
practice. They are emotionally distanced from the applicants but at the same
time understanding and compassionate towards them. They are “politically
neutral”, yet, they have a political “state-duty” to fulfil. They live up to the
professional role of the sceptic, but, at the same time, they are not cynical.
And they work fast, while still carrying each task out carefully in order not to
create more work at a later stage.
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Each of these values is now separately explored in more detail. I analyse the
meanings ascribed to them; how they structure everyday decision-making and
how they are linked to the ethics of the office.
The Efficient, Fast and Economical Decision-Maker
The quality charter given to all caseworkers in the SEM’s asylum direc-
torate reflects common characteristics of what is known as New Public
Management. It states that
[w]e decide who is granted protection in our country and who has no such
need. We are aware of the fact that our job has major consequences for the
lives of affected people. That is why our actions must meet high quality stan-
dards. […] We treat asylum seekers in a fair and correct manner, regardless
of what their claim consists of. Asylum applications are treated competently
and in consistence with the law and institutional practice […]. In doing so,
we work efficiently, fast and economically. […] We make quality measurable:
we set quality targets, define binding standards and make use of the necessary
measuring instruments.9
New Public Management reforms were introduced in the SEM and
other public administrations in Switzerland “from the early 2000s onwards”
(Poertner 2018: 274).10 Typical of these reforms was, amongst other things,
the introduction of explicit performance standards and measurements as well
as a strong emphasis on the so-called “output” of public administrations (see
Gill 2016: 39; Hood 1991; Rose 1999: 150–151).
In the SEM today, quantitative targets are regularly defined for the whole
institution, each division and section as well as for every individual decision-
maker. All decision-makers, as well as the sections and divisions themselves,
receive monthly statistical charts which show them what they have achieved
and whether they have fulfilled their quantitative aims or not. While reaching
their targets never posed a problem for a few of the decision-makers I spoke
to—some did not even know how many decisions they were supposed to take
each month, it was so easy for them—the majority of my interaction partners
suffered because of this time pressure and struggled, and often failed, to reach
their monthly target. Hence, they work under a lot of pressure to produce
9Quality charter, training material for new employees of the SEM’s asylum directorate, field
documents, my own translation.
10Other asylum administrations such as the FAO in Austria (see Dahlvik 2018: 63–72); the OFPRA
in France (see Probst 2012: 214–222), the BAMF in Germany (see Probst 2012: 214–222) and the
UDI in Norway (see Liodden 2016: 236–242) underwent similar developments.
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the quantitative output expected of them (see also Fresia et al. 2013: 54–55;
Liodden 2016: 237; Poertner 2018: 275).
The targets for individual decision-makers are set at meetings with their
superiors at six monthly intervals. They depend on officials’ working hours,
their customary productivity and any other tasks they might have. At the time
of my research, such targets often consisted of four to five asylum interviews
a month and eighteen to twenty decisions or rather, marks on their tally list,
every month. What counts as output and what does not, keeps changing.
During my fieldwork, both the number of asylum interviews conducted
and the number of asylum decisions sent out, counted towards caseworkers’
output. However, some types of decisions, like decisions concerning family
reunification, for instance, did not. Yet, it was not actually the number of
decisions per se that counted, but rather the number of people asylum deci-
sions had been taken for. Thus, if a decision-maker wrote a decision for a
five-person family this yielded five marks, while a decision for a single person
resulted in one (see also Poertner 2017: 15).
Output pressure is often particularly strongly felt by decision-makers
working on fixed-term contracts because they are told that whether or not
they will have their contract prolonged depends, amongst other things, on
whether they manage to produce the output requested of them. Hence, one
decision-maker, whom I have called Sebastian, told me that in the organ-
isational division he worked in they had been told that whoever produced
the least marks by the end of the year had to fear their contract not being
renewed. He complained that this had led to rivalry between co-workers and
to decisions being taken very hurriedly and badly. For people with an open-
ended contract this had not been so bad, he explained, but in his unit, there
were only a handful of them, the rest all held fixed-term contracts. His output
was not very good, he told me, because he was at the time mainly working on
‘cases’ from single young men from what he called a “complicated country”.
But he hoped that his superior would be able to see beyond quantity and
would also take into account the quality of his employees’ decisions.11
Quantity and quality must be weighed against each other in everyday
decision-making. Producing quantity is important because of the output
targets set by the institution, but also because of the large caseloads relative
to their time capacity decision-makers must deal with, which, according to
Michael Lipsky is a typical characteristic of street-level bureaucracies (2010:
29). This is immediately apparent when one enters a decision-maker’s office.
Everywhere—in and on top of bookshelves, on the desks and on the little
11Sebastian, caseworker, headquarters, field notes, my own translation.
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tables which have been added and sometimes even on the floor—there
are piles of case files: cases that need to be decided, cases which are still
waiting for an answer from further investigations, interviews that need to
be conducted, and cases that will “just have to wait” because they are not a
priority.
I was often told by superiors that it was their job, for the abovemen-
tioned reasons, to make sure that their employees produced enough decisions.
However, most of them, like Nora, claimed that they valued quality higher
than quantity: “I have to make sure my people write decent (ordentliche )
and correct decisions. And enough. And exactly in this order. You see, for me
quality is more important than quantity”.12 At the same time, they told me—
and complained about the fact—that for several of their fellow superiors, the
opposite was often the case.
Pressure to produce enough output and to work efficiently is not only
attributed to the office itself, but also to “politics” as the following statement
by a superior from Jonathan Miaz’s fieldwork illustrates: “[W]e [the SEM
(officials)] have a responsibility towards the Swiss people and the tax payers
to not just take correct decisions but decisions of the ‘right quality’. […]
And I deliberately speak of ‘the right quality’ and not of ‘optimal quality’
because it could always be done better” (Affolter et al. 2019: 271). The “right
quality” for this head of an asylum unit thereby means that the quality of the
decision matters, but that the effort put into producing qualitatively good
decisions “has to be measured against the quantitative demands of the office”
(ibid.). This for him constitutes a political demand he is required to fulfil.
The statement, therefore, shows how the superior has “internalised a certain
accountability toward these imagined, generalised and blurred figures” of the
“Swiss people” and “tax payers” (ibid.). Thus, the procedural norms regarding
how officials should go about taking decisions are interpreted in the light
of what decision-makers understand their duty to be. As my fieldwork has
shown, my interaction partners, as state agents, felt that they had to act in
the interest of “the state”. What this means for them is illustrated by the
above-quoted statement. State interests are, at least partially, perceived as what
“Swiss people”—in a rather abstract sense—want.
According to the quality charter quoted above, decision-makers are not
only expected to work fast, they must also work economically. Amongst
other things, working economically implies taking decisions that will not
likely be quashed by the Federal Administrative Court, since every decision
that is rescinded and obliges decision-makers to revisit the ‘case’, costs time.
12Nora, head of asylum unit, headquarters, interview transcript, my own translation.
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As shown in Chapter 5, this fear of having decisions quashed may have an
impact on the type of decision taken and the legal reasoning used to justify
them. How the procedural norm of working economically shapes officials’
everyday work can, for instance, be seen in the example of Theodor who
once explained to me
that his superior had instructed him to stop always looking for material
evidence in order to argue for the non-credibility of asylum claims using the
criterion “contradiction to facts” (Tatsachenwidrigkeit ). The superior consid-
ered this too time-consuming and had asked him to focus instead on framing
his arguments along the lines of “insufficient substance”, which could be done
on the basis of the asylum interview minutes alone. (Affolter et al. 2019: 271)
Time should, therefore, be spent “wisely”. The same also holds true for
money. Hence, during induction training, the novices were instructed not
to frivolously request that the authenticity of asylum seekers’ documents be
assessed by specialists, because this would cost the office a lot of money.
Rather, the expectation was that this was only to be done if decision-makers
were not otherwise able to assess the credibility of asylum claims in the ways
described in Chapter 4. Furthermore, for some of my interaction partners—
mostly occupying higher hierarchical positions in the SEM—money was even
a concern beyond what it meant in terms of procedural costs. Hence, some
officials claimed that it was important not to grant asylum and temporary
protection “too easily” because if all “those people” then brought their fami-
lies here that would cost Switzerland a lot of money. Yet, at the same time, as
I will show below, other officials did not share and even explicitly criticised
this view. Worrying about money in this sense was indicative of politically
motivated decision-making which, in their eyes, was unprofessional.
The Neutral, Apolitical Decision-Maker
When Alberto, slightly defensively, brought up “the question of nation states”
in the conversation introduced earlier in the chapter, and “whether one thinks
nation states are good or not”, he was referring to a particular political
ideology that questions the fundamental idea of nation states. Even if he
was sympathetic towards this idea—Alberto did not really state his opinion
and left this possibility open—the message he conveyed is clear: on the job,
there is no place for personal political opinions. But not only that. By saying
that these problems “cannot be solved by what we do”, he insinuated that
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decision-making is also apolitical. Both of these statements reflect perspec-
tives that are common in the SEM and other public administrations (see
Dahlvik 2018: 56; Johannesson 2017: 116–117; Liodden 2016: 207–209).
The apolitical norm fits with the impersonal spirit Weber depicts as an
important feature of the bureaucratic ethos. He writes: “‘Sine ira et studio,’
without hatred or passion, and hence without affection or enthusiasm. The
dominant norms are concepts of straightforward duty without regard to
personal considerations. […] This is the spirit in which the ideal official
conducts his office” (2013 [1978]: 225). In contrast, the “politician’s element”
is “ira et studium” (Weber 1991: 95). Thus, according to Weber, politicians
must have passion and fight, whereas bureaucrats should do neither. A similar
opinion is widespread in the SEM: there all an official should do is to follow
rules and “neutrally apply the law”. This is illustrated in the following quote
by SEM official Barbara:
I have a problem with “missionaries”. And there are some here in the SEM. We
don’t have a mission here. We just have to decide upon cases. We don’t have
to protect Switzerland from foreigners. That is not our role. But some people
here feel this way. They think that there are too many asylum seekers here. But
that is not my problem. I am paid to take decisions, so I take decisions. On
the other hand, there are some who proselytise on behalf of the asylum seekers.
They think that everybody should be able to stay here. But that is not the case.
We have the law. […] And then there are the others who say: “If you give a
temporary permit to this guy, who is only 20, and then he stays for 30 years,
that will cost Switzerland 10 million francs.” Again, that is not my problem.
If he fulfils the eligibility criteria he can stay. If you’re not happy with it, you
have to change the law. But then you have to go into politics, you shouldn’t
be working here.13
In her statement, Barbara is tellingly advocating for “political neutrality”,
which is widely recognised as an important norm within the SEM. She situ-
ates this “political neutrality” in the middle between what she identifies as two
kinds of political “extremes”: wanting to “protect Switzerland from foreign-
ers” and believing that “everybody should be allowed to stay”. This view
was shared by all my interaction partners. While some tended to be more
critical of “hardline” decision-making and others were more disturbed by
their colleagues’ “lenient” decisions, neutrality was always associated with this
middle ground.
13Barbara, caseworker, headquarters, interview transcript, my own translation.
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Barbara uses the word “missionaries” to describe a role decision-makers
should not take on. Missionaries pursue clear goals with their decision-
making: they either want to enable everybody to stay, or to make sure that as
few people as possible are allowed to remain in Switzerland. In contrast, for
Barbara, professional decision-making has no room for ideologies and pursuit
of goals other than following the law. She claims that a professional decision-
maker’s only aim should be to “correctly” and “neutrally” apply the law,
which is a common self-understanding and professional value in bureaucratic
institutions (see Dubois 2005; Lavanchy 2013: 69; Miaz 2017b: 384).
Barbara claiming that it is not her role “to protect Switzerland from
foreigners” could be read as standing in contradiction to her duty as protector
of the system and what I have called the ethics of the office. However, I argue
that it does not. As stated above, making sure that not “too many foreign-
ers” come and are allowed to stay in Switzerland is only rarely stated—and
perceived—by caseworkers as an explicit aim of asylum decision-making. But,
at the same time, protecting the system is self-evidently accepted as being
a decision-maker’s duty and as such is rather unquestioningly adopted and
incorporated by the officials. Protecting the system, which builds on the
idea that Switzerland must be protected from “outsiders”, lies at the heart
of professionalism in the SEM, shaping decision-makers’ understanding of
what it means to do the job well. Yet, protecting the system is not perceived
as an ideology, as lying outside the law. Rather, it informs what “correct” and
“neutral” rule-following means. In this sense, protecting the system becomes
apolitical as do the professional norms and decision-making practices, like
“digging deep”, that are associated with it (see also Johannesson 2017: 120–
121). In the words of Cris Shore and Susan Wright, this is, therefore, how
the political becomes masked “under the cloak of neutrality” (1997: 8).
The Objective, Sufficiently Distanced and Emotionally
Detached Decision-Maker
Since he has seen so many cases as a superior, he is now able to “see things
more clearly, from a certain distance, more objectively”, Alberto explains to
Rebecca and me. For him distance and objectivity are what it takes to be
professional and reach good decisions. He considers Rebecca’s decision to be a
bad one because it is “too generous”. Rebecca thinks that the fact that she was
“too nice” and made “too generous” a decision might have been influenced by
the family’s pleasant appearance when she interviewed them. In other words,
she thinks she had liked them too much. In the SEM, emotional attachment
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and personal involvement are seen as the antithesis of objective decision-
making. For a decision to be objective, it should be based solely on the “facts”
of the case: on applicants’ recorded statements and all the written docu-
ments applicants have supplied or decision-makers have acquired. Distance
and emotional detachment are considered crucial for achieving this (see also
Dahlvik 2018: 56, 77; Liodden 2016: 243–244). In the following, I examine
what SEM officials understand by distance and emotional detachment, and
what measures are undertaken to create such distance in order to enable
objective decision-making.
SEM officials are not allowed to interview asylum seekers they know
personally. If they are assigned the case of an applicant they know, they are
obliged to give it back or pass it on to a co-worker. Moreover, in a training
module dealing with the role of decision-makers in the interviews, trainees
were told to maintain appropriate distance—not just towards asylum seekers,
but also towards other professionals who participate in asylum interviews.
They were informed that whereas it was not forbidden to befriend these
professionals outside work, the interview was not a place for informal or
personal conversation.14
Separate waiting rooms reflect the distance created between different types
of actors. At the headquarters, one waiting room is for asylum seekers, and a
separate room is shared by interpreters, social aid representatives and other
visitors such as myself. The minute-takers have their own keys and move
around the buildings freely. At the two reception and processing centres
where I conducted my fieldwork, the auxiliary personnel sit in the same
common room as the decision-makers themselves, while asylum seekers wait
elsewhere. This separation ensures that all personal encounters and interac-
tions between officials and asylum seekers are confined to interviews, where
they are entirely “professional”. This not only secludes the decision-makers
but the interpreters, minute-takers and social aid representatives are also
kept apart from the asylum seekers (although they all might go outside to
smoke together). Several officials told me that these separate waiting rooms
enabled interpreters to keep their distance from asylum seekers because other-
wise they might be approached by the latter. An asylum seeker may, for
instance, ask them for help in answering questions appropriately or may ask
14In practice, this is somewhat different. Several decision-makers maintain friendly ties with
minute-takers and interpreters and this was evident during interviews when they initiated personal
conversations or took breaks together. However, caseworkers are always careful to maintain a certain
distance between themselves and the asylum seekers. Thus, conversations between decision-makers
and asylum seekers are usually limited to the interview itself and, at times, to some formal small talk
on the way to and from the office and the waiting room.
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them to tell them what questions might be asked. I argue that SEM offi-
cials are thereby not only preoccupied with keeping interpreters and asylum
seekers apart for the sake of the interpreters, but also for the sake of their
own decision-making. This has to do with the moments of translation in
the asylum interviews simultaneously playing a crucial role in the decision-
making process and yet being very difficult for the decision-makers to control
since they do not know what is being said between the asylum seekers and
the interpreters.
Another feature that promotes professional distance is the seating arrange-
ment during the interviews, which usually take place in an official’s personal
office. The offices are equipped in a standard manner. The minute-takers sit at
a desk with a computer. All the other participants are placed around a larger
rectangular table. These small rooms become very cramped during an inter-
view when five participants (including me) are sitting in them. This forces
people to sit close together. Although seating arrangements are generally not
conscious decisions, but merely copied from other officials, most decision-
makers sit at opposite ends of the table from asylum seekers, and so it is they
who sit the farthest apart. When I asked an official called Gabriel why they
always sat like that he replied: “Well, for me it’s important that I can look the
applicant in the eye, that I can look at him during our conversation, that I’m
opposite him and sometimes I am also grateful for the distance”.15
Gabriel’s quote points not only to the importance of distance, it also illus-
trates the value decision-makers ascribe to the “proximity” of face-to-face
encounters. Face-to-face encounters are valued for a number of reasons. As
shown in Chapter 4, they are seen as an important source of professional-
practical knowledge. Furthermore, decision-makers believe that by seeing the
applicant they can do better justice to the individual case, because they get a
better feeling of what is really at stake. Moreover, many decision-makers told
me that it was easier to stand by their decisions if they had personally inter-
viewed the asylum seeker. They usually felt more confident that they were
making “the right” decision when this was the case (see Chapter 4). Finally,
one decision-maker, Lucy, told me that she found doing asylum interviews
important, because “you sit opposite these people time and again and you
realise that it is not just a number [you are dealing with], but a human being
with all his hopes and dreams” (see also Dahlvik 2018: 61).16 Yet, while close
encounters in the interviews are acknowledged as important for the aforemen-
tioned reasons, decision-makers also see a danger that, like Rebecca, they will
become emotionally attached. Hence, being a good decision-maker requires
15Gabriel, caseworker, headquarters, interview transcript, my own translation.
16Lucy, caseworker, headquarters, interview transcript, my own translation.
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maintaining the right balance between proximity and distance. All my inter-
action partners told me that, for this reason, they usually put the case file
aside for a couple of days after the interview, to (re-)gain some distance, so
that their decision would not be influenced by sentiments the interview might
have triggered. In this way, they become objective again.
What I have described so far is the meaning given to “distance” as a
professional norm by the SEM officials themselves. At the same time, in
academic literature, “distance” and “distancing” are used in a more analyt-
ical and often critical way to describe bureaucratic work. Tobias Eule, for
instance, uses the term to describe how people become cases, numbered files
and outputs in and through administrative procedures (2014: 109; see also
Fuglerud 2004: 36; Scheffer 2001). This is something I too observed in the
SEM and is most clearly expressed in the language decision-makers use when
talking about the people they deal with. However, in terms of institutional
values, reducing people to numbers and not recognising them as individ-
uals is regarded as doing one’s job badly. Thus, in the training sessions, the
new decision-makers were frequently reminded that they were dealing with
“people and not numbers” or in the words of one instructor: “You decide
whether someone has to go back home or not. This isn’t just a piece of
paper”.17 The common outside critique of reducing people to numbers, cases
or files is thereby mirrored in this internal value. Good decision-makers are
supposed to care for the people they deal with (see also Watkins-Hayes 2009:
70). Therefore, following Veena Das, I argue that (emotional) detachment
should not be equated with cold disinterest (2015: 103–106; see also Candea
et al. 2015: 24).
Academics engaging critically with bureaucratic institutions have, further-
more, argued that administrative caseworkers take decisions, which lead to
inhumane circumstances and may at times even prove to be lethal, because
they are physically and psychologically distanced from the outcomes of their
actions. Thus, they do not feel responsible for them (see Arendt 2013;
Bauman 1989; Eule 2014: 109; Gill 2016). In the SEM, decision-makers
are also to some extent physically and psychologically distanced from the
outcomes of their decisions. Hence, on the one hand, they are very rarely
present when asylum seekers learn of their decision because, especially at the
headquarters, almost all decisions are sent out as letters.18 On the other hand,
17Training instructor, A-modules, field notes, my own translation.
18Theoretically, there is the possibility of passing judgement verbally. However, this is rarely done at
the headquarters and then mostly for positive decisions. At the reception and processing centres it
happens a bit more frequently and there mostly with negative decisions.
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they are not present when rejected applicants are deported since once a nega-
tive decision has been taken and becomes legally binding, the ‘case’ is passed
on to the return division of the SEM and the responsibility for deporting this
person is transferred to the canton of residence.
This was different during the three years, between 2007 and 2010, in
which Federal Councillor Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf was in charge of the
SEM. During this time, the two SEM divisions “asylum” and “return” were
merged. This meant that caseworkers had to do everything from inter-
viewing asylum seekers, to taking decisions, to organising so-called “voluntary
returns” (see Loher 2020) and deportations, including, at times, being present
for the deportations. While some decision-makers said they valued this time
for the new perspectives it gave them on their job, most decision-makers said
that, in retrospect, they did not enjoy doing their job during those three years.
Whether having to carry out all these tasks had an impact on the officials’
decision-making and the outcome of their decisions I do not know. However,
based on the office gossip I heard, it can be assumed that following deci-
sions through to the end in this way does not necessarily lead to more lenient
decision-making. Thus, several decision-makers told me that their colleagues
from the return division were much stricter and, if it were up to them “would
send everybody back”.19 Working together with them had, therefore, been
quite challenging.
In their work, SEM officials are confronted with stories of brutal and
traumatising experiences and endured hardships on a daily basis. Further-
more, they are aware of the potential consequences their decisions might
have for asylum seekers. Psychological distancing, in this regard, functions
as an important coping mechanism. Psychological distancing mainly works
through the shifting of responsibility. In Chapter 4, I showed how through
rejecting asylum claims on the basis of non-credibility, the responsibility for
the outcome of the decisions is shifted to the asylum seekers themselves: it is
their fault for not telling the truth. Moreover, responsibility is shifted to “the
law” (see also Jubany 2017: 210). Hence, decision-makers often explained to
me that they had no choice but to take a certain decision in the ‘cases’ they
were working on because that was what “the law” required. In this regard,
one decision-maker told me that when people who had “no reasons for being
granted asylum at all” asked him why he would not help them, he some-
times explained it like this: “Look, it’s like you’ve just come into a TV shop
and I’m the shop assistant. You come into the shop and ask for a broom,
but all I have here are TVs. I have no brooms I could give you. You want a
19Kristina, caseworker, headquarters, field notes, my own translation.
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broom and I only have TVs”.20 Finally, and in connection with the above, in
my conversations with decision-makers the latter occasionally also shifted the
responsibility to politicians and the electorate, since, in their view, it was ulti-
mately the politicians and the electorate that make asylum law and politics.
They were the ones who had turned asylum law into what it was today.
Nevertheless, despite responsibility being to some extent shifted to others
in this way, this does not mean that the caseworkers do not also assume
responsibility for their decisions. In fact, this responsibility “of actually
making a difference” is one of the things several of the decision-makers said
they liked best about their job. Assuming responsibility for the outcome
of one’s decisions is seen as a virtue and regarded as a necessity for good
decision-making. Hence, it is something of a credo in the SEM that, as a
decision-maker, one must always be able to stand by one’s decisions. Not
only this, but also as caseworker Alexandra put it:
Principally one has to ask oneself: If I took a negative decision, if I decided
that this person has to go home again, would I be capable of accompanying
this person home. And if you say, phew, I’d have scruples doing that, looking
a person in the eye and saying: “You have to go home”, then in difficult cases
this might “tip the balance” (das Zünglein an der Waage spielen).21
What Alexandra is referring to here is the granting of temporary admis-
sion in the case that asylum has been denied. The question decision-makers
must then decide upon is whether the person should be allowed to stay in
Switzerland or not, which, in the latter case, might lead to the person being
deported. I regularly observed that such decisions are not easy ones for case-
workers to take. Hence, they like it when there are “clear standards” they can
measure their ‘cases’ against: for instance, if the APPAs explicitly define areas
that are “safe”, meaning that people can be sent back to them, and such that
are not; or if they lay out clear criteria applicants from a certain country or
region must fulfil in order to be eligible for subsidiary protection. But even
so such decisions often remain difficult. The ‘case’ of the Iraqi family consti-
tuted a difficult case for Rebecca—and it had “tipped the balance” for her.
For Alberto it had not, which had to do with his understanding of fairness,
as I will discuss in more detail below. I do not know what decision Rebecca
finally ended up taking because I left her asylum unit soon after the encounter
with her and Alberto. Maybe she tried finding “better arguments” in order to
convince Alberto that her decision was “the right one” after all. However,
20Nick, caseworker, headquarters, interview transcript, my own translation.
21Alexandra, caseworker, reception and processing centre, interview transcript, my own translation.
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from the conversation I observed, it seemed more likely that Rebecca would
re-write the last part of her decision completely, providing justification for
why sending the family back to Iraq was both permitted under international
law and reasonable in humanitarian terms.22
The Sufficiently but Not Overly Suspicious
Decision-Maker
A very important professional norm in the SEM is “suspicion” or non-
naivety. To be sufficiently suspicious is regarded as “a sign of professionalism”
(Alpes and Spire 2014: 269). Conversely, “naively” believing asylum seekers’
statements without properly testing their credibility is regarded as a sign
of unprofessionalism, as Alberto insinuates in the field anecdote described
above (see also Miaz 2017a: 347). The same has also been described for other
administrations where people make (rights) claims on the state (Borrelli et al.,
forthcoming), such as French consulates (Alpes and Spire 2014: 269; Spire
2008), German asylum administrations (Scheffer 2003: 456), Swiss registry
offices (Lavanchy 2014) and welfare offices in the USA (Watkins-Hayes 2009:
50–51).
The norm of “suspicion” is linked to decision-makers’ self-understanding
as protectors of the system. In other words, it is connected to the ethics of
the office.
Many asylum seekers cannot be classified as refugees or persons displaced
by war. On the basis of their situation, they clearly belong to the group of
migrants. They are in search of a better place to live in Switzerland. […]
Many of them invent a dramatic story of persecution for the hearing by the
authorities. With such tactics they hope to be granted refugee status. […] The
authorities must reject such applications without delay and execute removal
systematically.23
The quote from the SEM website shows that the common assumption is
that most asylum seekers are “bogus”, that they belong to the so-called group
of “economic migrants” and are trying to manipulate the system in order
22I would like to remind the reader that the family was not actually from Iraq, so no conclusions
should be drawn regarding the SEM’s practice in connection to different countries. For reasons of
anonymity I have changed several identity markers of ‘cases’ so that the officials dealing with them
remain anonymous and can, to the best of my knowledge, not be identified by their co-workers and
superiors.
23https://perma.cc/ZG4B-NN6U, last accessed 26.02.2020.
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to be able to stay (see also Kelly 2012: 755; Souter 2011: 48). It is there-
fore the decision-makers’ duty to combat “fraud”, uncover the “undeserving”
and reject their claims as quickly as possible. This understanding of asylum
decision-making leads to “a shift from trying to find the truth to searching for
untruth, from a concern with proof to a concern with lies” (Kelly 2012: 765).
Or, put differently, it calls for suspicion. Hence, the way several caseworkers
described their role—particularly in asylum interviews—to me was that of
a “sceptic”. They see it as their duty to ask as many questions as necessary
until they are convinced that the asylum seeker’s story is true, or to produce
sufficient arguments for writing a negative decision (see Chapters 4 and 5).
Yet, while being sceptical is a sign of professionalism, being overly suspi-
cious is regarded as a vice. Decision-makers who are said to enter asylum
interviews with closed minds, always already knowing that everything will be
a lie, are criticised by their colleagues for doing their job badly. They are called
“cynics” by their critics. This “cynical” attitude to decision-making opposes
the professional norm of open-mindedness. Hence, during my research, I was
frequently told what is also taught in the training modules; that decision-
makers must be open-minded in order to do their job well. They should go
into every interview with a tabula rasa even if, at the same time, they should
already have an idea of what the decision might be in order to conduct the
interview efficiently.
Becoming a cynic is perceived as a greater risk for older employees who
have already “seen too much”. Naivety, in turn, is mostly attributed to new
decision-makers. It is seen as something newcomers have to grow out of. They
first have to learn to become sceptical enough and dig deep enough in asylum
interviews. Accordingly, as a sort of newcomer myself, I was also perceived as
being naïve and believing asylum seekers “too readily”. Connected to these
perceptions is a crucial difference in critique. Whereas naïve decision-making
is regularly equated with being unprofessional , I have never come across
the same criticism for cynical decision-making.24 New decision-makers who
“naïvely believe everything the claimants tell them” appear to lack sufficient
understanding of what it means to properly fulfil their duty, and experienced
decision-makers who naïvely believe an applicant are often criticised as being
lazy—too lazy, one could interpret, to properly fulfil their duties. On the
other hand, the term often used to describe an overly suspicious and cynical
attitude is déformation professionelle, or occupational hazard. Used by SEM
officials to describe how the views of decision-makers may become distorted
by long service on the job, this term is applied when veracity is disparaged
24And neither have Jonathan Miaz and Ephraim Poertner who also conducted research in the SEM
(see Affolter et al. 2019: 281).
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too much.25 Thus, critiques of cynical decision-making do not criticise offi-
cials for being unprofessional or not protecting the system, but for taking
protection too far, and losing sight of those who are “deserving”.
Ethos Is Ethics: The Fair Decision-Maker
Alberto tells me that for him it is very important that all the asylum decisions
leaving his section are fair. That is why he does not want the Iraqi family
to be granted temporary protection. For him, fairness is about reserving
protection for those “truly deserving” of it. This view is also expressed by
Gabriel, who once explained to me that it was the decision-makers’ duty
to meticulously examine the credibility of each case—and, thus, to be suffi-
ciently suspicious—because otherwise “everybody could just receive asylum
and that would be unfair to those who really deserve asylum, who really need
protection”.26
Fairness is something that comes up a lot in my ethnographic material.
As a procedural norm it means treating equal things equally and unequal
things unequally. Hence, it stands for legal equality. However, the way this
procedural norm is interpreted in the SEM “indicates that more is at stake
than concerns about pure procedure” as David Loher has shown for so-called
“return migration bureaucrats” in Switzerland (2020: 122). For SEM offi-
cials, taking fair decisions means using “the same standards for evaluating
each claim”.27 Ideally, they said, it should not matter who decides a partic-
ular case, the outcome should always be the same. The way to achieve this is
for them is to strictly follow the law as well as the rules set out by institutional
practice. Hence, strict rule-following is crucial in this regard.
For SEM officials, strict rule-following or application of the law is under-
stood in this sense: if there are legal arguments for rejecting a case, it must be
rejected. One should not grant asylum or temporary protection in such cases
just because making a positive decision might be quicker than meticulously
arguing a negative decision, because one has become emotionally attached to
the applicant, or because of personal political opinions, for example. At the
same time, if there are clearly no justifications for rejecting a claim, reasons
25In academia, the term déformation professionelle can be traced back to the sociologist Daniel
Warnotte, who used it to describe how “bureaucrats” become “intellectually and emotionally damaged
by their roles” (Maccoby 2007: 62).
26Gabriel, caseworker, headquarters, interview transcript, my own translation.
27Nora, head of asylum unit, headquarters, field notes, my own translation.
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should not be made up out of thin air. That too would be considered unfair.
Fairness and strict rule-following, therefore, subsume and build on many
other professional values: apolitical-ness, emotional detachment, professional
suspicion, objectivity and non-cynicism.
Furthermore, they are connected to the ethics of the office. Or as Julia
Eckert by drawing on David Loher (2020) claims, in this case, because fair-
ness is equated with strict rule-following which, in turn, is understood in
the above-discussed way, “ethos is ethics” (2020: 21). Fittingly, in the SEM,
good decision-makers are those who in the name of fairness properly fulfil
their duty of digging deep in every ‘case’ in order to make sure that there
are “truly no reasons” for rejection. Consequently, decision-makers who take
justice into their own hands by trying to help someone who is “undeserving”
are portrayed as behaving in an unfair and unprofessional manner. Thus, one
caseworker, Lucy, once explained to me that trying to help an “undeserving”
applicant—even someone who had suffered great injustice, for example, by
being “so poor he could not feed his five kids”—would be unfair to others
because:
This can rapidly lead to one marching to a different drum. And in my opinion,
then you are not being fair anymore, even though you want to be. Because
your decisions don’t conform with our asylum practice, you’re not maintaining
a unité de doctrine. […] It is not up to us to decide what is just or not. […].
Really, it’s the politician who should ask himself that question.28
As we see, Lucy fears that by “over-generously” helping one person she
might end up being “unfair” towards other (more “deserving”) asylum seekers.
This view was shared by many of my interaction partners. The world is an
unjust place, several of them offered in explanation, but it was not up to
them to change that. Justice, they felt, was the responsibility of politics and
politicians (see also Liodden 2016: 208).29 Their duty, in turn, is to protect
the system. That is what fairness means.
28Lucy, caseworker, headquarters, interview transcript, my own translation.
29This fits with what Veena Das argues when she writes that “detachment is done by an explicit




This chapter has dealt with what decision-makers think they should do. This
is important because, as Julia Eckert (2020) has argued, what administrative
caseworkers think they should do shapes what they do. What decision-makers
do again leads to the creation of certain (legal) truths. Hence, for instance,
if a decision-maker in-line with the professional norm of suspicion—and in
the name of fairness—digs deep, thereby creating the contradictions needed
to reason a negative decision on the basis of non-credibility, a particular figure
of the “false refugee” is created. And once asylum seekers have been classified
as “false refugees” by assigning them to the legal category of “non-refugee”,
their existence becomes a fact, leading to and reinforcing the perception
that, indeed, there “are” many false refugees which, in turn, strengthens the
office’s and individual decision-makers’ endeavours to identify and exclude
them from asylum (see also Zimmermann 2011: 337). At the same time, if
after digging deep the decision-maker reaches the conclusion that there are no
(or not enough) reasons for disbelieving an applicant, a certain image of the
“genuine refugee”—of a person “deserving of protection”—is (re-)produced.
What decision-makers do is structured not only by procedural norms—
the ethos of the office—but also by the broader ideological environment
the administration is embedded in. The ideological environment is expressed
through the ethics of the office. It is not, however, without contradictions.
Decision-makers in the SEM embody the role of protectors of the system.
It is their duty to “help people” (in the name of Switzerland, so to say).
At the same time, they must make sure Switzerland fulfils its humanitarian
duty. They must protect the abstract, noble value of asylum and they must
protect the asylum system from being abused. Sometimes these duties were
reflexively made explicit by decision-makers when explaining their job to me.
But more often they came out of decision-makers retrospectively justifying
their actions, and out of their assessments of co-workers’ practices. Further-
more, decision-makers’ role as protectors of the system can be discerned from
what they do in practice. Therefore, I argue that this role constitutes part of
officials’ implicit professional identity. In this way, it shapes what decision-
makers do, generating certain “truths” and thereby (re-)producing the norms
and values at the heart of their everyday work.
Much concern in street-level bureaucracy literature is with the dilemma
caseworkers experience between caring for people, wanting to help them and
becoming personally involved in their ‘cases’, on the one hand, and their duty
to follow the rules, on the other (see Lipsky 2010). Other authors working
on bureaucratic administrations are less concerned with this dilemma but
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rather argue that caseworkers’ concern and compassion for the people they
deal with is overridden by other concerns: most notably instrumental-rational
rule-following (Gill 2016: 136; see also Arendt 2013; Bauman 1988, 1989;
Herzfeld 1992). My take on this, which derives from this chapter, is a
different one. I do not wish to claim that SEM officials never struggle with the
dilemma between “compassion and flexibility on the one hand, and impar-
tiality and rigid rule-application on the other hand” (Lipsky 2010: 15–16).
Nor do I argue that decision-makers never act indifferently towards asylum
seekers. However, an observation I made was that mostly, decision-makers
care about the people they deal with. Yet, this compassion for people is
not necessarily perceived as the opposite pole of strict rule-following. For
decision-makers, it is the morally and ethically right thing to reserve protec-
tion for those “truly in need and deserving” of it—and to limit it to them.
In this sense, compassion and strict rule-following are brought together in
the name of fairness. For understanding what administrative caseworkers do
we should, therefore, not only pay attention to the dilemmas they experi-
ence, but also to how they overcome such dilemmas and why they might not
experience certain dilemmas we—from the outside—expect them to.
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I started this book with a quote from Nora, a superior in the SEM. She
was confident that she knew what words like credible, persuasive, plausible
and logical meant to established employees. They shared a common under-
standing; she could imagine what the words meant to them and therefore
did not question their decisions. My focus in this book has been to investi-
gate this shared understanding, to focus on the regularities of administrative
practice rather than the divergences or deviances.
I do not deny that divergences exist. It has been shown by several authors
that the outcomes of asylum decisions sometimes differ depending on which
asylum administration or court, which unit within these administrations and
courts and which individual decision-maker takes the decisions (see Anker
1991; Eule 2014; Fassin and Kobelinsky 2012; Hamlin 2014; Johannesson
2017; Miaz 2017; Ramji-Nogales et al. 2009; Rehaag 2012; Spirig 2018).
Furthermore, decision-makers may at times consciously decide to deviate
from a certain rule or norm. And indeed, the ways in which caseworkers
interpret rules and norms, of course, will vary.
However, my point is that we cannot fully understand bureaucratic
processes without considering how routine practices are generated and repro-
duced within administrations. Studying the regularities is as important as
studying divergences for a comprehensive understanding of how institutions
function, and how the laws and policies they are in charge of “applying”
work. I argue that by overtly focusing on the divergences and inconsisten-
cies in asylum determination, we run the risk of reproducing the common
criticism that asylum and credibility determination are done in an “arbitrary”
and “subjective” way (see Anker 1991; Crawley and Lester 2004; Einhorn
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2009; Goodwin-Gill 1996; Kagan 2003; Macklin 1998; Ramji-Nogales et al.
2009; Thomas 2009). I find this criticism problematic because of the implicit
assumption that, as Tobias Kelly writes, “so long as the right reforms are put
in place, the correct training initiated and the most suitable technical fixes
rolled out, everything will be, if not perfect, then at least considerably fairer
and more just” (2011: 184). The problem of discrepancies is either attributed
to the individual decision-makers and their “subjective views” or to the law
for leaving a loophole for such “subjective views” to be able to play a role
in the first place. However, I argue that a critical understanding of asylum
decision-making practices—and administrative practice in general—must go
beyond this.
“Subjective views” always play a role in the “application” of law and poli-
cies. People’s interpretations of law or, in other words, their discretionary
practices constitute a necessary part of what law itself is. Thus, law does not
sometimes leave a loophole and sometimes not leave a loophole for discre-
tionary practices. When “applying” laws and policies to specific situations or
cases they must always be interpreted by the people “applying” them, as this
book has shown (see Eule et al. 2019: 101; Hawkins 1992: 11; Heyman
2004: 493; Poertner 2018: 10–11; Wagenaar 2004: 651). Through these
interpretative practices, law and policies are continuously “(co-)produced” in
practice (Poertner 2018: 10; see also von Benda-Beckmann 1991; Brodkin
2011: 253–254; Eckert, Behrens, et al. 2012; Eule 2014; Shore and Wright
2011; Wedel et al. 2005: 34). However, while it is individual caseworkers
who must interpret the law and policies, this is not done in an individualistic
way. What is rather at stake here is “socialised subjectivity” (Bourdieu and
Wacquant 1992: 126), as has been brought to light by this book.
The criticism that asylum decisions and particularly credibility assessments
are based on subjective views and are arbitrary seems to be partially ascribed
to what is commonly referred to as “gut feeling”. The importance of “gut
feeling” for asylum, and administrative decision-making in general, has been
stressed by numerous authors (see Dahlvik 2018; Dubois 2010; Fassin 2013;
Fassin and Kobelinsky 2012; Johannesson 2017; Jubany 2011, 2017; Kelly
2012; Lavanchy 2014; Liodden 2016; Macklin 1998; Miaz 2017; Thomas
2009). “Gut feeling” may give the impression of being highly individual,
which seems to be at the core of the criticism of credibility assessment as
being “subjective”—a view that was sometimes also conveyed by SEM offi-
cials themselves. However, in this book I have shown that “gut feeling”, which
forms part of SEM officials’ “professional-practical knowledge”, is shaped by
the office. Decision-makers acquire it through their socialisation on the job,
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through belonging to and becoming a member of the office, and through
carrying out their daily tasks.
That “gut feeling” plays such an important role in asylum decision-making
and credibility determination is not exceptional. As Andreas Reckwitz (2003)
argues, (professional-)practical knowledge forms part of practice itself. This
practical sense of self-understanding underlies all our actions: including
administrative ones (see Dahlvik 2018: 57–62; Reckwitz 2003: 289–294;
Wagenaar 2004: 651). Understanding practice, therefore, demands that “gut
feeling” should be taken seriously rather than criticising its existence. We
must pay attention to “the almost unthinking actions, tacit knowledge,
fleeting interactions, practical judgements, self-evident understanding and
background knowledge, shared meanings, and personal feelings that consti-
tute the core of administrative work” as Hendrik Wagenaar writes (2004:
643).
Practical judgements are at the core of this book, since they lie at the
heart of asylum decision-making. Asylum decision-making—just like any
administrative-legal procedure—requires clear-cut classifications into “cate-
gories of inclusion and exclusion” (Handelman 1995: 280; see also Kelly
2015: 188). This is what SEM caseworkers are tasked to do; a responsibility
which requires them to sufficiently overcome the uncertainties inherent in
asylum decision-making to be able to reach “final” decisions, clearly classi-
fying asylum seekers into one of four legal categories: refugee with asylum,
refugee with temporary admission, non-refugee with temporary admission
and non-refugee without temporary admission.
Shared meanings, self-evident understandings, professional-practical
knowledge and routine behaviours play an important role. I have shown how
for Teresa (in Chapter 5), for instance, it is self-evident that the applicant not
asking his father about the letters the latter had asked him to deliver consti-
tutes a clear marker for non-credibility and that for Gabriel (in Chapter 6) it
is self-evident that he always seats himself and the asylum seeker at the oppo-
site ends of the rectangle table which are furthest apart from each other. These
are things decision-makers “simply” do or know, just like the many times
decision-makers told me that they “simply knew” from experience whether
an asylum seeker’s narrative was authentic or not. However, when questioned,
they mostly found it very hard to articulate how they knew this. Neverthe-
less, this type of know-how is an integral and critical part of the essence of
practice. In a similar way, decision-makers come to know with experience
what questions to ask in asylum interviews and rather routinely go about
digging deep. Such “shared repertoires of knowledge” (Affolter et al. 2019:
265; see Wenger 2003) exist for the office as a whole, but also for different
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organisational units. And they depend on other “communities of interpre-
tation” (Affolter et al. 2019) that the officials align themselves with or are
affiliated with by others, for instance, in connection with their educational
background, institutional age or the hierarchical position they occupy. These
forms of belonging, combined with their “shared repertoire of knowledge”,
often emerge from office banter; through how decision-makers distinguish
themselves—and their units, for example—from others. However, officials’
badmouthing of others as being too lenient, too strict, cynical, naïve or
behaving in a political way not only sheds light on the fissures and frac-
tures that run through the administration, it also points to commonly shared
meanings; the unquestioned middle ground, so to say.
“Allowing everybody to stay” is considered bad decision-making and so is
“wanting to keep everybody out”. Naively and readily believing the asylum
seeker is considered another quality of unprofessional decision-making, but so
is its counterpart of being overly suspicious and not believing every applicant.
Good decision-makers are perceived as those who reserve refugee protection
for those “truly deserving”, are sufficiently suspicious and dig deep in asylum
interviews. These are the shared—and for the most part unquestioned—
values and practices of professional decision-making. As such, they are crucial
for understanding how asylum decision-making works.
By dealing with everyday practices of asylum determination, this book
has highlighted the “everyday production of stateness” (Eckert, Biner, et al.
2012; see also Beek 2016; Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2014; Fassin
2015). I thereby followed Didier Fassin who argues that such practices of
state-making should not be treated as happening in a vacuum since state
“agents are confronted with explicit and implicit expectations formulated in
discourses, laws and rules while keeping sizable space to manoeuvre in the
concrete management of situations and individuals” (2015: 4). By analysing
everyday practices and by showing how decision-makers acquire an institu-
tional habitus on the job which shapes how they think, feel, know and act, I
addressed how decision-makers go about concretely managing situations and
individuals and how they deal with the space to manoeuvre, as described by
Fassin. At the same time, the book also shed light on the ideological, norma-
tive and regulatory environments in which SEM officials work; how these
are constitutive of the institutional habitus, but are also constituted by the
institutional habitus through the everyday practices the latter generates.
Didier Fassin and Carolina Kobelinsky put forward the thesis that “the
institution is the product of both policies and practices, but also that it
contributes in turn to fashioning the former and determining the latter”
(2012: 448). In bringing together the discussions of the different chapters of
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this book, I conclude by showing how this happens: how normative, struc-
tural and regulatory constraints as well as the institutional habitus constitute
each other and how practices generate the institution and are also determined
by the latter.
A majority of asylum applications in the different countries of the Global
North are rejected, mostly on the grounds of non-credibility (see Fassin 2013:
47; Kelly 2012: 759; Probst 2012). This was the puzzle I initially set out to
study: How could this pattern be explained? There seem to be two common
opposing answers to this from the view of the different actors involved in
or dealing with refugee status determination. On the one hand, the reasons
for the majority of asylum seekers being refused refugee status is seen to
arise from the “fact” that the majority of applicants “are” so-called “economic
migrants” and are thought to lie in the asylum interviews in order to try
and receive a residence permit. By doing so they are perceived as abusing the
system. As I showed in Chapter 4, this view is, for instance, clearly stated
in the SEM’s online manual on asylum and return. On the other hand, it
is often argued by NGOs, legal advisors and activists that the recognition
rate for the granting of asylum remains consistently low because the SEM (or
possibly even the Federal Council) set quotas as to how many people may
receive asylum. Both views are challenged in this book. Hence, the in-depth
study of everyday practices in the SEM allows us to look beyond (and chal-
lenge) both the tautological explanation proposed by the SEM, on the one
hand, and the political instrumentalism (implicitly) proposed by activists, on
the other. What I hereby propose is, thus, a different critique—or critical
understanding—of asylum decision-making and policies.
My point is not to say that asylum seekers do not lie, or feel forced to lie.
Nor do I want to suggest that I am more accurately able to assess “the truth”
of asylum seekers’ narratives. What I have rather shown in this book is that
so-called “lies”, “liars” and elements of non-credibility are produced through
the questioning techniques used in asylum interviews themselves (see also
Crawley 1999: 52; Sbriccoli and Jacoviello 2011: 184–185; Scheffer 2001,
2003). At the same time, I heard no evidence of recognition quotas during
my fieldwork. This is not to say that there is no political influence on asylum
decision-making. However, I argue that it mostly does not play out in this
top-down instrumental way. Many different factors concur to produce restric-
tive asylum policies and outcomes of asylum decisions, and they mutually
influence and reproduce each other.
One structural condition is posed by the “individual protection regime”
(Poertner 2018: 5) of countries in the Global North itself (see also Fassin
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2016a: 66–67; Fassin and Kobelinsky 2012: 448). Asylum or refugee protec-
tion is not a right people who have fled from other places per se have or
are entitled to. Rather, their entitlement to the right of asylum is assessed
on an individual basis through extensive administrative procedures. These
procedures resemble other administrative procedures in which people make
(individual) rights claims on the state or apply for “goods” or “benefits”.
A common trait in these administrations is that caseworkers assume and
are ascribed the role of “gate-keepers” (see Lipsky 2010: 4). They become
“guardians of a restricted good” (Heyman 2009: 381) which in the case of
decision-making in the SEM is the right to reside in Switzerland. This is what
protecting the system is about. Yet, protecting the system also goes beyond
this.
Asylum decision-makers in the SEM are state agents, which rather self-
evidently is taken to mean that they must act in the interest of the state.
Two commonly shared interpretations of what this means emerged from my
data. One the one hand, it means upholding Switzerland’s “humanitarian
tradition” and the value of the asylum system, which, as Didier Fassin and
Carolina Kobelinsky argue, paradoxically leads to restrictive decision-making.
They write that “[t]he less frequently [asylum] is granted, the more precious
refugee status becomes” (2012: 464). On the other hand, acting in the interest
of the state for decision-makers means that they must “fight abuse” and
thereby again reserve asylum for those “truly deserving” of it. The under-
lying assumption behind this is that not everybody should be allowed to stay;
that the state has an interest in ensuring that “too many foreigners” are not
allowed to reside in Switzerland. This is linked to the “politics of deterrence”
(Poertner 2017) which has a direct impact on practices of decision-making,
but is also the outcome of decision-making practices. As Ephraim Poertner
shows, the politics of deterrence translates into and manifests itself in the
different priority categories in the SEM (2017: 19). Certain asylum claims
are decided on very quickly, while others are deliberately held back in order
to avoid creating a so-called “pull-effect”, thus intending to make Switzerland
an unappealing country in which to apply for asylum.
The politics of deterrence are linked to broader political discourses. Asylum
seekers, as well as migrants in general, are today in political discourse often
portrayed as a “problem” and as a “threat” to national security and a country’s
economy, culture and identity (see Boswell 2007: 589; Dahlvik 2018: 9; Gill
and Good 2019: 5–6; Huysmans 2000; Jubany 2017; Miaz 2017: 11–14).
These discourses have figured as the drive behind and as a legitimation for the
numerous restrictive changes made to Swiss asylum legislation since the intro-
duction of the Asylum Act in Switzerland in 1981. Several of these changes
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were initiated by, as well as the consequences of, political referenda. The
media, political discourses and parliamentary inquiries into decision-making
practices in the SEM have an impact on those practices. Political pressure is
felt by the SEM officials, especially by those occupying higher hierarchical
positions who are, thus, more directly accountable to the Federal Councillor
in charge of the SEM. As a consequence of this, quite drastic changes to
practice doctrine are occasionally made, but more often, political pressure
seems to more subtly shape decision-making practices, leading to gradual
shifts in collective patterns of decision-making. Yet, this does not happen
in a unilateral way. Hence, political discourse is also influenced by decision-
making practices and the outcomes these produce. And, of course, political
discourses do not stand alone, but are embedded in broader social contexts.
This can be seen in the historical accounts of asylum and migration politics
which argue that the shift towards ever more restrictive asylum politics in
the 1980s was linked to the economic crisis and to the fact that the people
requesting refugee protection at that time had not all fled from communist
countries and, thus, did not so clearly fit into the East/West divide anymore
(see Däpp 1984; Fassin 2016b; Fassin and Kobelinsky 2012; Jubany 2017:
44–46; Kobelinsky 2015; Piguet 2006).
Asylum law as it exists today sets its own structural constraints and limits.
Decision-makers are required to take clear-cut either/or decisions which have
drastic effects on asylum seekers’ lives; a fact that decision-makers are well
aware of. These decisions must be reasoned in writing, although it is only the
reasoning for negative decisions that is then sent out to asylum seekers (and
their legal advisors). As I showed in Chapter 4, such decisions must be taken
and reasoned in a context of several “known unknowns” (Kelly 2012). Mate-
rial evidence corroborating asylum seekers’ stories often does not exist. Hence,
decision-makers mostly rely on other “facts” which are created through the
asylum procedure—or, rather, which the decision-makers themselves create
in the course of the proceedings. I have argued that creating such “facts” for
reasoning negative asylum decision is easier with regard to “non-credibility”
than it is for “non-eligibility to refugee status”. This is reflected in the fact that
reasoning negative asylum decisions on the basis of non-credibility whenever
possible (and appropriate) is a widespread policy in the SEM.
The way “facts” are, and necessarily must be created due to structural
constraints, shapes how asylum interviews are carried out. Research on
asylum procedures in different countries has shown that asylum interviews are
mainly about “searching for untruths” (Kelly 2012: 765) and checking asylum
narratives for inconsistencies and discrepancies (see Bohmer and Shuman
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2008: 136; Johannesson 2017: 12; Jubany 2017: 135–137). The absence
of such discrepancies and inconsistencies (and of other markers of non-
credibility known to decision-makers) speaks for the “truth” of an account,
while their presence indicates the opposite. This fits with Article 7 of the
Swiss Asylum Act which also defines “credibility” in a negative sense. Thus,
it is the criteria which characterise “non-credibility” that are listed in Article
7 AsylA rather than criteria which would characterise a credible account.
My research has shown that it is easier to produce “facts” for reasoning
negative asylum decisions on the basis of non-credibility rather than on non-
eligibility to refugee status; this is also an institutional policy since such deci-
sions are mostly more difficult to refute on appeal. Additionally—and equally
importantly—my research has shown that reasoning negative decisions with
non-credibility is also an important coping strategy for decision-makers. By
rejecting asylum claims on the basis of non-credibility, the responsibility for
the outcome of the decision is shifted to the asylum seeker: it is the latter’s
fault for not telling the truth.
Generating facts for positive decisions is also not necessarily difficult,
particularly since such decisions must only be reasoned internally. However,
as I have shown, granting asylum is, nevertheless, not something decision-
makers do “easily”, for other reasons. The book has brought to light how
digging deep becomes the neutral, ethical and apolitical thing for decision-
makers to do. Digging deep represents what it means to act in the name—and
in the interest—of the state. As a practice, digging deep is important because
of the way “facts” have to be created for reasoning clear-cut either/or deci-
sions, but it is also linked to the professional norm of suspicion. The profes-
sional norm of suspicion plays out and is reaffirmed through shared stories
amongst co-workers, peer pressure, organisational socialisation including the
way novices are coached by their co-workers and controlled by their supe-
riors as well as decision-makers’ need to fit into the office and its different
“communities of interpretation”. Furthermore, it is continuously reproduced
by the outcomes digging deep produces. Digging deep actively generates
the “liars” and “false refugees” it sets out to “uncover”, thereby reinforcing
the perception that, indeed, there “are” many false refugees which, again,
strengthens the office’s and individual decision-makers’ endeavours to iden-
tify and exclude them from asylum, reaffirming decision-makers’ role as
protectors of the system. Disbelief becomes normal.
While the empirical focus of this book has been on asylum decision-
making, its discussions contribute to a broader understanding of state admin-
istrations. Understanding state administrations requires studying the everyday
practices of state agents. But, as Didier Fassin argues, such practices do not
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take place in a vacuum (Fassin 2015: 4). We must pay attention to the ideo-
logical environments in which caseworkers carry out their work; to the norms
and values underlying their practices. These are not just explicit norms and
values, but also feelings and desires which are incorporated into caseworkers’
institutional habitus. They are expressed through practice, which is at the
same time constituted by and constitutive of the institutional habitus.
Rules matter, setting the possibilities and limits of decision-making. But
rules and laws only acquire meaning through people’s grasp of them (see
Wagenaar 2004: 65). This grasp is structured by the dispositions decision-
makers acquire on the job and, thus, by their institutional habitus. The
regulatory frameworks and ideological environments I describe in this book,
to a greater or lesser extent, also apply to other migration administrations
(see Borrelli et al., forthcoming; Eckert 2020). Beyond the field of migration,
it is particularly the structural constraints arising from administrative-legal
decision-making and the important role of professional-practical knowledge,
which I identified in this book, that appear relevant for other bureaucratic
administrations.
It has been argued that what the state is, how it works and how it is
produced, can only be understood by examining state agents’ everyday prac-
tices. I argue that this means studying what caseworkers do, what they say
they do, why they say they do what they do, and what they think they
should do. Furthermore, I have highlighted the crucial role of professional-
practical knowledge in everyday decision-making. Knowledge is practice.
Understanding administrations and understanding the “everyday production
of stateness” (Eckert, Biner, et al. 2012: 5), therefore, means paying attention
to what state agents know; paying attention to what constitutes this knowl-
edge, how it is acquired, how it is (re-)produced in and through everyday
practice and paying attention to how what administrative caseworkers know,
produces the patterns of administrative-legal decisions we can observe from
the outside. It is these regularities that matter.
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